Negotiating a Settlement in South Sudan: Peace and Power
by Andreas Hirblinger
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/> June 13, 2014
Inclusivity Will Fix It
The peace negotiations for South Sudan could resolve the crisis only through
a “genuine and inclusive political dialogue”,
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftn1> [1] according to
Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister, Tedros Adhanom, recently speaking on behalf of
the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). This echoes current
international thinking within the talks currently underway in Addis Ababa.
Inclusivity however is only one factor necessary for achieving a successful
settlement. The type of peace which the talks will deliver also depends on
the relations of power at the negotiation table.
A Stalemate? Political, Humanitarian and Military Dimensions
Serious negotiations require a stalemate that hurts in one kind or another:
a situation in which all factions have little to win, but a lot to lose.
However, the military situation has remained fluid in the past months. While
Kiir could rely on continued military support from Yoweri Musevini of
Uganda, Machar could gamble on the strategic benefits of the rainy season
and the promises of waging a low-intensity war against an army, which while
better equipped, would be unable to move heavy vehicles and machinery.
Concerns have been mounting about the increasing regionalisation of the
conflict, which has already increased tensions among neighbouring states.
IGAD plays a central role in the current negotiations. However, rivalries
between IGAD member states, in particular Uganda and Sudan, and Ethiopia and
Eritrea,
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftn2> [2] threaten to undermine
its mediating position. Moreover, a unilateral military intervention of any
of the member states would lead not only to an increasingly complex
situation on the battlefield, but an aggravation of the military and
political conflict. If additional regional players intervene militarily,
both Kiir and Machar will loose much of their ability to steer the course of
conflict to their liking.
Intensified efforts to negotiate a settlement make it clear that important
international players have lost patience with the two warring factions. The
two adversaries thus increasingly have reasons to worry about their standing
in the international arena. The recommitment to the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement in May was a result of the rapidly mounting international
pressure, including visits by US Secretary of State John Kerry, and UN
General Secretary Ban Ki Moon to Juba, and the threat of sanctions against
the key protagonists of the crisis. Reports about mass atrocities, and calls
for investigations into crimes against humanity have arguably played an
important role to present the parties with a more sober outlook on the
chances of achieving political victory primarily through military means.
International pressure was also an effort to reduce the humanitarian impact
of the crisis. Initiatives in late April came at a critical moment, as US
and UN bodies pointed to the impact of the conflict on the planting season
and increased food insecurity.
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftn3> [3] Only through an
immediate cessation of hostilities, could humanitarian access be improved,
and the risk of famine be reduced.
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftn4> [4]
These efforts also provide a starting point to resolving the crisis
politically, through the resumption of peace talks. However, while the
current international pressure has sufficed to bring the parties to the
negotiation table, a successful settlement depends on getting the relations
of power between them right.
The CPA Revisited: Challenges of Inclusivity
The current conflict discloses the failure of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) to provide the grounds for a peaceful political order in
South Sudan. The CPA was primarily meant to address the conflict between the
North and the South. However, the transitional governance arrangements in
South Sudan, which crumbled as the crisis unfolded in late 2013, were also
derived from the provisions of the CPA. The decay of the country’s political
order therefore begs important questions as to the nature of negotiations.
In hindsight, the CPA negotiations paid too little attention to frictions
between the various South Sudanese factions. As a consequence, the
exclusivity of the CPA negotiations led to a transitional order not robust
enough to accommodate and regulate the competing demands of the South
Sudanese leadership, nor able to address the distrust between the different
factions of the SPLM/A. Nearly 10 years after the signing of the agreement,
this has had its cost.
Many observers have voiced concerns over a transitional arrangement that
would essentially set the country back to the pre-crisis situation, with
Kiir and Machar heading up a Government of National Unity. This would not
only beg important questions as to how any new arrangements would guarantee
peace any better than previous ones, but would also send the problematic
message that reacting to a political crisis through violence, causing death
and destruction to thousands, is an acceptable strategy for maintaining
power. Rather than solving the underlying causes of conflict, it would reify
the political divisions in the country and approve the violent means used by
leadership to address them.
Alternative proposals however, indicate ways to reduce the focus on the
personal struggle between Kiir and Machar and thereby discourage
rent-seeking behaviour. One such proposal is a technical transitional
government without either Kiir or Machar. By way of accommodation, the two
could be given a monitoring role in the implementation of the peace
agreement.
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftn5> [5] This idea has gained
substantial support from South Sudanese civil society groups and foreign
governments, but has not gained support from Salva Kiir’s government.
Local Deals or a Comprehensive Process?
Negotiations untarnished by personal power struggles are difficult to
realise, given the military capabilities of those involved on the
battlefield. While not a party to the armed conflict, the position of the
high-ranking members of the SPLA known as the ‘former detainees’ is of
central importance.
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/13/negotiating-a-settlement-in-south-su
dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftn6> [6] While there is no
doubt that they also have an interest in restoring their own political
power, their role in the negotiations could change the dynamics of
negotiation. Joining the negotiations as an independent political party, the
group would push the talks towards a multi-party process. If, however, they
were co-opted by either of the two sides, the risk that a settlement would
primarily feed a power sharing deal between Kiir’s and Machar’s factions
would increase. While the latter provides the opportunity for simple trade
offs, a multi-party process does this to a lesser extent and requires the
parties to accommodate their demands through institutional arrangements.
There are indications that Kiir’s government prefers clear fault-lines over
complexity. Recent developments in Jonglei State are indicative that
co-opting rivals through local deals may be a strategy of Salva Kiir’s
government. Parallel to the first Kiir–Machar meeting in Addis, the
government negotiated and signed, on 9 May 2014, a peace agreement with
David Yau Yau’s South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) – Cobra
Faction. The deal calls for the establishment of the Greater Pibor Area and
concedes greater autonomy to the region. These developments will lead to a
reform of the governance arrangements in Jonglei state and are thus
encouraging for a political settlement to the crisis in the state. The
signing of the deal however also has the effect of effacing the underlying
causes of the insurgency in Jonglei State from the current negotiations in
Addis. Revisiting the dynamics in the new area of ‘Greater Pibor’, and
including stakeholders such as the SSDM/A – Cobra Faction would have made
for a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of South Sudan’s underlying
governance challenges.
Indeed, local deals may even reduce the chances for a comprehensive peace.
This is because by conceding authority in specific regions, Kiir may be able
to maintain his hold on power by alleviating symptoms of the crisis and
manipulating local power dynamics, while making only limited changes to the
system of government. Recent reports suggest that as a result of the
agreement signed with the SSDM/A, the SPLA might now be able to use the
territory around Pibor as an additional corridor to fight the SPLA-In
Opposition (SPLM-IO). Blurring the lines between a negotiated and a victor’s
peace, Kiir’s government seems to have limited willingness to win peace
through political reforms so long as this can be done through tilting the
balance of power through paying off and appeasing individual factions.
Balancing Power
The current schedule of negotiations suggests that security arrangements and
political arrangements would be discussed separately, with the former
involving only Kiir’s and Machar’s team, and the latter open to third
parties as well. Of course, political and military power can hardly be kept
separate, and groups such as the “former detainees” will have limited
capacity to play an independent role given they are not party to the armed
conflict.
For the mediators and other international actors, their delicate task is to
make sure that not only those who have the greatest capacity to wreak havoc
will have a say at the negotiation table. It is pivotal for a successful
settlement that third parties are willing and able to take an independent
position, and in this vein encourage a discussion about transitional
arrangements as independent as possible from the increasingly polarized
struggle between Kiir and Machar.
_____
<
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http://cewarn.org/attachments/article/257/Press%20Release-%20(7-6-2014)%20-%
20Inclusive%20Peace%20Process%20for%20South%20Sudan%20Begins%20(1).pdf
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dan-peace-and-power-by-andreas-hirblinger/#_ftnref6> [6]
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51021>
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51021
Andreas Hirblinger is a PhD candidate at Cambridge University.
Received on Fri Jun 13 2014 - 15:38:32 EDT