Off-track in Somalia: parliament attack exemplifies lost momentum, weak
leadership & deepening crises
- By Yusuf M. Hassan
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/05/27/off-track-in-somalia-parliament-atta
ck-exemplifies-lost-momentum-weak-leadership-deepening-crises-by-yusuf-m-has
san/> May 27, 2014
Somalia is off-track on its journey towards improved security, an agreed
federal constitution, and credible national elections by 2016. On May 24th,
in another attack that exemplifies rising insecurity, the insurgent group Al
Shabaab stormed the Federal Parliament building in Mogadishu. In August
2012, when the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) emerged at the completion
of the Roadmap Process, it was accorded unwarranted optimism by the
international community and hailed as the country's "best hope" after
decades of conflict and statelessness. Political newcomer Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud was heralded as a peace activist, who could reunite the fragmented
nation and given red carpet treatment at world capitals. The new Government
received diplomatic recognition for the first time since 1991.
These significant, yet hasty actions took place before Hassan Sheikh could
prove his credibility and capacity for national leadership as President of
Somalia. Regrettably, he misinterpreted the quick international endorsement
as validation to implement a highly divisive and partisan political agenda.
Hassan Sheikh's two visits to Washington revealed the US Government's
shifting tone - one that was at once cautionary and pragmatic. "President
Obama drops by a meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia
(January 17, 2013)" was the title on
<
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/photo/2013/01/president-obama-dr
ops-meeting-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud-somalia> WhiteHouse.gov, which,
in diplomatic parlance, reflected Washington's tentative acceptance of the
new leader. Washington's realpolitik was better defined during his second
visit, in September 2013, when
<
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214470.htm> Secretary of
State John Kerry commended FGS counter-terrorism efforts, but emphasised
broader US policy objectives: "There's work yet to be done in Puntland and
Somaliland, and we encourage you to continue the work of reaching out, of
reconciliation and rebuilding the democracy".
Then came the political hammer: in a testimony to the US Senate in February
2014,
<
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6a321b3e-8dc4-11e3-bbe7-00144feab7de.html#axzz32Q
8I3gqT> US national intelligence director James Clapper said that the
credibility and effectiveness of FGS to fulfill its mandate "will be further
threatened by persistent political infighting [and] weak leadership from
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud". Mr Clapper's comments came two months
after former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon clashed with the President
and consequently lost a confidence vote in Parliament. While President
Hassan denied Mr Clapper's allegations, there is no question that political
discord within FGS institutions is having a crippling effect and impeding
progress in political, security, economic and humanitarian spheres.
Since 2011, Mogadishu has experienced some relatively peaceful periods,
Turkish aid projects and Diaspora investment. However, these gains could be
reversed as insurgents have managed to wage an endless campaign of violence,
compelling National Security Minister Abdikarim Hussein Guled, the
President's close ally, to resign in shame after the recent attack on
Parliament. The insurgents have previously launched deadly attacks on the
presidential palace, the Supreme Court, the UN compound and the Turkish
Embassy in Mogadishu.
<
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47863#.U36jZZSSy1s> UN
Special Envoy to Somalia Nicholas Kay, in a briefing to the Security Council
on May 22, voiced valid concerns about the letter of May 5th signed by
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/08/us-somalia-president-idUSBREA470P
P20140508> over 100 Somali MPs, calling on the President to resign, which Mr
Kay justifiably fears will revive institutional deadlocks that paralysed
former interim governments and plunge the country deeper into crisis. The
MPs threatened impeachment and cited the Government's shortcomings to curb
rising insecurity (in April, two MPs were assassinated in Mogadishu within
24 hours), and its inability to manage economic difficulties, restore basic
services and advance national reconciliation. Mr Kay warned that, "Somalia
is approaching a danger zone" and urged FGS institutions to "work together"
to avoid further delays in the country's fragile state-building process.
In his briefing, Mr Kay described a humanitarian situation that could
potentially "jeopardise political, economic and development gains", raising
the prospect of a deepening crisis. Further complicating matters, the UN
Security Council called for "improved arms and ammunition management in
Somalia" - emphasising the international community's concern that the 1992
UN arms embargo, which was partially lifted in March 2013, is being flouted
by FGS and that diverted weapons are ending up on the black market, or
worse, in the hands of insurgents.
The FGS has also disappointed many in the donor community. At the
<
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/170913_post_somalia_conference_en.ht
m> New Deal conference in Brussels, in September 2013, the international
community pledged $2.4billion to aid Somalia's recovery, but donors have
become wary of entrusting Mogadishu with direct funding, conditional to
improved financial reforms and greater transparency. Distrust soared after
<
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/14/us-somalia-corruption-insight-idU
SBREA1D08P20140214> then-Central Bank governor Yusur Abrar wrote a damning
resignation letter in October 2013, citing corruption allegations, threats
to her personal safety, and implicated senior FGS officials in graft.
The imperative to get Somalia back on track is hindered by many barriers.
The FGS functions in an extremely difficult operational environment, with
perpetual insecurity, limited resources, a divided nation and foreign
exploitation. It is regrettable and costly that FGS unilateral policies did
not remedy these troubles, but pursued an approach that puts the centre
(federal) and the periphery (states and regions) on a collision course, by
contravening constitutional distribution of power, disregarding national
consultation on security and federalism, and failing to implement
fair-sharing of foreign aid. For example, the FGS cannot unilaterally
rebuild Somali National Forces, which obliges its cooperation with domestic
partners to actualise the shared goal of a Somali force that is professional
and representative, and which may replace AMISOM.
In that same spirit of cooperation, progress can be achieved on an agreed
federal constitution and national elections. Additionally, dialogue between
FGS and Somaliland should include Puntland as a stakeholder, to secure a
comprehensive and lasting agreement. Indeed, with lawful implementation, the
federal model should be mutually beneficial for the centre and the periphery
in the concomitant political dispensation.
The Somali people were jubilant in 2012 when the FGS emerged; they were
expecting a just, responsible and responsive Government that is accountable
and effective. While the FGS has lost that critical momentum, it should
harness and exploit that enduring spirit by adopting a pragmatic approach to
reconcile and reunite the fragmented country. Social repair is a
prerequisite to state building, to healing past wounds and ending the
culture of impunity. A successful approach would mobilise human capital,
advocate open and constructive national dialogue, implement federalism in a
consultative process, nurture social justice and community reconciliation
initiatives and foster economic development.
Confrontational and polarising policies risk inflaming societal divisions,
waste time and resources, marginalise the periphery and evoke donor
mistrust. This became evident in the Federal Government's mismanagement of
the Jubaland state formation process and the Baidoa Conference. The FGS
would be best positioned to embrace a fresh political track that engenders
partnerships and rebuilds mutual trust and cooperation among legitimate
Somali political actors. Increased domestic support would empower the FGS to
enact sweeping reforms in institution building, economy, security, and
public finance sectors. Somali people share the overriding purpose of
tackling the scourge of intractable insurgencies, poverty and exodus, but
with sensible policies, the FGS remains in a position to play an
instrumental role in this regard.
Yusuf M. Hassan is a Somali-American journalist and writer. In his former
capacity as Puntland government adviser, he has engaged with Somali
political actors, foreign diplomatic missions and the UN, and has
participated at international conferences and forums on Somalia.
Received on Tue May 27 2014 - 14:39:22 EDT