http://fpif.org/obama-administrations-somali-pivot/
The Obama Administration's Somali Pivot
Concerned about terrorism as well as influence from Washington's economic
rivals, the Obama administration is renewing its efforts to support the
Somali central government.
By Abdinur Mohamud, June 16, 2014.
U.S. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman recently announced that the U.S.
will appoint an ambassador to Somalia for the first time in over 20 years.
(Photo: USIP)
Somalia has been a trouble spot on the African continent for much of the
past two decades, unable to meet the humanitarian and security needs of its
own citizens, engendering regional insecurity, exporting massive numbers of
refugees, and hindering the flow of international commerce on the Red Sea
and the Indian Ocean. An endless political conflict rages at all levels of
the federal government and its regions that continues to dampen public
aspirations for political stability and regional peace. Even after the
Obama administration recognized Somalia as an "equal partner" in January
2013, the nation remains fragile and unstable.
In fact, political, humanitarian, and security conditions have not improved
much since the adoption of a provisional constitution, the establishment of
a federal parliament, and the inauguration of President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud in 2012.
After two years at the helm, the Somali government seems incapable of
shaking off its failed-state status. The weak and ineffective central
government has little practical control over much of its territory, and it
provides little in the way of needed humanitarian services. There is
widespread corruption and inter-clan warfare. A massive flow of refugees
has moved in and out of the country, which continues to suffer intolerable
rates of unemployment and economic hardship. International aid agencies
deliberately sidestep Somalia's nascent public institutions. The federal
government, whose taxing authority is limited and generates little revenue,
consequently looks weaker. It remains deprived of the international
financial and technical assistance necessary to strengthen its coffers and
enhance its stature locally and internationally.
Obama's New Policy
On June 3, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman
announced a new U.S. policy toward Somalia, shifting from what could be
described as a tacit disengagement policy to full engagement. Outlining an
intensified push to improve security, governance, and development in
Somalia, the undersecretary unveiled the Obama administration's plan to
nominate an ambassador to Somalia for the first time in more than 20 years,
signaling a clear departure from the Bush administration's signature
dual-track policy.
The U.S. objective, the undersecretary highlighted, is to enhance Somalia's
security and contribute to the country's political and economic
development. In essence, the new policy perfectly aligns with the four
pillars that undergird U.S. strategy on the African continent, namely
strengthening democratic institutions, supporting economic growth and
development, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and
development.
The policy shift comes at a time when many African governments are
seriously engaged in conflicts with terror groups such as Boko Haram in
Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and numerous al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in
Northwest Africa. Boko Haram's recent abductionof over 200 schoolgirls is a
clear example of a growing problem.
In general, the institutional weaknesses of African governments play a
major role in exacerbating the structural conditions that allow these
nefarious groups to thrive in the first place. By strengthening
governmental structures and the rule of law--and by responding to existing
social problems through education and economic development rather than
relying on sheer military might--the United States can augment the capacity
of African governments.
Stabilizing Somalia has been the primary focus of regional and
international community organizations for a long time. To that end, the
international community pledged over $2 billion last year for security and
reconstruction projects, while the United States alone contributed more
than $500 million in training, equipment, and logistical support for the
Somali army. Most if not all of these contributions fall into the hands of
international security and developmental agencies working in Somalia, with
scarcely anything reaching the coffers of the Somali government.
Despite all the foreign investment, al-Shabaab's reign of terror continues
unabated. Its forces roam freely throughout the country, causing havoc at
will in and outside of Somalia's borders. The recent shootings of Kenyan
World Cup viewers, along with the 2013 attacksthat killed scores of
innocent shoppers in Nairobi's upscale Westgate Mall and the bombing of a
Kampala restaurant earlier in 2010, signal that al-Shabaab is a threat not
only to Somalia but to the entire region. It also signaled its reach,
flexibility, and the sophistication of its methods.
Despite the presence of over 22,000 African Union troops known as AMISOM
(African Union Mission in Somalia), the Somali government and its allies
seem incapable of securing even the most prominent national institutions
such as the parliament, the courts, and the presidential compound, let
alone expelling al-Shabaab from Somalia altogether in the foreseeable
future.
Increased Polarization
Since withdrawing U.S. troops in 1993, the United States has engaged
Somalia in a haphazard manner. With the end of the Cold War, the United
States lost strategic interest in the Horn of Africa--that is, until the
area became a safe haven for terrorists and a source of trouble for the
entire region. A proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea intensified
internal conflicts and supplied weaponry and ammunition to warring
factions. The United States itself got a piece of the action when it
imprudently bankrolled some Somali warlords to rid the country of Islamic
organizations vying for political power.
The George W. Bush administration later proposed a so-called dual-track
policy recognizing the fragility of the structures of the Somali state and
the divisiveness of clan-based politics. The policy acknowledged the need
for the United States to collaborate with the central authority on security
matters while providing humanitarian assistance to stable regional
administrations.
But dual-track led to unprecedented political and social polarization. The
number of clan-based regional authorities mushroomed during this period,
often with contested or overlapping territories, while the federal
government failed to recognize the crucial importance of instituting
national reconciliation processes. Such a process could have brought the
Somali people closer together before embarking on complex national
conversations around the completion of the provisional constitution and the
implementation of federalism.
Somalia is politically more polarized today than it has been at any time in
the past two decades. This is mainly because of the proliferation of myopic
political narratives that pit one clan against another and deprive the
general public of its citizenship rights. By inadvertently playing off
these deeply entrenched clan sentiments, the dual-track policy only made
matters worse.
With piracy on the seas affecting the flow of commerce and contributing to
deteriorating regional security in the Horn of Africa, some political
analysts erroneously suggested that the United States should fight
terrorism and promote stability in Somalia through "constructive
disengagement." The proponents of this strategy urged the United States to
take a hands-off approach, though occasionally providing humanitarian and
development assistance where necessary. This strategy, if followed, would
have set the country up for failure by depriving it of the support it
needs, effectively leaving it to its own devices.
Other analysts have similarly discounted the importance of central
authority by promoting their preference for a balkanized Somalia through
what they've called a "mediated state model" of governance. In this model,
the central government ostensibly outsources its basic functions to the
private sector, nonprofit organizations, and local polities, leaving only a
negligible federal frame incapable of defending the country from its
enemies, foreign or domestic. Fortunately, the new U.S. policy towards
Somalia considers neither option.
Why the U.S. Policy Shift?
With the growing insecurity in Africa from Boko Haram's skirmishes in
Nigeria, al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb in West Africa, the new shift of U.S. policy toward Somalia
recognizes the need to strengthen nascent governmental institutions and
help fragile states like Somalia to stand on their own feet instead of
depending on outside sources for survival. The United States clearly came
to the realization that a stable and unified Somalia is more tenable and
sustainable than a balkanized mini-state mired in internal conflict. The
focus this time is developing a strong, legitimate, and sustainable central
authority that caters to the needs of all of its citizens.
Moreover, the role of U.S. economic interests in Africa cannot be
underestimated. The continent's growing economies offer a burgeoning
consumer market for trade and investment. China, India, Brazil, Russia, and
Turkey are among other global economic giants angling for a piece of the
African economic pie. Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the continent
within two weeks of assuming power signaled the region's crucial importance
to his country, while President Obama promised during his visits that
enhanced U.S. investment would support local economies. On August 5-6, the
United States plans to host African heads of states in Washington to
further economic ties with the continent.
Whatever the motives for the American change of heart, Somalia today needs
all the international support it can get to rehabilitate its fragile
economy and institutions, and America's renewed interest in Somalia bodes
well for the entire continent. After 20 years of missed opportunities,
Somalia cannot afford to squander this opportunity to steer its ship away
from treacherous waters and into the community of nations. The sooner
Somali leadership at all levels of government understands that, the better
for the entire region.
Looking ahead, as Undersecretary Sherman aptly put it, "the pivotal test
for Somalia will not be procuring more assistance from the international
community or even defeating al-Shabaab. The truly defining test will be an
internal one--Somalis have to decide whether they want to exist as disparate
clans isolated from the world and in conflict with one another, or as a
united country with all the attributes, benefits, and responsibilities that
such unity brings."
Whether the Somali people and their leadership heed this enduring advice
remains to be seen.
Abdinur Mohamud is a former Somali minister of education and a contributor
to Foreign Policy In Focus. He now works and lives in Westerville, Ohio.
Received on Mon Jun 16 2014 - 21:53:09 EDT