The six-region federal system announced recently in Yemen is likely to
inflame rather than subdue regional, ethnic and sectarian conflicts, writes
Medhat Al-Zahed
Monday,03 March, 2014
The recent proclamation of a federal system in Yemen continues to
reverberate throughout the country. The Houthis in the north are adamant in
their opposition, and many southerners are demonstrating for the
re-establishment of an independent state in the south. In short, the
federalist formula appears to have created more problems than it has solved.
Two weeks ago, Yemeni President Abd-Rabbou Mansour Hadi unveiled the
decision to transform Yemen into a federal state of six regions. These
consisted of two in the south - Aden and Hadramawt - and four in the north -
Azal, Saba, Al-Janad and Tahama. Each region is to consist of four
provinces.
Hadramawt, with its capital in Makalla, is to be made up of the provinces of
Hadramawt, Al-Mahra, Shebwa and the island of Socotra. Aden will comprise
the capital of the former southern state, now the regional capital, together
with Abyan, Lahej and Daleh. Saba will include the provinces of Al-Jawf,
Mareb and Al-Bayda and have its capital in Saba itself. The fourth region,
to include Taez and Ibb, will be named Al-Janad and have its capital in
Taez.
Azal, the fifth region, will have its capital in Sanaa and will be comprised
of Dhamar, Amran and Saada. The sixth region, Tahama, will take in Hudaydah,
Rima, Mahwit and Hajja and have its capital in Hudaydah.
FEARS AND DOUBTS: The announcement of the federal plan has triggered a wave
of anxious questions.
Will the transformation to a federal system reflect the democratic urges of
the country's revolution? Or is it an attempt to divide and conquer the
democratic forces that were previously unified and are now being submerged
in tribal, sectarian and regional conflicts?
Will the decision enable Yemen to become more effective in handling the
terrorist threats that have been striking the capital? Or will it merely
pass on such problems to the armies and militias of the new federal states
and provinces?
So far it appears that the decision has not resolved the problems of the
south or the Houthis. It may even aggravate and complicate these problems.
Some observers believe that the federalist move in Yemen is part of a
regional trend relating to the Iranian-Saudi conflict. The real aim, they
say, is to marginalise Iran's allies in the south-western corner of the
Arabian Peninsula.
Other observers see a connection with a scheme for a Greater Middle East
that would capitalise on the weak points in the Arab world and inflame fault
lines created by authoritarian regimes and tribal and sectarian disputes.
Still others counter that the plan is a foregone conclusion, resulting from
an already existing state of disintegration and that it has needed no
foreign conspiracy to give it impetus.
To a large segment of public opinion in Yemen, the six-region federal plan
that has resulted from the special regions committee that the president
formed in late January at the end of the country's national dialogue clearly
diverges from the platform of the Yemeni Revolution epitomised by its calls
for bread, justice, dignity and freedom.
These slogans, which expressed the pressing needs of the Yemeni people,
unified millions across the country throughout all its governorates. The
Revolution's platform offered a real alternative to the divisive forces of
tribalism, regionalism and secessionism, as it was thought it would open the
way to full and equal citizenship for all peoples and all provinces.
There could have been a politically and geographically different federalist
project that drew on this spirit and these principles, effectively
mobilising Yemen's resources towards the defeat of terrorism and the
realisation of comprehensive development.
However, a federal "solution" that emerges from the very regional and social
divides that riddle the country seems likely to compound Yemen's already
existing problems, and this has lain at the root of the objections to the
plan raised by the country's Socialist Party and Southern Movement and the
Houthis in the north.
The project has been greeted with opposition by influential opposition
forces in the north and south, and the country's security establishment has
been reeling beneath power conflicts, terrorist strikes and the push and
pull of tribal influences.
The opposition in the south has cried foul because the new federalist
formula has stripped the region that formerly made up south Yemen of the
province of Hadramawt, which is rich in oil and mineral and fishing wealth
and is also strategically important because of its position at the entrance
to the Gulf.
Some fear that the division will sow the seeds for future conflicts.
Hadramawt, the birthplace of the former president of south Yemen Ali Salem
Al-Beidh, accounts for a third of the surface area of Yemen as a whole and
10 per cent of its population, while it sits on more than half of the
country's oil wealth.
This region therefore appears to be the winner of the federal plan in view
of its natural resources and relatively small population. However, it
remains to be seen how the division will impact other portions of the
country that stand to be deprived of the oil revenues that once filled the
national coffers and how this will effect relations between Hadramawt and
the other regions.
PIPELINE ARMIES: There are already signs that Hadramawt will not voluntarily
serve as the chief funder of the new federal budget.
Because of heavy losses in lives and equipment sustained in battles in the
hills and valleys of Hadramawt, the Yemeni army has had to call in large
reinforcements from other provinces in operations personally commanded by
the country's minister of defence. Still, this "pipeline army," as some
observers have wryly referred to the government forces in the civil war in
the south-western region, still appears to be unable to defend itself in
many areas.
To complicate matters further, the province of Al-Mahra, which the new
federal plan has attached to Hadramawt, also appears to have ambitions of
its own, aiming to capitalise on its strategic advantage as a window on both
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
Southern critics of the federal plan also argue that it will destroy the
unity that had been achieved in the south in 1967 after long and bitter
battles between diverse sheikhdoms and sultanates. The south, inclusive of
both Aden and Hadramawt, had remained unified until assimilation with the
north in 1990.
The Socialist Party holds that what is required now is to rectify the course
of this integral unity, which had failed to take into account the
specificities of the south. South Yemen, which had focussed on the promotion
of social and economic rights (though at the expense of civil and political
freedoms), had engaged in a network of Arab, regional and international
relations that was different to that of the north.
When the south was unified with the north following the collapse of the
international socialist camp to which the south had previously belonged, it
took a "leap into the unknown," according to party spokesmen.
At that time, it was believed that a federal solution could be a more
appropriate option, in view of the fundamental differences between the
northern and southern outlooks and systems. However, the south fell in with
the plan for all-out integration.
Yet, as that plan unfolded the south was systematically marginalised,
eventually triggering the civil war in 1994. That war was settled militarily
with the fall of the Al-Anad base that controlled the route to the southern
capital of Aden and the subsequent defeat of the south.
While there is some overlap in the outlooks of the Socialist Party and the
Southern Movement, there also remains a fundamental difference. While the
latter calls for southern secession, the former subscribes to continued
unity with the north but in a manner that reforms the former system.
The Socialists believe that a federal system should be introduced in Yemen,
but on the basis of two regions - the north and south as geographically
defined until 1990 - and in a manner that observes the economic, cultural
and political rights of the south.
They reject the formula that has emerged from the presidential regions
committee, which is to say the division of the north into four regions and
the south into two. They argue that this formula will open the way to
subsequent partitions in both the north and south, and instead they advocate
democratising local government, a process that would be very different from
the current federal project.
HOUTHI OPPOSITION: The Houthis in the north are also adamantly opposed to
the federal plan, which not only deprives them of a Red Sea port, but also
attaches them to the region of the capital.
Otherwise put, it traps the Houthis in the midst of a Salafist and Wahabi
majority and dilutes their area of influence by submerging it in a broader
administrative environment. Houthi influence has long prevailed in Saada,
from where they have waged six wars against the central government. It has
also extended into Saudi territory, and for some periods the Houthis
controlled the Al-Dukhan Mountains.
Under the current federal partition formula, the Houthis will be attached to
the Azal region that includes the capital Sanaa, the Houthi bastion Saada,
Amran and Dhamar. Because Al-Hajja will be attached to Tahama, they will
lose the access to the Red Sea which they had through that province.
The Houthis will also lose their influence in the oil-producing area of
Al-Jawf, which has been included in the region of Saba.
Voicing Houthi objections to the federal plan, Mohamed Al-Bakhiti, a
spokesman, said that "we reject [this partition] because it divides Yemen
into poor and rich. Proof of this is to be found in the fact that it
combines Saada with Amran and Dhamar, whereas Saada is culturally,
geographically and socially closer to Al-Hajja and Al-Jawf, which are
oil-producing areas with outlets to the sea."
He said that the formula had been deliberately designed "to serve the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by providing it with a large tribal and oil space
along its border." He also explained that the oil-rich regions of Saba and
Hadramawt were adjacent to Saudi territory and had close tribal and kinship
bonds with the country.
BETRAYED REVOLUTION? Yemen could have taken a different course, one in which
federalism would have been a solution rather than the source of new
problems.
It could have followed through on the Yemeni Revolution of February 2011,
capitalised on the collective outpouring of popular sentiment to realise its
agenda for justice and democracy, and dismantled the networks of tribal
influence and favouritism in order to lay the foundations of a citizen
state.
The tribal establishment in the country has long served as one of the
authorities' chief mechanisms for suppressing dissent. The alliance between
the Hashed and Bakil tribes was one of the cornerstones of the former Ali
Abdullah Saleh regime, for example.
These tribes had arms and militias, and the former regime showered military
rank, medals and money on them. They were also closely connected to the
influence and money of the Saudi regime. This establishment remains intact.
The revolution could have led Yemen to a brighter future had there been
serious efforts to sustain the impetus of its democratic spirit and youthful
energies in order to break the chains of sectarian, regional and tribal
allegiances and rally the country behind the cause to build a prosperous and
democratic Yemen and a government dedicated to this cause.
Unfortunately, the revolution fell prey to the political alliance that had
ruled the country under the former regime and that continues to do so under
the current president. This alliance consists of the General People's
Congress (GPC) and the Islah (Reform) Party, the political wing of the
Yemeni chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood.
That fact that Yemen is situated at the gateway to the Gulf has rendered its
revolution vulnerable to designs to undermine it, using violence followed by
political machinations. Prime among these have been the Gulf Initiative that
secured a safe exit for ex-president Saleh and simultaneously secured the
perpetuation of the cornerstones of his regime.
As a result, the ruling GPC is now playing a key role in the so-called
national unity government, Saleh's vice-president has been elevated to
president, and when early presidential elections were held he was the only
candidate.
With the Islah Party (the GPC's chief partner) being ever willing to appease
the weight of Saudi and Gulf interventions and the continued support of most
leaders of the military establishment for the regime, it was difficult for
the Yemeni Revolution to attain a tangible victory.
Unlike the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, the military establishment in
Yemen remained solidly behind the old regime. There were only minor
defections, such as that of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar who for family
reasons connected with the succession split away with a unit from the
Republican Guards that was subsequently joined by units from the First
Armoured Division.
There is no other explannation for the Gulf Initiative, and it was clearly
designed to back the regime after repressive measures had served their
purpose. The former Yemeni president returned from Saudi Arabia in
September, following his convalescence from the wounds he received in the
bomb attack against the Presidential Bein Al-Nahdein Mosque in June 2011.
He then kicked off his resumed campaign with another bloodbath, recalling
the massacre he perpetuated during the "Friday of Dignity" demonstrations in
March 2011 and which caused more deaths and wounded than the "Battle of the
Camel" incident in Egypt the previous month.
Since Yemen first joined the Arab Spring revolutions, a fierce battle has
raged, both locally and regionally, over the best formula for a federal
system for the country. The anger of the southerners, the majority of whom
have come to favour secession after years of marginalisation and
discrimination, could have been assuaged with a two-region federal plan that
retained the unity of the south. However, some parties apparently feared
that such a scenario would prelude another secession of the south and the
revival of the independent state that was socialist in its heyday.
According to Yemeni affairs expert Arib Al-Rantawi, "the most important
factor that propelled the imposition of the six-region formula was not
local, but rather consummately regional. The Arab countries neighbouring
Yemen were the parties that encouraged, pushed and rallied support behind
this formula, which is designed to weaken the southerners and isolate the
Houthis in the Yemeni interior without access to the sea."
"As a result, there are many in Yemen who believe that the Arab governments
do not want to see Yemen stand on its own two feet and prefer to deal with
six mutually antagonistic 'governments' rather than one strong central
government or with a south Yemen that is not under its control and subject
to its dictates."
"This is an open secret, as every Yemeni can tell you."
Regardless of how it came about, the 2014 federalist plan is as much an
"escape forward" as the unification plan of 1990 was. Both were designed as
exits from a situation of crisis, but both only precipitated, or only will
precipitate, more crises in a country in which the state does not hold a
monopoly on arms and the means to maintain law and order.
Yemen is fracturing, yet the new federal project is likely to inflame rather
than subdue regional, ethnic and sectarian divides. The potential power and
identity conflicts that lie on the horizon can only benefit regional and
international powers and interests.