The Sovereign Nation-State as a Contributor to Terrorism
By Strobe Driver
4 November 2014
The current crises associated with terrorism notwithstanding, in particular
the shocking acts by individuals in the beheading of civilians as acts of
revenge, there are issues with regard to the nation-state and its role in
the ‘shaping’ of terrorism that have remained undisclosed. The active
participation of individuals and/or groups and their forming of a reaction
to the nation-state is what has remained at the forefront of the commentary.
By its very nature, the focus on the reaction implies a dyad: the perpetual
reinforcement of the nation-state as being just and reasonable, and that
those who react against the nation-state and its laws/wisdoms are criminals.
Hence, there has been no comment with regard to the ‘process’ – such as the
systemic brutalisation of a populace as encountered by the ‘Marsh Peoples’
of southern Iraq under the Saddam Hussein regime, which caused them to rise
up after the First Gulf War. To wit, governments need not acknowledge their
role in creating terrorists, and terrorism. However, placing terrorism in
perspective with regard to the nation-state provides a useful template and
guide to what it consists ‘of.’
‘There are many definitions for the word terrorism as there are methods of
executing it… however, most definitions of terrorism hinge on three factors:
the method (violence), the target (civilian or government) and the purpose
(to instill fear and force political or social change).’ [1] Save for the
ongoing mantra of poverty creating discontent and disenfranchisement of
peoples – which is often followed by group violence – governments of
nation-states tend to decouple from deeper issues that bring about
decentralised, yet organized, group violence. Therefore, the questioning of
what governments actually ‘do’ in order to bring about the rise of a
‘non-state actor’ remains unmentioned, unexamined, and, more importantly,
unattached to governments and their explicit actions. The Islamic State (IS)
is the current overt example in such a state of affairs and is encountering
the wrath of several nation-states – including Australia.
Whether liberal-democracy is the best form of government is a moot point and
need not be debated here, as this essay is concerned with why a group would
rebel against a liberal-democratic government – such as the current Iraqi
government – and pursue change through violence. A counter-argument is, and
remains, if the sovereign state was accomplishing the task of good
government/governance, the corresponding inclusiveness it would generate
would surely render violent reaction (near) non-existent. This is currently
not the case in many nations. Therefore, the question of what does it ‘take’
for a group – such as IS – to react with violence, and why is it intent on
the creation of a territory that essentially overrides traditional
boundaries? A useful broad-spectrum answer to this question is evident by
their actions of claiming the territory IS believes is theirs and, as such,
IS has no respect for traditional Western/Eurocentric stipulated boundaries.
Whilst there are no surprises in the outcome of governments – whether
liberal-democratic or otherwise – not questioning their role in creating
terrorism and/or terrorists per se, as this could involve the burden of
introspection, it is nevertheless useful to delve deeper into how the notion
of sovereignty has changed; and in turn, observe what this fluidity has done
in encouraging a ‘rise in terrorism.’
There is a need, in order to bring a balance to the current debate, to cast
aside the horrendous acts of individuals and focus on terrorism per se that,
therefore, involves taking a clinical approach to the issue. There is much
needed in the overall commentary with regard to terrorism and terrorists
that requires coming to terms with the role of the nation-state in order to
comprehend what has come to be its bedevilment. Terrorism, after all, does
not happen ‘in a vacuum,’ and it is not an ahistorical event. Therefore,
understanding terrorism in the later twentieth century and the early
twenty-first century requires a significant historical leap, which enables
the nation-state to be grounded in its historical intent – what it was
supposed to ‘become’ – and paradoxically, observing this factor and how it
has changed over time offers an understanding of why non-state actors
(terrorists) exist.
The Treaty of Westphalia [2] – hereafter referred to as the ‘Treaty’ – in
1648 saw the formulation of the sovereign nation-state (often referred to as
the ‘State’ or ‘Statehood’), and from this time the notion of what is to be
‘sovereign’ has been imposed on the world. The Treaty was an agreement by
the elite powers of Western Europe that ended the Sixty Years War [3] which
had laid waste to much of Europe. Eventually, the processes and the
underpinnings of the Treaty would usurp all that stood in the way of the
accompanying Westphalian system of government and governance. Or, put more
simply, how governments are structured and how they should interact with
their respective populaces through rule-of-law, diplomacy, merit, and
numerous other ‘reasonable’ acts. The power of the Treaty can be seen in the
sovereign-state marshalling its abilities through the use of a disciplined
army and in some cases navy, and of the State becoming the ‘strongest form
of political organisation.’ [4] Feudal rulers, feudal families, tribes,
clans, weak(er) monarchs, dynasties, elites, and numerous other groups would
be drawn into the State in one way or another. This could be achieved
through persuasion, as in the case of the French in Corsica by offering
protection or the use of brute force, such as the British in the case of
Scotland and the Dutch in Indonesia. Others – nomadic peoples such as the
European gypsies, native peoples such as the Australian Aborigines, and the
Amerindians – would be completely overcome through ongoing pressure and, at
times, direct force. African tribes, too, through the arbitrary drawing up
of borders by the great colonial powers (Britain, Italy, Portugal, and
France) over approximately two centuries [5] experienced the Treaty
first-hand in this way. The intrusion of Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships,’ in
order to demand long-secluded Japan trade with the West (1853-1854), [6] is
also an intrusion of the Westphalian system spurred on by mercantilism, in a
post-1648 world. The banal yet necessary observation to acknowledge is that
the centuries-long success of the covenant of statehood remains
internationally recognised and largely accepted to this day. There is,
however, one crucial aspect that came into being via the Treaty and it is a
rigid understanding of what sovereignty has at its root: recognized
demarcated borders, and the non-interference of others. Thus,
The world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial states
that recognize no superior authority; the processes of law-making,
settlement of disputes and law enforcement are largely in the hands of
individual states; [and] international law is oriented to the establishment
of minimal rules of coexistence. [7]
The above statement suggests sovereign states are allowed – due to the
implementations of numerous international laws – to govern their recognized
territories in any way they choose. Therefore, no other country is to impose
their ‘values’ of governance on another sovereign state. The reality of the
situation is vastly different. Powerful nation-states, for centuries, have
sought to impose their value-systems on others often resulting in ‘total
war.’ Total war consists of ‘a high mobilisation of society… [comprise] a
fight for survival… [and] mobilize resources and means to wage battles with
few restraints.’ [8] There have also been micro-instances of this phenomenon
– known as ‘limited war’ – delivered against groups within nation-states by
their own government or by other more powerful States, often for a nebulous
‘greater good.’ Limited war is, however, a more difficult phenomenon to
explain as it is nebulous by definition. Broadly speaking, ‘limited war’
requires nations to place ‘artificial restraints to preclude it from
escalating into total war… [and] limitations on the objectives sought;
weapons and manpower employed; the time, terrain, and geographic area of
hostilities; and the emotions, passions, and energy, and intellect committed
by a nation.’ [9] The problematics of limited war are that it has, within
it, conceptual tensions: how much of a commitment is ‘limited,’ and by what
‘means’ should they be measured? [10] Osgood’s enunciation of the pivotal
discord within the concept stresses the difficulties of what ‘limited’
actually consists of in hostilities, and this incorporates the following
dichotomy: ‘war may be limited from the perspective of one belligerent, yet
virtually unlimited in the eyes of another.’ [11] The North Vietnamese
forces fighting a total war, as opposed to American and allied forces
fighting a limited war, in Vietnam (1962-1975) are examples of this discord
writ large.
Some recent examples of limited war are the Russian Federation fighting the
Chechen Rebels in the Second Chechen War; the French in the Indo-China
Conflict (the First Vietnam War) and Algeria (the Algerian Conflict); the
British in Malaya (the Malayan Emergency, or the War of the Running Dogs);
the United States of America (US) and its allies in Vietnam (the Vietnam War
[12]); and the Second Gulf War, also known as the ‘War on Terror,’ mounted
by the US and its allies in Iraq; to name only a few. These examples
encompass the mix of State-versus-State conflicts, and include
State-versus-non-State actor conflict, although the main aim is to announce
the temerity with which the nation-state acts.
To be sure, non-State actors, or actors of a ‘renegade State’ that rebels
against the government of a nation-state, are immediately labelled
‘terrorist groups’ or ‘insurgencies’ through the prism of international law.
The implication intrinsic within these definitions is that the backlash
against a sovereign government is inherently illegal, which technically it
is, and therefore ‘corrupt,’ which is a moral addendum the nation-state
often applies to its enemies. The opposition Tamil Tigers, rebelling with
violence against their suppression by the government of Sri-Lanka, were
deemed ‘terrorists,’ as was the ‘Viet Cong’ ‘insurgents’ when fighting the
Americans and their allies in the south of Vietnam, and so too was the Irish
Republican Army in ‘the Troubles’ in ‘defending’ their homeland against
Britain. The myriad of reasons each side would present in their
justifications for actions is an arid argument at this point, as what is of
interest here is the action of the nation-state toward those that oppose its
will.
What is of the most relevance to the abovementioned is the understanding
that powerful nation-states have, since time in memoriam, inserted a
‘fluidity’ into the notion of sovereignty which has essentially allowed
powerful nation-states free reign over less-powerful nation-states and
groups. In simpler terms, powerful actors have deliberately become involved
in the affairs of others and their actions have disregarded the clearly
pronounced element of what sovereignty ‘consists of’ – the non-interference
of others – within, and through the Treaty. As this has happened
continuously in previous centuries, the way in which sovereignty has been
eroded in the twentieth century is what is important here, and it leads to a
sagacious understanding: IS has moved in the same direction as powerful
nation-state actors in its non-acceptance of sovereignty with the use of a
deliberate invasion strategy. A strategy that has been effectively shown to
gain results for nation-states, and moreover, IS fighters are showing
similar contemptuous disregard of the Westphalian system – as heralded by
many of the most powerful of nation-states.
Whilst the beheading of civilians and crimes in conflict zones, whether
civilian or military, cannot and should not be condoned; the intrusion by
others into the lands of a sovereign state, whether through direct incursion
or influence, pronounces that the model of sovereignty within the Treaty –
and its modern day equivalent the United Nations Charter – is now defunct,
and open to interpretation. Actions such as the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, ongoing US drone-strikes in Pakistan, the
Indonesian military presence in Irian Jaya/West Papua in order to suppress
‘rebel actions,’ the recent Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, the
presence of Russian forces in Chechnya, the French moving troops into Mali,
and the presence of Royal Australian Air Force F-18 Super-Hornet’s over
Iraq, is to name only some instances of modern day brute force. All,
however, signal that powerful nation-states are able to act with relative
impunity and have altered the meaning of what it is to be ‘sovereign.’
Having a presence in a country through violent incursions, regardless of the
justification, defiles what the Treaty was designed to achieve: peace
through the non-intervention of others in the sovereign state.
The issue of violent reaction occurring when people/s are ignored,
brutalised, disenfranchised, status-deprived, and repressed, or a
combination thereof, by the actions of a sovereign state is another banal,
yet necessary, point to make. However, the labelling of violent dissenters
as ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgents’ is a term with obvious ramifications as
dictated by the nation-state, and through the prism of international law.
What should be acknowledged over and above this is that powerful
nation-states have continuously shattered the boundaries of others’
sovereignty and have engineered a free reign of their power in order to
fulfil their quests. In doing so, powerful nation-states have effectively
caused their own domino-principle: the rise of non-State actors pushing for
their ‘rights’ outside the remit of the Westphalian system.
In sum, the ‘rise’ of terrorism has both directly and indirectly been caused
by powerful Western and Euro-centric sovereign nation-states since the end
of World War One, and more so since the end of World War Two. In addition,
the United Nations, in particular the UN Security Council, has fundamentally
failed in its distribution of fair and reasonable jurisprudence. [13] Their
example has been assiduously followed by some Baltic, Asian, Central Asian,
South-east Asian, and Middle Eastern nation-states since the latter part of
last century. All have had a part in the making of what is currently
bedevilling the Middle East. Unless the sovereign state curbs its tenacity
in the suppression of ‘dissenting’ groups, more will come. Why will this
happen? In large part, it will be due to abject derision and contempt, which
Western liberal-democracies – as the major stakeholders in what is
considered to be ‘good governance’ [14] – have held the Treaty and its
latter-day equivalent in the second half of the twentieth century, and
continue to do so in the early part of the twenty-first century.
Notes
[1] Harvey Kushner. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 2003, 359. Italics in original.
[2] The Treaty of Westphalia is also referred to as the Peace Treaty of
Westphalia, the Settlement of Westphalia, the Peace Settlement of
Westphalia, and the Peace Treaties of Westphalia. The Treaty of Westphalia
was not borne of a single document as each, to some extent consisted of, and
constituted, a ‘treaty’ of sorts. The most pertinent ones were of
Franco-German intercession: the Treaty of Münster, and the Treaty of
Osnabrück respectively. See: Leo Gross. ‘The Peace Treaty of Westphalia.’
The American Journal of International Law, 42, 1, January, 1948, 20-41. <
<
http://www.jstor.org/view/00029300>
http://www.jstor.org/view/00029300>
[3] The Sixty Years War – which produced the outcome of the Treaty of
Westphalia – is divided into two counts. The first part consisted of an
erratic 30 years of warfare leading up to a more definitive Thirty Years War
(1618-1648). Although it should be noted the 30 years of warfare, which
ended in 1618, was more of an ‘ad-hoc’ conflict than the Thirty Years War
(sometimes also referred to as the Later Thirty Years War). Both wars are,
however, usually combined by historians’ and referred to as the Sixty Years
War. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648), when referred to in isolation, is
consistently seen in more contemporary terms of warfare, due to the
sustained/protracted and face-to-face nature of the various conflicts, and
the level of ‘quasi-state’ or ‘state-like’ organization of the respective
armies involved. There is, however, disagreement amongst historians which
needs to be acknowledged here. Held refers to the war which produced the
Treaty of Westphalia as the event which brought to an end the Eighty Years
War between Spain and the Dutch Republic, and believes the Thirty Years War
was only the ‘German phase’ of the war. See: David Held. ‘Inequalities of
power, problems of democracy.’ Reinventing the Left. Edited by David
Miliband. Cambridge: Polity, 1994, 78. Finally, Sutherland states the Thirty
Years War was not a war at all, and states the ‘war’ has been developed into
a ‘factitious conception’ which has become an indestructible myth.’
Sutherland views the conflict not as a ‘war,’ but as an interminable
struggle between the Habsburgs and the French royal dynasty, the Valois and
their successors the Bourbons, which did not end until circa 1715. See:
Nicola Sutherland. ‘The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of
European Politics.’ English Historical Review. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 107, 1992, 587.
[4] Alfred Cobban. The Nation State and National Self-Determination. London:
Oxford University Press, 1969, 30.
[5] Max Fisher. ‘The Dividing of a Continent: Africa’s Separatist Problem.’
The Atlantic. 10 September, 2012.
<
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-dividing-of-a-
continent-africas-separatist-problem/262171/>
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-dividing-of-a-c
ontinent-africas-separatist-problem/262171/
[6] Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Visualising Cultures. 2010.
<
http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/black_ships_and_samurai/>
http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/black_ships_and_samurai/
[7] Roger King and Gavin Kendall. The State, Democracy and Globalization.
Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2004, 34. Italics mine.
[8] John Vasquez. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993, 67.
[9] Adrian Lewis. The American Culture of War. The History of U.S. Military
Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom. New York: Routledge,
2007, 203. Italics in original.
[10] Strobe Driver. Why wining a war is no longer necessary: Modern Warfare
and the United States of America through the prism of the wars of Vietnam
and Iraq. Doctoral Thesis. Federation University: Ballarat, 2011, 103.
[11] Robert Osgood. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 2.
[12] The ‘Vietnam War’ is ‘known as the “American War” in Vietnam.’ See:
British Broadcasting Corporation. Timeline: Vietnam.
<
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1243686.stm>
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1243686.stm
[13] See: Broken Promises. The United Nations At 60. Citizens United and
Citizens United Foundation. Editors: John Selllman and Johnalynn Holland.
Director Kevin Knoblock, 2005.
[14] This is particularly true of governments that have embraced Western
liberal-democracy as a form of governance since the end of World War One
and, thus, it has continuously been deemed to be the only ‘suitable’ form of
government. Moreover, its credibility was enhanced when it eventually
‘defeated’ its long-term rival: Communism. The success of liberal-democracy,
its merit in governance, its venerableness and robustness, and its
righteousness and purpose are reflected in what Francis Fukuyama deeming the
collapse of Communism to be the ‘end of history.’ See: Francis Fukuyama. The
End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
Strobe Driver completed his doctoral thesis in war studies in 2011 and
writes on International Relations; and Asia-Pacific security. He is also a
sessional lecture and tutor at Federation University in the social sciences,
history and international relations.
Received on Tue Nov 04 2014 - 09:50:05 EST