Helping or hurting Yemen?
UN Security Council Resolution 2140, designed to assist in implementing the
outcomes of the Yemeni national dialogue, needs to be deployed in a
politically sensitive way, writes Nasser Arrabyee in Sanaa
17 March, 2014
Two conflicting groups in Yemen have intensified the fighting between their
respective militias after Saudi Arabia labelled them terrorist groups in the
mould of Al-Qaeda. About 40 people have been killed in the north and
north-east of Yemen over the last few days between the Sunni Islamist Islah
Party (the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood) and the Shiite Houthi group.
Each group seems to have been happy to call its enemy "terrorists," while
denying that it itself is made up of terrorists. The Islah activists say
that Islah was not mentioned by Saudi Arabia as a terrorist group, but the
Houthis were, while the Houthis have not cared what Saudi Arabia has said
about them since they are the traditional enemies of the country.
These developments are likely to complicate the implementation of the
outcome of the national dialogue in the country which the international
community insists on supporting apparently regardless of the consequences.
The UN envoy in Yemen, Jamal Binomar, arrived in Sanaa this week in order to
find out to what extent the conflicting groups will listen to him after he
convinced the UN Security Council to issue a threatening Resolution, number
2140, on the matter.
Binomar, now in his 28th visit to Yemen since he started as mediator between
the county's conflicting groups in 2011, appears to be happy to come to
Yemen wielding the biggest stick he has ever been issued with. The UN
Security Council has threatened to apply sanctions to the country after the
groups disputed an UN-supported decree to divide it into six provinces, four
in the north and two in the south, within a the framework of a federal
state.
The Security Council issued its third resolution on Yemen in late February
in an attempt to try to help this conflict-torn country establish a state of
law and order by drafting a new constitution and approving it through a
referendum and electing a new president. The new constitution and elections
are the most important steps that need to be taken now after the 10-month
national dialogue that ended last December.
The British-drafted UN Security Council Resolution 2140 came after it became
clear, at least to Yemenis, that it was apparently impossible for the
transitional president, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, to stop the campaign against
the transition in the country that has included assassinations, the bombings
of <
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/UI/Front/>
gas
http://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png and oil and
electricity installations, and kidnappings.
Al-Qaeda recently attacked the country's maximum security prison and
released at least 29 criminals. Earlier, it attacked the headquarters of the
ministry of defence, killing more than 52 people in the hospital of its
compound. The two terrorist operations inside the capital showed that
Al-Qaeda felt safe in Sanaa, even as US drones are striking its operatives
elsewhere in the country.
The Islamist-headed consensus government and president Hadi have also
pointed the finger at former president Ali Abdulla Saleh, accusing him of
being behind some of the obstructions.
Meanwhile, Binomar, who is supposed to mediate between the conflicting
sides, has seemed to fail to deal neutrally. At least in some of his
speeches, Binomar has discriminated between the two sides, calling one
"revolutionaries" and the other "not revolutionaries" (those belonging to
the former regime), though the transition deal recognised both of them as
equal partners.
Saleh's side has accused Binomar of bias as a result, and the Party and its
allies have lodged an official complaint with the Security Council to this
effect, causing political wrangles between the UN mediator and Saleh. UN
Security Council Resolution 2140 is seen by observers as a "big stick" to
support Hadi and Binomar, both of whom have failed to ensure a reasonable
degree of consent, or at least to clear the air with Saleh's side.
According to observers, it is known that each side is trying to spoil the
prospects of the other in order to push things in its favour. However, it
would be too easy to say that the spoiler is Saleh and his Party and not to
an extent the other way around.
The Resolution is supposed to sanction those setting out to wreck the
national dialogue outcomes by freezing their assets and banning travel. Over
the last two years, neither Binomar nor the Yemenis themselves have been
able to determine who has been responsible for the most disruptions.
A committee is now to be formed of all 15 members of the UN Security
Council, the idea being that this will assign blame for the delay in the
implementation of the national dialogue resolutions. At present three
scenarios present themselves.
In the first, the best scenario, all those aiming to damage the national
dialogue will want to avoid sanctions and the possible use of Chapter 7 of
the UN Charter by the Security Council and will therefore submit to its
implementation. However, they may still cooperate with each other by
stopping the obstructions in order only to protect themselves, while not
being fully committed to the federal solution.
It is widely believed in Yemen that what happened in 2011 was not a real
revolution but merely a division within the traditional ruling group, one
side calling itself "revolutionaries" and the other the "protectors of
legitimacy." Because neither group was able to prevail, both of them now
effectively rule the country under the UN-supported and Saudi-US sponsored
deal (GCCI) which they signed in November 2011 in the Saudi capital Riyadh.
The only person now outside this system of rule is Saleh himself. However,
he still presides over his Party, the GPC, which still has 50 per cent of
the ruling senior posts throughout the country.
In the second scenario, the second-best one, the UN committee would identify
those seeking to disrupt the transition using hard evidence that can be
submitted to the courts. While it would be preferable for such people to be
tried in Yemeni courts, because Yemeni judges would likely be unwilling or
unable to try them they could be tried outside Yemen. This scenario would be
difficult to implement as it would require hard evidence.
In the third scenario, the worst-case one, the committee could designate the
spoilers on the basis of fabricated reports, politicised information or
media guessing.
In this case, the wronged groups would return to conflict without thinking
of the consequences, as for them other sanctions would be better than the
threatened freezing of their assets or travel bans.
Al-Qaeda is expected to push in this direction in order to achieve its
long-awaited wish to bring what it calls "the soldiers of the enemy" out
into the open.
UN Security Council Resolution 2140 focuses on ending the presidency of
former president Saleh, saying that it was "turning the page" on his
presidency. This has been understood to mean that Saleh must also step down
as president of the GPC in favour of Hadi, who is now deputy chair of the
GPC and thus Saleh's Party deputy.
Removing Saleh from the presidency of the GPC by force would be extremely
difficult if not impossible, especially since the transition deal was signed
by Saleh in his capacity as head of the GPC.
"If the Resolution violates the GCCI in any way and turns into a tool for
settling accounts, then Yemen will return to the swamp of war," said Ahmed
al-Sufi, a GPC senior official and secretary to Saleh.
Rajeh Badi, official spokesman of the consensus government, said that he did
not expect the failure of the Resolution, which no one in Yemen would dare
to challenge. "The Resolution will stop the spoilers, and no one would dare
to confront the unanimity of the international community by even thinking of
obstructing the outcomes of the dialogue," he said.
The UN Resolution would certainly help Yemen if it is wisely implemented,
but it will also hurt it if it is implemented in a politicised way. It
should be implemented in such a way as to help the Yemenis to establish a
state that respects all the country's communities.
Helping or hurting Yemen?
Received on Mon Mar 17 2014 - 17:56:19 EDT