http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/opinion/in-cuba-misadventures-in-regime-change.html?_r=2
The Opinion Pages | EDITORIAL
In Cuba, Misadventures in Regime Change
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By THE EDITORIAL BOARDNOV. 9, 2014
In 1996, spurred by an appetite for revenge, American lawmakers passed a
bill spelling out a strategy to overthrow the government in Havana and
“assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom.” The Helms-Burton Act,
signed into law by President Bill Clinton shortly after Cuba shot down two
small civilian American planes, has served as the foundation for the$264
million the United States has spent in the last 18 years trying to
instigate democratic reforms on the island.
Far from accomplishing that goal, the initiatives have been largely
counterproductive. The funds have been a magnet for charlatans, swindlers
and good intentions gone awry. The stealthy programs have increased
hostility between the two nations, provided Cuba with a trove of propaganda
fodder and stymied opportunities to cooperate in areas of mutual interest.
The United States should strive to promote greater freedoms on the island
of 11 million people and loosen the grip of one of the most repressive
governments in the world. But it must chart a new approach informed by the
lessons of nearly two decades of failed efforts to destabilize the Castro
regime.
During the final years of the Clinton administration, the United States
spent relatively little on programs in Cuba under Helms-Burton. That
changedwhen George W. Bush came to power in 2001 with an ambitious aim to
bring freedom to oppressed people around the world. The United States
Agency for International Development, better known for its humanitarian
work than cloak-and-dagger missions, became the primary vehicle for
pro-democracy work in Cuba, where it is illegal.
In the early years of the Bush administration, spending on initiatives to
oust the government surged from a few million a year to more than $20
million in 2004. Most contracts were awarded, without much oversight, to
newly formed Cuban-American groups. One used funds on a legally
questionable global lobbying effort to persuade foreign governments to
support America’s unpopular embargo. Other grantees sent loads of comic
books to the American diplomatic mission in Havana, bewildering officials
there. The money was also used to buy food and clothes, but there was no
way to track how much reached relatives of political prisoners, the
intended recipients.
According to a November 2006 report by the Government Accountability
Office, one contractor used the pro-democracy money to buy “a gas chain
saw, computer gaming equipment and software (including Nintendo Game Boys
and Sony PlayStations), a mountain bike, leather coats, cashmere sweaters,
crab meat and Godiva chocolates,” purchases he was unable to justify to
auditors.
Adolfo Franco, then head of the aid agency’s Latin America office, defended
the programs in a speech in April 2007 at the University of Miami, claiming
they were contributing to the steady growth of Cuba’s political opposition.
He argued that the agency needed to keep taking “calculated risks,” even
though many in Congress were skeptical that the efforts were fruitful.
“Ending this regime is a solemn duty,” said Mr. Franco, a Cuban-American.
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The G.A.O. probe led the aid agency to start awarding more funds to
established development organizations, including some that pitched bold
initiatives. In 2008, Congress appropriated $45 million for the programs, a
record amount. One major undertaking that started during the Bush years to
expand Internet access in Cuba had disastrous repercussions for the Obama
administration.
In September 2009, the State Department sent a relatively senior official
to Havana in an attempt to restore mail service and to cooperate on
migration policy, marking the highest level contact in years. That
December, Cuban authorities arrested an American subcontractor who traveled
to the island five times on U.S.A.I.D. business, posing as a tourist to
smuggle communication equipment.
At the time, many senior State Department officials were not fully aware of
the scope and nature of the covert programs, but the Cubans, incensed at
what they saw as a disingenuous two-track policy, took a hard line with the
American prisoner, Alan Gross, sentencing him to 15 years in prison. Senior
officials at U.S.A.I.D. and the State Department were startled by the risks
being taken, and some argued that the covert programs were
counterproductive and should be stopped. But Cuban-American lawmakers
fought vigorously to keep them alive.
After Mr. Gross’s arrest, the aid agency stopped sending American
contractors into Cuba, but it allowed its contractors to recruit Latin
Americans for secret missions that were sometimes detected by the Cuban
intelligence services. An investigation by The Associated Press published
in April revealed a controversial program carried out during the Obama
administration. Between 2009 and 2012, Creative Associates International, a
Washington firm, built a rudimentary text messaging system similar to
Twitter, known as ZunZuneo, Cuban slang for a hummingbird’s tweet. It was
supposed to provide Cubans with a platform to share messages with a mass
audience, and ultimately be used to assemble “smart mobs.”
The program was scrapped in 2012. Contractors had been paying tens of
thousands of dollars in text-messaging fees to the Cuban telecommunications
company and never found a way to make the platform self-sustaining. A
second A.P. report revealed in August that U.S.A.I.D. had been sending
young Latin Americans to Cuba to identify “potential social change actors,”
under the pretext of organizing gatherings like an H.I.V. prevention
workshop. The contractors, also hired by Creative Associates, received
quick pointers on how to evade Cuban intelligence and were paid as little
as $5.41 an hour for work that could have easily landed them in prison.
The American money has provided food and comfort to some relatives of
political prisoners, and been used to build limited access to
satellite-based Internet connections. But it has done more to stigmatize
than to help dissidents. Instead of stealth efforts to overthrow the
government, American policy makers should find ways to empower ordinary
Cubans by expanding study-abroad programs, professional exchanges and
investment in the new small businesses cropping up around the island. They
should continue to promote Internet connectivity, but realize that
accomplishing that goal on a large scale will require coordination with the
Cuban government.
Perhaps most important, Washington should recognize that the most it can
hope to accomplish is to positively influence Cuba’s evolution toward a
more open society. That is more likely to come about through stronger
diplomatic relations than subterfuge.
Received on Tue Nov 11 2014 - 17:00:21 EST