Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War
Africa Briefing N°99 26 Jun 2014
OVERVIEW
Despite the recent military surge against Somalia’s armed Islamist extremist
and self-declared al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab, its conclusive “defeat”
remains elusive. The most likely scenario – already in evidence – is that
its armed units will retreat to smaller, remote and rural enclaves,
exploiting entrenched and ever-changing clan-based competition; at the same
time, other groups of radicalised and well-trained individuals will continue
to carry out assassinations and terrorist attacks in urban areas, including
increasingly in neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. The long
connection between Al-Shabaab’s current leadership and al-Qaeda is likely to
strengthen. A critical breakthrough in the fight against the group cannot,
therefore, be achieved by force of arms, even less so when it is foreign
militaries, not the Somalia National Army (SNA), that are in the lead. A
more politically-focused approach is required.
Even as its territory is squeezed in the medium term, Al-Shabaab will
continue to control both money and minds. It has the advantage of at least
three decades of Salafi-Wahabi proselytisation (daawa) in Somalia; social
conservatism is already strongly entrenched – including in Somaliland and
among Somali minorities in neighbouring states – giving it deep reservoirs
of fiscal and ideological support, even without the intimidation it
routinely employs.
An additional factor is the group’s proven ability to adapt, militarily and
politically – flexibility that is assisted by its leadership’s freedom from
direct accountability to any single constituency. From its first serious
military setbacks in 2007 and again in 2011, it has continually reframed the
terms of engagement. It appears to be doing so again.
Countering Al-Shabaab’s deep presence in south-central Somalia requires the
kind of government – financially secure, with a common vision and coercive
means – that is unlikely to materialise in the near term. More military
surges will do little to reduce the socio-political dysfunction that has
allowed Al-Shabaab to thrive; in certain areas it may even serve to deepen
its hold. The Somalia Federal Government (SFG), supported by external
allies, should consider the following political options:
* implementing, as outlined in the “National Stabilisation Strategy”
(NSS), parallel national and local reconciliation processes at all levels of
Somali society;
* imitating Al-Shabaab’s frequently successful techniques of
facilitating local clan dialogue and reconciliation (as per the National
Stabilisation Strategy, NSS), as well as religious education;
* developing a new approach to establishing local and regional
administrations that privileges neither SFG appointees nor clients of
neighbouring states; and
* making the local (Somali) political grievances that enable
Al-Shabaab to remain and rebuild in Somalia the paramount focus, not
regional or wider international priorities.
Nairobi/Brussels, 26 June 2014
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Received on Thu Jun 26 2014 - 14:57:15 EDT