Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 21:46:47 +0200
Peacekeepers in the CAR: disunited, disillusioned and mostly ineffective
Posted on
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/05/28/peacekeepers-in-the-car-disunited-di
sillusioned-and-mostly-ineffective/> May 30, 2014
M’Poko Airport in Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, is a hub
of activity. Internally displaced Central Africans camp on the runway;
soldiers from all around the continent line the perimeter; while advisors
and combat forces from as far away as France patrol the gateways. Which of
these groups you perceive to have the strongest presence depends, to a great
extent, on your point of view. From the air it seems to be the Central
Africans, seen from the terminal building it is the African Union (AU)
soldiers who are most visible, but at the entry checkpoints it is the
Europeans that are in control.
French forces under Operation Sangaris were deployed to the airport in
December 2013. They were soon followed by the African-led International
Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) that included troop
contributions from Rwanda, Chad, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Burundi,
Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In April
2014, France voted to increase its presence from 2,000 to 4,000 men. Member
states of the European Union (EU) also began sending troops to M’Poko;
Finnish and Estonian troops have already deployed as part of the European
Union Force for the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA). At the April
EU-Africa summit, the United Nations (UN) authorised a new mission to the
CAR that would increase MISCA’s numbers from 6,000 to 10,000, as well as
providing an additional 1,800 police officers from September 2014.
With half of all troops resting at any given moment, there are currently
several thousand active peace-keepers deployed at M’Poko Airport, across
Bangui and in the CAR’s key rural towns. They share a mandate to “help
protect civilians, stabilise the country and restore State authority over
the territory, as well as create conditions conducive to the provision of
humanitarian assistance”. Their presence is aimed at discouraging random
internal movement by providing civilians with a sense of security. It is
also designed to facilitate systemised movement – or evacuation – when the
circumstances render that necessary. Additionally, peacekeepers play a key
role in securing the transport of aid and consumer goods through M’Poko,
border posts and rural hubs.
Following the recent summit, France is expected to extend its mandate to
include the use of “all necessary means” to enable a national disarmament
campaign. Nevertheless, the Sangaris, MISCA and EUFOR troops are, and will
remain, a joint peace enforcement operation and not a force for offensive
action.
Disunity
The UN authorises and advises the collective intervention force. It cannot,
however, ensure adherence to the mandate it approved or create a sense of
unity. This has proven to be unachievable among the MISCA ranks. In December
2013 for example, a group of Burundian soldiers – of which a total of 850
were deployed to the CAR under MISCA – opened fire on a Chadian unit,
killing three peace-keepers. In May of this year, rumours circulated in
Bangui that opportunistic Burundian soldiers were lending their uniforms to
militia for economic gain. Reports have also leaked through the Central
African press that Congolese units have refused to cooperate with other
MISCA units, while members of the Cameroonian deployment, owing to wage
arrears, have refused to cooperate at all.
Most significantly, Chadian soldiers withdrew following accusations that
they committed human rights abuses during fighting near the airport in March
that killed 24 and injured over 100. The 800 strong Chadian unit had been
instrumental in evacuating Bangui’s Muslim population to towns north of the
city and to refugee camps over the CAR’s borders. Chadian-led convoys
leaving the city each week became a prime target for militia grenade
attacks. The abuse accusations were made after Chadian soldiers responded by
opening fire on one occasion.
Despite being nominally coordinated by Multinational Operational Commander,
General Martin Toumeta Chomu of Cameroon, each African contingent has the
scope to act independently on the ground. This is in part due to the
changing nature of the conflict, which requires situational reactions, but
it is also because direct orders of AU units come from a national (i.e.
Chadian, Burundian, Cameroonian or Congolese etc.) commander. This commander
himself follows nationally stipulated, rather than coordinated or
international, terms of engagement. This leaves considerable room for
regional agendas. The direct action that Chadian peacekeepers took to defend
convoys leaving Bangui might be understood as a reflection of Chadian
President Idriss Déby’s policy of direct mediation in the CAR, particularly
since the national commander of the Chadian troops is the president’s
brother.
Disillusion?
The combined UN force is limited by its peace-keeping mandate and hampered
by lack of unity and inadequate funding. This intervention force will not
relieve the conflict. The supplementary UN mission expected in September
and supported by the April EUFOR arrivals is equally unlikely to resolve it.
The absence of a national army, reliable infrastructure and institutions, as
well as an established government, will hinder progress towards a
resolution. The activities of several armed groups with strong designs for
artisanal mines, the presence of over 500,000 displaced civilians and the
wide-spread sharing of toxic rumours of cannibalism and disenfranchisement
due to displacement, will only make matters more difficult.
It is overly optimistic to expect that peace will soon be restored to the
CAR. The fluidity of the situation, as evidenced by the last six months,
does, however, demonstrate that significant changes are possible. In
December 2013, the country was led by Michel Djotodia and threatened by a
rebel group known as the ex-Séléka. In January, Djotodia sought exile in
Cameroon and was replaced by Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, backed
by France and the Republic of Congo. By February, the self-formed vigilante
militias that forced the ex-Séléka to flee Bangui became the new number one
enemy of the state. By March, these groups had grown confident enough to
include UN troops amongst their targets. In April, ex-Séléka began
orchestrating reprisal attacks outside of Bangui and in May, new
self-defence groups were established in the capital to fight against the
vigilante militias.
When the new UN recruits arrive at M’Poko airport they will not face the
same situation that resulted in their deployment. But their mandate and
command structures will not have changed to reflect the new facts on the
ground. They will attempt to establish order and stability, but are unlikely
to succeed.
The writer is a political analyst based in London.
<http://africanarguments.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/CAR.jpg> Situation
in Central African Republic
The UN Security Council discusses the situation in the Central African
Republic.
(image/jpeg attachment: image001.jpg)