Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 02:13:07 +0100
Sahel: A Reason For Country
EPLF: A Front For A Government
25.03.2014
Pilgrims from inside the country and abroad ParticiPating at the 30th
anniversary celebrations of the demise of WukaW iz which is underway in
Mahmimet under the theme "Sahel: A Reason For Country EPLF: A Front For A
Government".
_____
Backgrund
North eastern Sahel Front: From birth to demise Part I
Written by shabait
Beginning from the mid-1970s, the Eritrean armed struggle has started to
acquire both military skills and hardware. On the contrary the Ethiopian
army stationed in Eritrea in particular was extremely weakened by the
<http://www.raimoq.com/photos-sahel-a-reason-for-country-eplf-a-front-for-a-
government/>
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the massive financial and military support it used to receive from its
western patron the U.S. After the turmoil that toppled the Haileslasie
regime and the unrelenting attacks of the Eritrean armed struggle in
particular the Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA) it was exposed.
Consequently in between January 1977 and January 1978 in just one year, the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) following its military strategy of
liberating the people and the land step by step, brought the largest parts
of Eritrea under its control with the exception of Asmara, Assab, AdiKeih
Barentu, Asmara and parts of Massawa. The Ethiopian army in these towns was
awaiting its fate, encircled.
During the Haileslasie regime, the western countries; the United States and
to some extent Israel took the task of building and arming the Ethiopian
army. After the removal of the monarch by the allegedly Marxist military
clique however the winds started to blow from east. Soviet Russia was on the
constant watch out for strategic spots around the world, and swiftly moved
to bring in to its orbit the disillusioned Ethiopian military gang that were
in power in one of the most strategic parts of the world. After its first
attempt to approach for continued military support from the U.S was hopeless
the Derg, was also eager to establish contacts with USSR. As a result it
started secret negotiations with Soviet Union starting in 1976. This ended
in a military pact between the two new friends, signed in 1977.
The result was the first largest military intervention in the African
landmass since World War II and the prolongation of the suffering of the
Eritrean and Ethiopian people for another decade and more. In between 1977
and February 1978, without adding the arms that followed in later years, the
Soviet Union shipped arms worth a billion dollar to Ethiopia. In addition
hundreds of military officers from Russia, Cuba, East Germany and south
Yemen were brought in to train and advice the Ethiopian army. At that time
17,000 Cuban troops also came in to aid the Ethiopian army in the Somali
front.
On the northern and Eritrean front the Derg never took the Tigrean People's
Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) seriously
and for a good reason. The ELF was mired at that time in a vicious and
reckless power struggle that finally destroyed it while the TPLF, barely a
couple of year old was an infant military and political force. This left the
EPLF as the only force and target with little more than 14,000 thousand
manpower equipped with light and medium arms, to face the massively backed
Ethiopian army.
With no one to count on from outside for help to the EPLF, the military
balance was far from symmetrical. Aware of this harsh reality, the leaders
of the EPLF knew that engaging the Ethiopian and Soviet onslaught was both a
military nonsense and political suicide. To ensure the continuity of the
Eritrean People's armed struggle, the EPLF decided for the famous Strategic
<http://www.raimoq.com/photos-sahel-a-reason-for-country-eplf-a-front-for-a-
government/>
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1978.
THE BEGINNING OF THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
By the time the Derg was preparing for its counter-offensive, with the
exception of the aforementioned towns almost 80% of the Eritrean territory
was under the control of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the
Eritrean Liberation Front. The Dergue planned to attack the EPLA from five
directions. To execute this plan it mobilized six army corps comprising 38
infantry brigades, 6 mechanized brigades and 10 artillery battalions. In
addition to this land force, a navy equipped with modern combat and
transport ships and an air force comprising five squadron jet fighters were
also in line to provide cover and support. The military strategy ready to be
executed by this machinery was drafted by experienced Soviet generals.
In executing this strategy the Ethiopian army began its counter-offensive by
mid June 1978 in all five directions simultaneously. Although the Derg was
able to bring back much of the liberated parts of Eritrea under its control
again, it didn't do so easily as it was forced to pay heavily. The Derg
began its offensive with the intention of wiping out the Eritrean liberation
fronts within the time span of 2-3 months. However by the first two months
it was too late for its mission as it spent them locked in a relentless
fighting with the Eritrean fronts. Soviet and Ethiopian generals were quick
in realizing that the war was heading in to becoming a protracted one. Hence
they changed gear and brought in additional Soviet advisors and embarked on
devising a new war strategy for a second offensive.
As this was happening, the EPLA was positioned in four fortified fronts. The
first one being the eastern front near and around Asmara and Massawa, the
second one covered the northern outskirts of Asmara stretching from Drfo up
to Adi Yaqob, while the third one was in Barka around Engerne. On November
1978, enemy troops started the offensive on these three fronts. The Dergue,
taking advantage of its arms and manpower superiority was able to break the
EPLA lines by stretching the trenches making it impossible for the EPLA to
cover it, but not without a price. Consequently the EPLA was forced to
withdraw. The EPLA however draw the enemy in to several ambushes including
in Elabered and Mamide were it has lost thousands of troops, hundreds of
armoured vehicles and artilleries.
The enemy's plan to capture the main base of the EPLF by controlling Afabet
and Nakfa and fighting its way through Marsa Teklay was discouraged by its
heavy loss and defeat in Elabered, Ma'emide and Azhara. The result was from
1979 onwards the Derg focused on preparing for its third offensive.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORTHEASTERN SAHEL FRONT
After the Derg's 2nd offensive was pacified, the EPLA built two defence
lines. On the eastern lowlands it fortified its positions in Ma'emide and
Azhara and on the keren -Afabet line it dug itself in Genfolom. From this
last position EPLA units were able to block the 3rd enemy offensive that
began on late January 1979, any further. However the enemy manoeuvred away
its troops and mechanized units through landing crafts in to Marsa Teklay
and Mahmimet respectively.
The EPLF never ruled out the possibility that the enemy could come through
the sea. Hence it has always stationed two battalions around Marsa Teklay
and Mahmimet. And after the movement of the enemy toward North eastern
Sahel, it was forced to withdraw its units in from Ma'emide. As the EPLA
units around Mahmimet and Marsa Teklay were not strong, the base of the EPLF
was endangered when enemy troops easily moved toward it. In order to move
the base away it was mandatory to chase away the Ethiopian troops first. On
the first two weeks of February 1979, the EPLA troops opened a
counteroffensive and chased away the Derg in to the plains.
After moving its base to Geregr Asmara, QebrWu'et, Halibet, and Arag, the
EPLF established the North-eastern Sahel front in a front line that
stretched around 40km in its first existence. Following the different
battles the front was connected with the Nakfa front and the Sudanese border
making a front line that measured around 667km.
Parallel to this, the EPLA was also forced to withdraw to Hiday River from
Afabet. After giving the enemy a heavy blow there it hold its permanent
positions in and around mountain Denden and the peaks attached to it. The
Derg resorted in blanket shelling of Nakfa, the only town that would never
come under its control ever after. In 13 February 1979, EPLA units launched
a counter-offensive to chase away the enemy so that they can strengthen
their positions peacefully.
During the 8 months of the protracted war that lasted throughout the
strategic
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EPLA units were fighting according to the demands of battle not military
science. With the establishment of fronts however they were organized
accordingly. Hence they were stationed in the north-eastern Sahel Front and
Nakfa Front proportionally. The 51st, 58th, 70th and 8th brigade which was
later renamed 77th brigade were stationed in the Nakfa front while the 23rd,
4th, and 31st were placed in the North-eastern Sahel front. The 44th brigade
was also placed in this front but after the 5th enemy offensive. The 76th
mechanized brigade also placed two battalions in the North-eastern Sahel
Front and one in the Nakfa front.
The Derg also equipped its North-Eastern Sahel Front with the 505 arms
corps, comprising eight brigades, two mechanized brigades aided by two
battalions equipped with over 80 122mm 85mm and 76mm artillery, two tank
battalions with over 60 tanks and one battalion equipped with 12 BM21
artillery.
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