Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 23:44:19 +0100
Somalia’s Sullied Security
by <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/abukararman/> Abukar Arman |
on March 11th, 2014
“We cannot have our right hand tied in our back and be asked to defend
ourselves with our crippled left hand.” – Abdirahman Sheikh Issa
The recent
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/22/us-somalia-attack-idUSBREA1L0F420
140222> al-Shabaab attack at the heart of the government’s compound, Villa
Somalia, marks a turning point; both in terms of the audacity of the group’s
militancy and the massive military campaign that the Federal Government of
Somalia (FGS) and AMISOM are set to
<http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/02/26/somalias-sullied-security/>
unleashhttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png.
This may cause a considerable loss to al-Shabaab, especially in terms of
territories and hardware, but to count the overtly advertised March campaign
as the deadly finale in which these militant extremists would be buried is a
quixotic wish, to say the least.
When a security failure of such magnitude occurs, the natural reaction is to
ask: how did it happen and who dropped the ball? This type of
crisis-inspired scrutiny and discontent often provides an opportunity to
institute new policies, improve or overhaul strategies; but, only when
natural reactions are not subservient to the politics of exploitation.
Relentless arrows
With lingering political polarization, damning report by U.N. Monitoring
Group, and seemingly relentless media campaign, any kneejerk reaction to
write off the current government — hence any opportunity to salvage the
Somali state — is understandable, though not acceptable. Indeed, FGS has
made some strategic mistakes and in the process drained much of its
political and social capital, but throwing it under the bus, at this
critical juncture, is not an option.
FGS has sent a detailed rebuttal to the U.N. Sanctions Committee chair to
illustrate how political the latest U.N. Monitoring Group charges and their
recommendation to re-impose arms embargo on Somalia are; and it is set to
dispute the charges before the Security Council on March 6. One of the most
outrageous things done by the Monitoring Group is revealing the clan
affiliation of the government officials that they implicated. While it does
not matter to the Security Council and U.N. Sanctions Committee whether
implicated government officials were from clan X or Y, such revelation does
matter to the Somali audience and could widen inter-clan divide and
hostilities.
The shrinking nation syndrome
What do countries such as Somalia, Libya and Yemen have in common? Aside
from being natural-resource-rich and having ample self-destructive elite who
are willing to sell their proverbial farms for ego messages and a few
pennies, they are three representations of an unfolding saga of bloody and
clannish sectarian feuds fueled by hate narratives. They are set to turn
their respective countries into chronically dependent para-states that are
perpetually hostile toward one another, and are helplessly exposed for
exploitation.
It is no secret that there are some domestic, regional and international
actors who overtly or covertly facilitate, propel or manufacture the fait
accompli in such countries. Security issues cannot be dealt with as though
they exist in vacuum.
“I submit that Balkanized, Somalia represents a new and sizable experiment
for privatization/globalization and enclave
<http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/02/26/somalias-sullied-security/>
investmenthttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png in a
conveniently self-cleft society. Once this process truly begins, it will
likely be irreversible and will signal the beginning of a new trend/policy
for weak/failed states. It may create wealth for a few local elites, but
will probably be to the detriment of all others,”
<http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Opinion_20/One-Two-How-Many-Som
alias-Beware-Balkanization.shtml> argues Paul Camacho.
Against that broader backdrop, let me say this: Security in Somalia is, for
lack of a more accurate description, a self-defeating apparatus of profound
complexity. Within that framework, FGS — like the transitional governments
before it — is left in a state of profound confusion, uncertainty and
helpless dependency.
Everybody’s business is nobody’s business
In theory, AMISOM has the absolute authority in daytime (macro) security,
and armed ghosts control the skies and grounds at night.
Virtually all monies donated to stabilize Somalia go to AMISOM and its
multifaceted support security apparatus. Each component of this apparatus
enjoys its own lucrative contract. Meanwhile, no serious attempt was made in
the past decade to rebuild an adequately paid professional national army
with its own barracks and warehouses, though each AMISOM soldier costs at
least ten Somali soldiers. And no attempt was made to disarm.
Recently, a tentative bilateral agreement between Somalia and Turkey in
which the latter was to help rebuild the Somali army was torpedoed in a
number of different ways, including direct protest and pressure from certain
influential members of IGAD that caused the previous government to cave in.
In the humanitarian and the development front, Turkey has been an effective
outlier within a failed, but still glorified, international aid and
development model. Under the latter model, security—like all other things—is
outsourced, in-sourced, counter-sourced, and cross-sourced to various forces
and political entities with regional and geopolitical interests that are
often at odds with one another. These actors, a number of them being
international nomadic mercenaries, are all protected behind highly secured
camps and enjoy their Green Zone luxuries and, of course, impunities. Almost
always, it is the $260 per month, under-trained and under-armed Somali
soldiers — like the ones who foiled al-Shabaab’s mosque attack during Friday
prayer — who are exposed to the greatest danger.
Against that backdrop, FGS is projected and is generally seen as an
incompetent crony serving foreign interests against its own. It is time to
streamline security and build an effective command and control.
Ethiopification of AMISOM
Though some beneficiary elites across Somalia might disagree, bringing
Ethiopian troops on board as part of AMISOM will likely undermine security
in the long-run, create humanitarian disaster, and ruin whatever credibility
is left for the African Union troops.
In two years of occupation (2007-09) has earned a horrific record that
includes indiscriminate massive killing of civilians, use of white
phosphorous bombs and human rights abuses that, according to Human Rights
Watch, amounts to
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0807webwcover.pdf>
war crimes. It is hard to comprehend the naïve argument that the same
soldiers who looted, raped, and confiscated pots and pans from families
already on the verge of starvation are now so morally reformed that they
came back to die in order to save Somalia.
Expectedly, some “experts” on Somalia are already making the case for such
an argument. They point out the obvious that Ethiopia’s policy is “closely
aligned with the aspirations of…Interim Jubba Authority, Puntland and
Somaliland” while totally ignoring the fluidity of clan-based allegiance.
In the short foreseeable future, expect an Ethiopian general to take over
AMISOM’s field command and for this controversial peace-keeping force to
grow obese on Ethiopia’s field-tested Genetically Modified Intelligence. He
who has the command of the data designs the strategy.
Status quo is an off-the-cliff option
Contrary to the conventional perception, Somalia is facing an existential
threat that is more potent and more extensive than al-Shabaab. That is not
to say that we should not worry about al-Shabaab, or, in any way, minimize
the ruthless violence emanating from them, their deranged interpretation of
Islam, and their campaign to radicalize the youth. At the end of the day,
al-Shabaab is an overt threat; as such, it is as widely exposed as the
warlords before them.
Despite the current threats, FGS should not be terrorized into submission.
The top leadership must not take for granted the last chance afforded to
them to save Somalia. Military solutions might seem feasible, but
considering the threat at hand and the illusive security dynamic on the
ground, it would snow in Mogadishu before that occurs. With Hundreds of
thousands of soldiers from the mightiest nation and the mightiest military
alliance on earth and billions of dollars in cash, victory could not be
secured in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lesson learned is that asymmetric
warfare requires tailor-made strategies and willingness to keep the
diplomacy and reconciliation doors open.
So, what’s the alternative? Immediately after the end of the upcoming phase,
FGS should demonstrate its sincerity and commitment to genuine
reconciliation, and appeal to the Security Council to replace AMISOM forces
with U.N. Blue Beret while the reconciliation is taken place. Meanwhile, it
should negotiate a bilateral agreement with Turkey to rebuild the Somali
National Army. Surely there would be new waves of objections, but this is a
matter of existential importance.
(image/png attachment: image001.png)