"The base is a key part of Pentagon's plans "to maximize the impact of a
relatively small U.S. presence in Africa," according to the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressional panel that conducts assessments
of U.S. defense strategy and priorities. All African countries except
Eritrea receive some form of U.S. military assistance, according to data
from the U.S. State Department"
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/africom-u-s-war-onterrorisminafricaalshabaabbokoharam.html
The consequences of the U.S. war on terrorism in Africa
The American military's expansion to the continent poses significant
challenges to democratization and domestic security
June 2, 2014 12:45AM ET
by Ken Opalo _at_kopalo
On May 5, President Barack Obama hosted his Djiboutian counterpart, Ismail
Omar Guelleh, at the White House. The two leaders signed a 20-year lease
agreement for the Djibouti-based Camp Lemonnier, the biggest U.S. military
base in Africa. Covering 500 acres, the installation is a crucial launching
site for U.S. military operations against militant groups in the Horn of
Africa and Yemen. The U.S. agreed to pay an annual fee of $70 million for
the site, which now hosts more than 4,000 U.S. military personnel and
civilians.
The base is a key part of Pentagon's plans "to maximize the impact of a
relatively small U.S. presence in Africa," according to the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressional panel that conducts assessments
of U.S. defense strategy and priorities. All African countries except
Eritrea receive some form of U.S. military assistance, according to data
from the U.S. State Department. Most of this assistance is channeled
through the department's International Military Education and Training
program, which facilitates professional relationships with African
militaries. The Obama administration is looking to invest in "new,
effective and efficient small footprint locations and developing innovative
approaches to using host nation facilities or allied joint-basing" as part
of its focus on security in Africa. A handful of African nations --
including Ethiopia, South Sudan, Niger, Uganda, Kenya, Mauritania, Mali,
the Seychelles and Burkina Faso -- already host U.S. drone sites, shared
bases and military surveillance facilities. Also, the U.S. maintains a
secretive program training counterterrorism commandos in states that
straddle the vast Sahara, whose ungoverned spaces provide a rear base for
terrorist groups.
The Pentagon's military footprint in Africa is indeed small compared with
other parts of the world. For example, in 2012, U.S. military aid and arms
sales to Africa accounted for a mere 4.25 percent of the global total. (The
Near East received 67.7 percent.) These military outlays were just 5.5
percent of the $7.8 billion the U.S. allocated for foreign assistance in
the African region, with health care ($5.6 billion) getting the lion's
share. Regardless of the size of the U.S. military footprint in Africa, its
expansion of has serious implications for the continent's security, the
consolidation of democracy and the professionalization of its militaries as
well as for respect for human rights across the region. Unfortunately,
these concerns do not rank high on the Pentagon's agenda.
U.S. Africa command
The U.S. geographic command responsible for Africa is overseen by U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM), based in Stuttgart, Germany. In 2009, two years
after it was created, AFRICOM had an operating budget of about $400 million
and more than 1,000 staffers. Unlike other similar U.S. operations, it is
fully integrated with other U.S. agencies in Africa -- including USAID and
the State, Commerce and Treasury departments. This arrangement informs
AFRICOM's focus on a 3-D approach -- defense, diplomacy and development -- in
the region.
At the core of the U.S. military engagement in Africa is the war against
Al-Qaeda affiliates: Somalia's Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
(AQIM), as well as armed groups such as Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) and Nigeria's Boko Haram. To help conduct AFRICOM's counterterrorism
operations in the region, the U.S. has recruited a motley crew of African
allies, including those that face direct threats from these groups. Kenya,
Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Ethiopia are key partners in the war against
Al-Shabaab, and Niger and Burkina Faso have emerged as critical hosts of
U.S. operations against AQIM. But Washington's strategic calculations and
the interests of African leaders who sign on to these arrangements do not
always converge with the interests of the majority of African people.
In order to preserve ongoing cooperation arrangements, the U.S. has
consistently looked the other way in the face of gross human rights
violations and anti-democratic tendencies of its partner states. Djibouti's
Guelleh, now in power for 15 years, scrapped term limits to pave the way
for a third term in 2010, leading to the opposition's boycott of
parliament. In Djibouti, not unlike in other allied countries, the 2013
U.S. State Department annual country reports revealed cases of torture,
arbitrary arrest and restriction of freedom of association. Ethiopia and
Uganda, the two leading U.S. allies in sub-Saharan Africa, are serial human
rights offenders. Ethiopia is the second leading jailer of journalists in
Africa (after only Eritrea). In a renewed crackdown on freedom of
expression, authorities in Ethiopia jailed nine additional journalists and
bloggers last month only days before Secretary of State John Kerry's trip
to Addis Ababa. The country has been in the news for the recent killings of
unarmed student protesters in the Oromia region. Uganda gained
international infamy earlier this year by pioneering a draconian anti-gay
law. In both countries, opposition parties operate under severe
restriction, with Ethiopia having only one opposition member in its
547-person legislature.
The challenge for AFRICOM and its African partners is to devise strategies
that will ensure that security objectives are not pursued at the expense of
democracy, military professionalization and respect for human rights.
The United States has been implicated in maintaining a secretive detention
program in concert with the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and
Somalia. A 2008 Human Rights Watch report, "Horn of Africa Renditions,"
detailed a little-known unlawful detention policy, akin to the Central
Intelligence Agency's extraordinary rendition program. According to
journalist Jason Leopold, Mohammed al-Asad, a Yemeni citizen arrested in
Tanzania in 2003, claims that U.S. forces tortured him at a black site in
Djibouti. In Kenya the government has recently been accused of summarily
executing radical Muslim clerics suspected of having links to Al-Shabaab.
(The government denies the charge.) The war on terrorism has provided
opportunities for some African leaders to enact sweeping anti-terrorism
laws with the aim of silencing dissent. In Ethiopia alone, more than 35
journalists and opposition leaders have been convicted under that country's
anti-terrorism proclamation.
Militarized solutions
In addition to turning a blind eye to human rights abuses, the U.S.'s
inherent bias toward military approaches to security threats in Africa
limits the options available to African governments facing domestic
security challenges. In many cases, negotiations with entities designated
as terrorist groups contravene U.S. anti-terrorism laws that forbid any
kind of exchange that might be beneficial to terrorist groups. After
initial attempts to negotiate with the LRA, Uganda has recently embarked on
a purely militaristic solution backed by U.S. military hardware and
advisers. Further afield, the United States' designation of Boko Haram as a
foreign terrorist group and the promise of military assistance after the
kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls may unreasonably limit Nigeria's
options for political and other kinds of negotiated settlements. Because of
their exposure to terrorist attacks (as witnessed in Djibouti on May 25)
and their economic consequences, African states allied with the U.S. must
strive to maintain enough wriggle room to pursue localized solutions to
their security challenges.
U.S. military operations and engagements with African militaries also risk
compromising the professionalization of African militaries. Uganda offers
an instructive case. Kampala has been a key U.S. military ally since the
Iraq War and is the leading partner in the African Union mission in
Somalia. Washington maintains an important facility at the Entebbe airport
and is assisting in the hunt for the LRA leader Joseph Kony. But over the
same period, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, in office since 1986, has
personalized the military. Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda argues that
Museveni has used a "strategy of fragmentation" to create factions within
the military in an attempt to limit coherence in the institution. The
president's son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is the commander of the special
forces, a group whose duties include protecting the president and the
country's oil resources. More generally, unless carefully mitigated,
Washington's unchecked war on terrorism in the region will result in
overgrown military units outside normal chains of command, creating
problems for effective civilian control in the long run.
The challenge for both AFRICOM and its African partners is to devise
strategies that will ensure that security objectives are not pursued at the
expense of democracy, military professionalization and respect for human
rights. Furthermore, in the spirit of its 3-D approach, AFRICOM must be
open to domestic solutions to Africa's security needs. Such domestic
solutions have the advantage of localizing the specific conflicts that
create insecurity in the first place. Ultimately, African leaders must be
careful not to let their countries be turned into mere venues for an
international conflict between the U.S. and transnational terrorist groups.
Ken Opalo is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Stanford University.
His dissertation research is on institutional change, focusing on
legislative development in Africa.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera America's editorial policy.
Received on Wed Jun 04 2014 - 09:29:07 EDT