The current debate about Somalia's future and its relationship with foreign
donors is split between two schools of thought - those who advocate 'hybrid
systems of governance' and those who continue to see state-building as the
necessary first step towards stability and prosperity.
The Kenyan government's brutal human rights violations against the Somali
community in Kenya as well as its its unlawful military and diplomatic
actions in the Jubba regions of Somalia have gone largely uncommented upon.
Despite the troubling silence of African, Islamic, and Western leaders, a
glimmer of hope emerged in April. Two Nordic diplomats have ignited a
renewed a focus on peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia, challenging
donor powers to end the indirect rule, occupation and containment, and
seriously support state-building in Somalia. The current transgressive
interactions between neighboring and other foreign countries and Somali
leaders - including presidents and mayors of both clan enclaves and cities -
flout Somalia's sovereignty, independence, and unity and undermine the
state-building objective central to Somalia's peaceful existence and
prosperity.
H. E. Pekka Havvisto, minister of international development of Finland and
co-chairperson of the forum for International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and
State-building (IDPS), and Jens Mjaugedal, special envoy of Norway for
Somalia, have called on donor powers to effectively honor their commitments
to state-building in Somalia, as mandated by United Nations (UN) Security
Council. Immediately, in dissension, Ken Menkhaus - professor of political
science at Davidson College in North Carolina, USA, Horn of Africa
specialist and an affiliate of Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden -
came out forcefully against the wisdom and viability of state-building in
Somalia. Thus, the glimmer of hope for state-building is under attack.
On April 10, at a roundtable discussion on peacebuilding and state-building
in the Horn of Africa, held at Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.,
Pekka Havvisto has articulated the critical need to implement the goals and
principles of the New Deal for Engagement in Conflict Affected and Fragile
States agreed upon in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011. The five goals of
the New Deal for state-building - namely political legitimacy and
inclusivity, people's security, system of justice, economic foundations,
revenue and fair delivery services - have been developed through
collaborative consultations between international donors, the g7+ countries
(19 conflict affected and fragile states), the international Network on
Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and civil society secretariats under the
leadership of IDPS Forum. Furthermore, the New Deal incorporates the five
principles of aid effectiveness - ownership, alignment, harmonization,
results, and mutual accountability - on the basis of normative relations
between donors and recipients.
Minister Pekka reiterated the fundamental principles of the New Deal which
require the governments and citizens of g7+ nations to - through a
self-owned and self-led process - adopt a social contract (constitution)
which binds the citizens and state. This ownership should be manifestly
respected and supported by donor powers.
Particularly for Somalia, where the foundations of governance are completely
absent, Minister Pekka contended that the strong interests of neighboring
countries in Somalia as well as and the international community's limited
interest in security served to undercut the takeoff of the New Deal. To
preempt any possible suggestion that either the informal and formal
institutions should have primacy, he asserted that both institutions exist
side by side in the Horn of Africa countries. In summary, his message was to
promote the understanding and adoption of the New Deal for fragile states.
On April 17, in conversation with Peter Fabricious, foreign editor of
Independent Newspapers in South Africa, Norway Special Envoy for Somalia
Jens Mjaugedal repeated the views expressed by the Minister of Finland. He
was particularly disturbed by how donor powers were far from grasping the
reality of Somalia and wasted precious time discussing issues peripheral to
state-building in a warzone. He unambiguously suggested that donor powers
need to conduct internal triage before embarking on state-building. He
pointed out that the funding of UN programmes is not contributing to the
vital, overall aim of establishing the capacity, credibility and relevance
of the Somali government.
For example, he cited the fact that that the Somali government is unable to
pay salaries to eight thousand civil servants because donor powers did not
disburse one dollar of the $2.3 billion pledged at the Brussels Conference
in September 2013. It is also hard not to despair in the face of the level
of suffering subjected upon the Somali National Army, which carries the
burden of the war against Al Shabab. Somali Soldiers do not get the one
twelfth (1/12) of the stipend regularly paid to each African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM) soldier. At the same time they are deprived of basic
care, even in the case of casualty.
Jens Mjaugedal did not advocate the release of large sums of money,
suggesting only the release of less than 5% of the $2.3 billion. He stated
that 'Somalia is the one of the most privatised countries in the world',
which means Somalia is without state authority. Similarly, Professor Michael
J Boyle said that Somalia's conflict has been globalised. Thus,
state-building in Somalia is an urgent matter for the purpose of
international peace and security. History will remember the Nordic diplomats
for their bold actions, bringing the true reality of Somalia to the
everyone's attention. Somali leaders failed to reflect and act upon the
reality, needs, and aspirations of their people and country.
With regards to the endemic corruption alleged against Somali leaders, the
anti-state-building strategy pursued by powerful, foreign actors involved in
the internal politics of Somalia can be identified as the cause. Today, the
majority of the Somali people believe that they have lost the control,
ownership, and freedom to determine their own future to outside forces. This
feeling could produce a disastrous backlash for all.
Before presenting and commenting on the dissenting argument of Professor Ken
Menkhaus, I would like to mention three instructive points which the general
secretary of the g7+, Helder da Costa, made in a letter published in The
Guardian newspaper in April 2014, under the title 'New Deal for fragile
states needs time and political commitment to flourish'.
- The New Deal demands fundamental changes in the modus operandi of donor
powers and the way they work in fragile countries. It details principles,
commitments, and actions. The practice of risky taking, speedy actions,
flexibility, persistence, and creativity are proviso in it
- The "better angels" working in the development agencies know the positive
effects of the New Deal, but they remain stuck to their institutional
culture stubbornly resistant to changes
- Genuine state-building demands great investment of time, resources and
political will
On 29 April, Professor Ken Menkhaus published his dissenting policy note,
probably intended to delight the security-concerned US Administration. The
media briefing of May 3 on Secretary of State John Kerry's meeting with
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
indicates the US Administration's ambiguity on state-building in Somalia.
While the US Administration accorded diplomatic recognition to the federal
government of Somalia, it also allowed regional actors to dishevel Somalia
and undermine state-building goals. This could fuel new political and social
tensions, if not conflicts.
The title of the dissenting policy note, which first reinterprets and then
dismisses the views expressed by the two Nordic diplomats, is 'If Mayors
ruled Somalia-Beyond state-building impasse'. Professor Ken Menkhaus'
attempt seems to be part of a larger effort to kill the agenda of the New
Deal after the crisis and abysmal performance of Somalia, South Sudan, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Unfortunately, Somalia - the classic
example of a failed states - has also become quickly an example for
state-building failure.
Professor Ken has consistently argued against the restoration of the Somali
State which collapsed in January 1991, on the basis of a set of selective,
embellished, and recycled narratives which have never been subjected to
rigorous academic and empirical research and analysis. He confidently
predicts that 'with or without the $2.3 billion in New Deal assistance,
Somalia's government will remain weak and fragile for years to come'. His
intense promotion of 'hybrid governance in Somalia' is shaped by the
following findings against South Central Somalia:
- Somali political elites in Mogadishu embraced state-building as a
lucrative project, but not as an objective. In addition, Somali leaders lack
not only capacity but political will too
- The culture of corruption and the deep-rooted problems of spoilers among
the political and business elites in Mogadishu is endemic
- The serious problem of insecurity and access in South Central Somalia
makes the principles of inclusivity and local ownership out of reach for
government
- The weak legitimacy of any government due to divisions caused by
representation, clan, political Islam, and federalism are insurmountable
- The realisation of a social contract between the state and its citizens in
South Central Somalia is unrealistic in the short term
- Finding a solution to 'Somalia's wicked problem' remains almost
impossible. Therefore, Somalis and foreign donors have to accept flawed,
contested municipality governments of dubious legitimacy.
On 8 August 2012, a few days after the approval of the provisional
constitution which ended the transition period and established a permanent
government, Professor Ken Menkhaus published a paper entitled, 'Somalia's
20-Year Experiment in Hybrid Governance'. In this paper he argues that the
Somali State cannot be reconstituted in the foreseeable future, going on to
list the arguments put forward by four different schools of thought
regarding the relevance of informal governance systems (hybrid governance)
in Somalia. In defining the term 'hybrid governance', he settles on
'municipality governance (city-state)' ruled by Mayors. It is not clear if
the concepts of secession and separation of communities form part of this
idea of hybrid governance which considers the discussion of a national
constitution premature subject.
The conception of municipality governance as the location of multiple clans,
best governance for law and order and basic service delivery defies reality,
economics, demography, legitimacy, security, and political sense, and is far
from an empirical truth. In addition, the claim that accountability is
stronger in most municipalities due to their proximity to citizens is also
demonstrably weak.
However, it is possible that under certain circumstances, cities and towns
are less encumbered by clan disputes simply because one sub sub clan
dominates in each city. But it is hard to see how external assistance,
denied to a national government, could be channeled to municipal
administrations, given the rules governing foreign aid. It is equally
difficult to see how NGO assistance will improve the livelihoods of the
citizens of this war devastated and fragmented country.
It is academically dishonest to argue that donor powers have ever seriously
attempted to peacebuild and state-build in Somalia. In fact, Dr. Michael J.
Boyle noted that 'Somalia has played the part - both in political practice
and political myth - of a testing ground in which states play out their
fantasies out of political order. The consequence is that Somalia, as a real
place with real people, has rarely been seen on its own terms'. Therefore,
the foreign driven political initiatives in the last 12 years have been far
more lucrative for donor agencies and their bureaucrats than for to Somali
Elites.
Following a workshop organised by the London School of Economics and
Political Science in collaboration with the University of Antwerp on Hybrid
Governance, Professors Kate Meagher, Tom De Herdt, and Kristof Titeca have
published a briefing article titled, 'Hybrid governance in Africa: Buzzword
or paradigm shift?', on the African Argument website. The article presents a
long list of yet to be answered questions about this new concept being sold
as 'practical and legitimate governance that works'. The questions include
the role of academics as promoters or investigators of the new concept, the
nature of the powers that create the hybrid governance structures when good
governance norms have been disregarded, and if hybrid governance enhances
the performance and legitimacy of the state or erodes it. The professors
cautioned against the assumption that all informal institutions are by
definition locally legitimate as a misreading of local realities.
Another unanswered question is that of how hybrid governance deals with
public accountability and citizenship rights. The participants of the
workshop noted the growing evidence that hybrid governance does not always
represent a good synergistic arrangement between weak (fragile) states and
local institutions. The scholars who attended the workshop advised the
academics promoting hybrid governance to exercise prudence so as not to get
hand deep in the dirty. The consensus on addressing the problems of fragile
states is well spelled out in the New Deal partnership for effective
international development cooperation between donor powers and fragile
states.