Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 22:50:56 +0200
Inter-Tribal Clashes in Southern Libya: A Factor of Local and National
Instability
Tribal Revolutionary Rebels, courtesy of BRQ Network /flickr
15 May 2014
Different tribes continue to vie for power and influence across southern
Libya, writes Riccardo Dugulin. Not only are the tensions there undermining
the country's public administration and ability to exploit natural
resources, they also highlight the army's inability to control vast tracts
of Libyan territory.
By Riccardo Dugulin for International Security Observer (ISO)
Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in October 2011, a plethora of issues
has been tearing apart the Libyan social fabric and substantially hindering
the country's security environment. In the northern and northeastern
provinces, criminal networks, former rebel groups, and radical Islamist
militants have resorted to violence in an effort to expand their political
and financial gains.
In Libya's southern regions, stretching from Sebha to Kufra, tribal
animosities represent a major factor of instability. Since 2012, Arab ethnic
and black African tribes vying for local power and national recognition have
clashed against each other. These incidents pose a threat to the country's
public infrastructure and to the government's ability to successfully
exploit its energy resources. In addition, tribal tensions in southern Libya
have highlighted the Libyan army's inability to fully control the country's
territory.
The Tebu tribe is a Chadian ethnic group consisting of approximately 350,000
people.[i] Its members mainly live in the northern Aouzou Strip in Chad, the
southern regions of Libya and on Niger's northeastern border. Under
Gaddafi's rule, the Tebu people were widely marginalized and discriminated
by the Libyan authorities. As part of the country's Arabization policy, the
state put in place an institutionalized persecution of the Tebu people. This
move culminated in a December 2007 decision to strip all the tribe members
of their Libyan citizenship.[ii]
After the 2011 Libyan civil war, tensions flared up in the country's
southern regions as Tebu tribesmen demanded greater socio-political
recognition. In the first semester of 2012, Tebu fighters clashed with Arab
ethnic Zuwayya tribesmen in Kufra and with Abu Seif tribesmen in Sebha. The
fighting in Kufra lasted from February until the end of June and resulted in
more than 270 dead.[iii] The violence was sparked by a clash between Zuwayya
and Tebu gunmen in Kufra. Hostilities stopped after the intervention of the
Libyan armed forces and the imposition of a ceasefire. A similar scenario
unfolded in Sebha where a personal dispute between Tebu and Abu Seif
tribesmen sparked six days of intense violence that led to more than 160
dead.[iv] The situation de-escalated when Libyan army soldiers entered into
Sebha.
Tensions between Tebu fighters and Arab ethnic tribes remain a constant
factor of instability in Sebha and Kufra. Violence flared up in January 2014
when Tebu gunmen kidnapped and killed a commander of a Sebha revolutionary
brigade in Taraghin, southeast of Sebha. The incident resulted in more than
two weeks of fighting between Tebu and Arab ethnic tribes leaving more than
a hundred dead.[v] The violence spread throughout the region and highlighted
the structural factors of instability in Libya's southern regions. In
addition, sporadic tribal clashes throughout February 2014 resulted in
temporary shutdowns of the Sarir power station in the Kufra region.[vi]
These rounds of violence lead to effects that spread further than the
disruptions they directly cause in the affected areas. Inter-tribal violence
highlights the current inability by the Libyan government to successfully
rein in tribal armed groups operating in the country's southern regions; it
underscores the fact that external terrorist actors may use the porosity of
the southern Libyan border to develop staging areas for future attacks; and
it bodes negatively for the Libyan political system's ability to integrate
the country's components into its legislative structure.
The Effects of Tribal Tensions in the Sebha and Kufra Regions
The 2012 and 2014 clashes in Sebha and Kufra underscore a set of effects
that can result from tribal tensions in Libya's southern regions. The
instability generated by these periodic rounds of violence threatens both
local life standards and the operations of international corporations
investing in the area.
As was highlighted during the January 2014 Sebha clashes, violence exerts a
heavy toll on local infrastructure and bears the potential of shutting down
local administrations. In late January, reports were issued by the hospital
of Murzuq, a town south of Sebha, that basic medical supplies were running
low and that the personnel lacked the logistics to carry out basic
tasks.[vii] People in need of treatment had to be evacuated to medical
facilities up to 170km away from Murzuq. This situation was caused by the
increased inflow of wounded from Sebha as well as by the fact that overland
travel routes were blocked by the fighting. The violence also paralyzed the
commercial and political life in Sebha. Shops were closed for more than two
weeks and the local council suspended its work, depriving the town's
inhabitants of basic administrative services.
In addition to these direct effects endured by the local population,
inter-tribal clashes in Sebha resulted in disruption that affected both
Libyans and international personnel. The Sebha airport, located in the
eastern portion of the city was intermittently closed during the January
2014 violence. Clashes in the area often led to the suspension of flights
because of security concerns.[viii] According to airport officials,
government forces should provide a safe area of at least 20km around the
facility for it to operate normally. However, because of its proximity to
the contested city, tribal clashes do erupt near the airport's perimeter.
The closure of the Sebha airport had a negative effect on travel to Libya's
southern regions as there are only two airports used for commercial flights
in the region. The second one, the Obari airport, quickly becomes
overcrowded when the Sebha airport closes.
A third effect of inter-tribal fighting lies in the direct impact these
events have on the country's energy production. The case of the Sarir power
station exemplifies this issue. The station is guarded by a unit of the
Petroleum Facility Guards (PFG). The PFG Sarir unit is mainly formed by Tebu
fighters. The 427th Brigade of the Libyan army is stationed in the Sarir
power plant area. It is mainly composed by ethnic Arab Zwai tribesmen.
Clashes between both tribes often result in the shelling of the energy
infrastructure. These attacks lead to the temporary shutdown of the complex
and the potential suspension of energy supplies to northern Libya.
Inter-tribal clashes in the Kufra region can thus have large scale
repercussions in the rest of the country. In addition, a direct consequence
of the clashes in the country's southern region is that they can result in
the temporary closure of oil fields, such as the al-Elephant and the
al-Sarara ones. In turn, no oil arrives to the northern refineries and
terminals. Power shortages and oil shortages may result in additional social
discontent and labor unrest. These tensions caused by unstable energy
supplies can lead to demonstrations and work stoppages generating a threat
to business continuity for international companies.
Inter-Tribal Clashes: an Indicator of Libya's Long-Term Issues
Clashes in Sebha and Kufra stand as an indicator of troubles ahead for the
Libyan government. Following the analysis of the tensions between black
Chadian and ethnic Arab tribes in southern Libya, three conclusions can be
drawn.
First, while inter-tribal violence has so far been curtailed by the
intervention of military forces, the fact that the government had to send
troops to the country's southern border regions underscores its lack of
capabilities to fully control these areas. This situation leaves major
territorial gaps that can be exploited by armed groups other than local
tribes to challenge the Libyan state or threaten international interests in
the area. The takeover by Gaddafi loyalists of the Tamerhint airbase and
their show-of-force in Ajilat[ix] at the end of January 2014 highlights the
fact that armed groups operating in the south can be a nuisance to the
state. These actions did not result in any territorial or political gain for
the Gaddafi loyalists. However, in the long-run they may contribute to
further erode the government's legitimacy in the area.
Second, the southern border regions of the country offer an ideal safe haven
and staging area for regional Islamist terrorist networks. Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is known to operate in the northern regions of Niger
and Chad. While AQIM has not yet penetrated the inter-tribal conflicts in
southern Libya, the porosity of the southern border and relative inability
of the armed forces to secure these areas raises the risk of further
terrorist incursions in the southern portion of the country. In the
beginning of January 2014, a senior member of the Tebu tribe stated that
AQIM fighters are strengthening their foothold in the southwestern region
close to Sebha[x]. Armed radical Islamists are in the process of acquiring
weapons and forging alliances with local Arab tribes and members of the
Tuareg community in order to gain the right to remain in the area.
The third and last point refers to tribal tensions that could factor
negatively in the country's overall electoral process. In February 2014,
Tebu representatives called for the boycott of the elections for the Libyan
Constitutional Committee.[xi] This boycott was caused by the alleged ongoing
discrimination against Tebu tribesmen. In March members of the Tebu
community staged rallies in Tripoli calling for enhanced political rights.
They requested Libyan authorities to implement policies against alleged
state-sponsored discriminations and to provide tribesmen with enhanced
security. While these events are not highly influential in themselves, they
point toward a loss of legitimacy by the government and the risk of claims
for increased autonomy in the country's southern regions.
At this juncture, there remains an elevated risk of further tribal clashes
in Sebha, Murzuq and throughout the country's southern regions. These
incidents bare the potential of further destabilizing the region and
breaking the fragile peace agreement that was reached at the end of February
2014. For now, tribal clashes in the south do not involve federalist
demands. Tebu fighters demand greater integration in the current political
system and a fairer allocation of the national budget without calling for
enhanced autonomy inside Libya. Further small-scale clashes between Arab and
Chadian tribes in the Libyan southern desert should closely be monitored as
they can rapidly lead to major disruptions in the affected areas and
instability throughout the country.
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