Sudan: is the National Dialogue really dead? (And did it ever really exist
anyway?)
- By James Copnall
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/25/sudan-is-the-national-dialogue-reall
y-dead/> June 25, 2014
'The National Dialogue is dead'. The verdict comes from Ghazi Salaheddin
Atabani, one of the longest-serving Islamist intellectuals of the Bashir
era, who defected to the opposition late last year. He, and several other
opposition leaders, had previously extended a cautious welcome to President
Omar al Bashir's call, in January, for a national dialogue to examine the
country's many problems. What has changed?
It is difficult to dispute the fact that issues of identity, security, the
economy and the country's overall direction need to be addressed. Indeed,
these questions have reoccurred frequently since even before Sudan's
independence in 1956. Nevertheless, other opposition leaders, and the rebels
fighting the government in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur, had
rejected the President's appeal at the outset, believing it to be a way of
dividing and diverting them rather than an attempt to engage them in a
genuine reform project.
Dr. Ghazi came to see their point of view: his obituary notice for the
National Dialogue was delivered earlier this month in light of the arrests
of Sadig al Mahdi and the lesser known opposition politician Ibrahim al
Sheikh, and also because of the continued restrictions on press freedom and
opposition party activities. Although Sadig has now been released, it is
difficult to see how the National Dialogue can be meaningfully resurrected.
For some, the real question is whether it was actually alive at any point.
Outside the country, the National Dialogue did receive conditional backing
from the African Union and other interested parties, presumably aware that
it would not do to publicly undermine even a slim chance of a real Sudanese
dialogue. Inside Sudan the pro-regime press has trumpeted its support.
Dozens of parties signed up, even if most were offshoots of major parties or
small groups with little popular support. Others sounded less impressed.
The Sudan Democracy First Group, no friends of the President, wondered
whether it was 'A National Dialogue, or a National (Congress Party)
monologue?' The Sudan Revolutionary Front, the rebel coalition, showed
little interest in the talks, particularly when they were asked to lay down
their arms as a precondition to joining. No rebel group is prepared to
abandon its only form of leverage.
The former ruling elite (the Democratic Unionist Party and the National Umma
Party) and the disaffected Islamists (the PCP and Ghazi's Reform Now Party)
were more open to Bashir's overtures than the Communists and the armed
opposition. Yet there were serious disagreements about the wisdom of such a
move amongst even those who decided to participate. The differing reactions
to the National Dialogue gnawed away at the frayed threads holding together
the loose opposition grouping, the National Consensus Forces.
Hassan al Turabi's 'unconditional' acceptance of the National Dialogue
infuriated others in the alliance, and led to the suspension of his Popular
Congress Party. Rebel leaders and some opposition politicians felt that
these increased tensions within the opposition had been President Bashir's
intention all along.
The limited architecture thrown up by the National Dialogue has also
revealed another potential flaw. The process has so far been designed for
political parties, and - maybe - rebel groups, if the latter ever agree to
take part. The committee set up has allocated seven seats to the NCP, and
seven to members of opposition parties. Sudan Democracy First has bemoaned
the 'absence of any engagement of civil society and other social actors,
including youth and women's groups, professional associations, and
traditional leaders-all of whom have close relationships to key
constituencies and grassroots communities. In the government's dialogue,
there is clearly no space for these groups.
The NCP's Qutbi al Mahdi has said the Dialogue 'will include civil society
organizations, women's groups, students, workers and craftsmen, and national
personalities', but so far this hasn't happened. Five months after President
Bashir's speech, very little progress has been made, in the National
Dialogue, towards any actual conversations; and Sadig's arrest halted any
forward momentum at all.
The veteran opposition leader, who was first Prime Minister in the 1960s,
landed in jail after he criticised the alleged atrocities committed by the
Rapid Support Forces, particularly in Darfur. The continuing fighting in
Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile underlines how much a real national
conversation is needed - and how the conditions for one are not in place.
In a joint statement released on June 10, the US, Norway and the UK put the
blame squarely on Khartoum: 'the Government of Sudan has taken actions of
late that have enabled some to raise doubts about the sincerity of this
initiative [NB: the National Dialogue]. Most notably, the Government
continues to wage a war and target civilians in Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile and bears primary responsibility for intensifying the conflict in
Darfur, where some 300,000 have been displaced this year.' Rebels are to
blame, too, for the continued fighting. It is difficult to see how a real
dialogue could be heard over the persistent rattle of AK47s.
Sadig's arrest also highlighted the fact that the free political space a
real National Dialogue would require is simply not present in Sudan. In
April, President Bashir ordered the authorities to allow political parties
to carry out their work and to permit greater press freedom. In practice,
opposition parties find it impossible to hold public rallies, and press
freedom is actually diminishing. Newspapers are often seized, and officials
warn journalists about 'red lines' - including discussing the alleged crimes
committed by the Rapid Support Forces.
There is not much prospect of the bulk of the opposition continuing with the
National Dialogue unless the government takes several confidence-building
measures. These would include removing restrictions on press and political
freedoms, releasing political prisoners, and maybe even abrogating some of
the clauses in the much-criticised Security law.
That all this is unlikely reveals one of the central tensions at the heart
of the question. Restrictions on freedoms, and the powerful security
service, are fundamental reasons why the NCP has stayed in power for so
long. Removing them is not in the party's interest. Neither is a true
reshaping of the Sudanese state, in which the NCP would become one of the
ingredients rather than the chef.
Many of the same national questions - and stumbling blocks - are part of the
landscape in South Sudan too. The rapid descent of the country into civil
war has prompted calls for its politicians to reassess their path, and
indeed the very structure of the state. The debate over whether federalism
is an appropriate model for the new country, as Riek Machar and many Eastern
Equatorian politicians have suggested, is just one example of this.
In South Sudan, like in Sudan, real dialogue has yet to start; and despite
promises, it is not yet clear whether the full range of South Sudanese
society will make their voices heard in the deliberations over the country's
future.
In both Sudans, an opportunity may be provided by the current malaise. The
NCP is only prepared to countenance a National Dialogue because it is weak,
after the secession of the south and the resulting economic crisis, the
fracturing of the Islamist movement, and the continued conflicts in its
peripheries. In South Sudan, the six month old civil war has shown everybody
that the trajectory after independence simply wasn't tenable.
In both countries, the limited civil society has attempted to push for real
change, one directed not by politicians or warlords but by the people
themselves. So far this hasn't worked, and it may not in the future. Yet it
is clear that in both of the Sudans, real, wide-ranging, non-politicised
conversations about the past, present and future are needed.
James Copnall is a journalist and author of
<
http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/a-poisonous-thorn-in-our-hearts/> 'A
Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and Incomplete
Divorce'
Received on Wed Jun 25 2014 - 14:37:32 EDT