Is the GCC a Toothless Organization?
by <
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/author/aahmadian/> Alireza Ahmadian |
On May 13th, 2014 |
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/05/12/the-gcc-is-gcc-a-toothless-organiz
ation/#comments> 0 comments
The [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is comprised of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the
Sultanate of Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. According to the GCC’s Charter, what
unites these countries are their “special relations, common characteristics
and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam.” “Their desire is to
effect coordination, cooperation and integration between them in all fields”
to “serve the sublime objectives of the Arab Nation.” They seek “closer
relations and stronger bonds” to “reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic
causes.”
The decision to establish the GCC in 1981 was not a product of a moment, but
a historical reality that had existed before, the Charter reads. Hence, the
GCC is “a continuation, evolution and institutionalization of old prevailing
realities,” and “a practical answer to the challenges of security and
economic development in the area. It is also a fulfillment of the
aspirations of its citizens towards some sort of Arab regional unity.”
The concept of the so-called “Arab World” or “Arab Nation” exists only in
the abstract and not in reality. First of all, there are non-Muslim Arabs in
the world and even in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf that are
automatically excluded from the Charter.
Moreover, Islam is not a monolithic religion. “The creed of Islam” and
“Islamic causes” are subjective terms that can be understood differently by
Shiites and Sunni, as well as different factions within each branch of the
faith. A question arises here as to what constitutes an “Islamic” cause:
waging a jihad against the Syrian government or waging a jihad against the
rebels?
Furthermore, there are intra-state and inter-state differences amongst the
GCC countries that prevent the formation of a unified Arab identity and make
the GCC less than an effective political player.
Intra-state problems within the region are caused by ethnic, religious and
tribal differences. While a sense of nationhood and nationality developed as
a result of a struggle for autonomy in many parts of the world, the Persian
Gulf Arab monarchies did not undergo the same process. They are the result
of the end of a colonial era.
<
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/how-arabs-can-defeat-sectarianism/h
a75> Marwan Muasher asserts that Arab leaders used ethnic and religious
differences “to create rifts and exploit them to extend their reign.” In
other words, some of those states developed their identity in terms of what
they were not and what they did not want to be. For instance, Saudi Arabia
would like to project an image of the guardianship of Sunni Muslims, while
it oppresses its
<
http://www.minorityrights.org/4302/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-overview.html>
Shiite minority.
Tribal identity is also a salient aspect of who the people are and to whom
they owe their allegiance in Arab countries. Therefore, within each Arab
state, there are ethnic, religious and tribal cleavages.
In a globalized world, it is quite common to have multiple identities.
However, some of the GCC states use one layer of identity to discriminate
against a segment of their society.
<
http://www.minorityrights.org/4273/kuwait/kuwait-overview.html> Kuwait, for
instance, has refused citizenship to non-Muslims since 1980.
As long as the GCC states do not properly address their internal problems
and accept their diversity, they cannot project power and become a serious
contender in the region as a unified geopolitical force.
There are also inter-state rivalries among them as they have demonstrated to
have different needs and diverging strategic interests. The so-called Arab
Spring, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, the coup d’état
that removed the government of President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, and the
Syrian civil war — all are examples of events that exposed frictions in the
GCC.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — the world’s largest producer of crude oil and
custodian of the two holiest mosques of Islam — has traditionally played the
dominant role in the GCC, but it has faced explicit challenges by other
members in the past few years.
<
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/12/14/saudi-foreign-policy-rendered-redu
ndant/> Saudi Arabia is the representative of the status quo and does its
best to suppress the winds of change in the region and within its borders.
The Saudi’s favorite lexicon is “stability” and it’s willing to expend their
resources to maintain it.
The Saudis backed President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and were irritated with
the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood after he was ousted by popular protests.
The Brotherhood’s call for a republican form of Islamism or what some call
<
http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/split-persists-between-washington-riyadh/p3
2696> “electoral Islamism” was perceived as a threat to the Saudi’s absolute
monarchical system.
Unable to contain the rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt for sometime, the
Saudis were terrified by the Shiite protests in
<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14540571> Bahrain in 2011
against “systematic discrimination against [Shiites] in jobs and services”
(the majority of Bahrainis are Shiite but the ruling Alkhalifa family is
Sunni). The Saudis and Emiratis forces helped the government of Bahrain to
crack down on Shiite protesters.
It is noteworthy that other GCC countries did not participate in the
crackdown in Bahrain. Manama has remained completely dependent on Riyadh for
its security and understandably supported the Saudi’s in foreign policy
issues.
On Mar. 5, 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE
<
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/05/world/meast/gulf-qatar-ambassadors/>
withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. Doha was accused of interfering in
internal affairs of other GCC countries by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood
and giving a free ground for activists and dissidents in the Persian Gulf
and beyond. Kuwait and Oman refused to recall their ambassadors.
Unlike the Saudis and Emiratis, the Kuwaitis have been trying to co-opt the
Islamic Constitutional Movement (HADAS), a Brotherhood branch. Three members
of the movement currently serve in the National Assembly of Kuwait.
Furthermore, Kuwait enjoys good working relations with Iran and Iraq, whose
Shiite governments have not had amicable relations with Riyadh in the past
few years.
Oman, on the other hand, has pursued an independent and non-interventionist
foreign policy. Oman played a pivotal role in facilitating
<
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10471030/Secret-U
S-Iran-talks-cleared-way-for-historic-nuclear-deal.html> secret dialogues
between the United States and Iran that led to the Geneva interim agreement
between the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council plus Germany
(P5+1) and Iran. The Saudis were completely left out of the process and
their displeasure with the deal and a potential rapprochement between
Washington and Tehran have been widely reported and analyzed.
<
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/oman-rejects-gcc-union-in
sults-saudi-arabia.html> Oman also rejected the Saudi call to move the GCC
toward unity even though a movement “towards some sort of Arab regional
unity” already exists in the GCC’s Charter. Some observers argue that Oman
refused to endorse the Saudi proposal because it could
<
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/12/10/Why-did-Oma
n-refuse-a-Gulf-union-.html> “antagonize” Tehran. However, there is
definitely much more at stake for Muscat than just an unwillingness to
irritate Tehran.
Oman’s mediatory role between Iran and the U.S., and Iran and the Arab
countries, particularly the GCC, gives the country leverage by making it an
essential player in the region. This enables Oman to punch far above its
perceived geopolitical weight.
Qatar, on the other hand, has posed the most serious challenge to the Saudis
and their ambition to remain the dominant player in the GCC. Qatar is a
major exporter of natural gas. Revenues from natural gas have helped the
country to pursue an independent political and economic agenda that is
sometimes at odds with those of Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is rich in oil not gas,
so it cannot out-supply or undersell its gas to undermine Qatar or force it
to reconsider its policies.
Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots such as Hamas,
that also gets backing from Tehran. Qatar has also been less concerned about
the so-called “Iranian threat” and, subsequently, has had much better
relations with Tehran.
Qatar’s most strategic economic asset is its natural gas reserves out of the
offshore North Dome field/South Pars. Qatar shares the field in the Persian
Gulf with Iran. Given Doha’s size and population, it cannot be a regional
hegemon,but it has pursued a policy of playing Iran and Saudi Arabia against
each other that serve its interests.
Even the UAE does not always support the Saudi policies. In fact, the UAE
politically and diplomatically balances between Iranians and the Saudis.
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia also support different factions in the Syrian
civil war that sometimes turn their guns against one another.
As preceding examples show, the GCC has been unable to present a unified
front in dealing with regional issues and some GCC members have serious
domestic problems that cannot be ignored or suppressed indefinitely.
However, the GCC has recently invited Morocco and Jordan to join it with the
goal of establishing a
<
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140414/DEFREG04/304140018/GCC-Seeks-Fo
rm-Military-Bloc-Jordan-Morocco> military alliance.
Egypt has not been formally invited, as different GCC states have different
approaches to General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup that removed the
Muslim Brotherhood from power and the ensuing violence. Riyadh is however
pushing for Cairo’s inclusion.
Some observers believe that the decision to form a military alliance is
either a signal to Iran, or will be a tool to contain Iran’s regional
ambitions. Iran’s all-out support for the Syrian regime and its alleged
support for Shiite factions throughout the region, in addition to
territorial disputes with the UAE over the three Islands of Abu Musa,
Greater and Lesser Tunbs, make Tehran a strategic rival and arguably a
threat to some members of the GCC.
It is believed that with the U.S. planning to pivot to Asia and the
possibility of a comprehensive agreement between P5+1 and Iran over Tehran’s
nuclear program, Iran can possibly play a more active role in the region.
Even if the envisioned military alliance delivers a message to Tehran, there
are a number of issues to consider. First of all, the GCC does not have a
unified stance on Iran. Only Saudis and Bahrainis are concerned about the
“Iranian threat.” Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar have good working and economic
relations with Tehran while Oman, in addition to having economic relations,
is Iran’s confidant in the Arab world.
Secondly, while the formation of a quasi Arab NATO will never be welcomed by
Iran, the alliance’s deterrent effect on Tehran would be minimal. The GCC
plus Morocco and Jordan cannot contain Iran without the United States. In
fact, many Iranian leaders have invariably considered the United States, not
the Saudis or the GCC, to be their rival in the Persian Gulf. The answer for
the security concerns of the countries in the Persian Gulf is a truly
regional security organization that includes Iran and Iraq as well.
Finally, and most importantly, history has shown that the Saudis and
Iranians would eventually reconcile their major differences but continue to
compete with one another in the region and beyond. It is very unlikely that
the “cold” war between Iran and Saudi Arabia will turn “hot.”
<
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-4967.00028/abstract>
Kenneth Katzman, Middle East specialist, with the Congressional Research
Service, argues that the tendency of Persian Gulf Arab countries is towards
balance of power and accommodation. He submits that “the Persian Gulf
monarchy states of the Gulf Cooperation Council” do not have the political,
economic and military strength to contain Iran and “they traditionally
looked for ways to accommodate their neighbors.” If a competitor were
stronger than them, they would accommodate it. If it were weaker, they would
still accommodate it. Thus, this policy is not a matter of weakness, but of
sheer pragmatism.
The GCC needs a real purpose if it is to remain a viable organization and a
better mechanism to bring about consensus amongst its members. Animosity
towards Tehran cannot last long as member states would want to reap the
benefits of forging trade and commercial ties with Iran.
Moreover, inter-state and intra-state problems can hinder the GCC’s
effectiveness as a unified geopolitical force. As long as the GCC does not
properly address those issues, it will remain an organization that issues
political declarations that do not require any action on the part of its
members. Until it overcomes these problems, its political and strategic
effectiveness could be called into question.
Received on Tue May 13 2014 - 17:40:10 EDT