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A Legal Precipice? The DPRK-Uganda Security Relationship | 38 North:
Informed Analysis of North Korea
Uganda and North Korea are two countries which few would immediately
identify as natural partners. Yet on October 29, 2014, Kim Yong Nam,
Chairman of the Presidium of the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly, arrived
in Kampala to a hero’s welcome. Over four days, Kim met with the Ugandan
President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister amongst others, and
had a state banquet thrown in his honor.
Kim’s visit comes as part of a longer African tour to the handful of
countries on the continent where the DPRK still has a noteworthy foothold.
Many of them are known or suspected to be long-time military customers, and
bolstering ties will have been on the agenda for each stop. The reported
purpose of the Uganda visit was to enhance security cooperation
specifically. As noted by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, bilateral
relations in this area have spanned decades. Military training and weapons
transfers were facilitated by Pyongyang during the Cold War. Today, Kampala
has made a conscious effort to publicly discuss the more benign nature of
cooperation with Pyongyang, making sure to add that, while it has nothing
to hide, Uganda’s foreign relations are no one’s business. Venturing close
to the grey areas of sanctions-relevant activity, DPRK-Uganda cooperation
nevertheless merits further scrutiny.
*Africa-Bound*
Uganda formed part of a broader African travel itinerary for Kim Yong Nam.
The other destinations for the delegation were Ethiopia, Sudan and the
Republic of Congo. Like Uganda, they have all had relations with North
Korea for some time, including security relations. Cementing and expanding
these historical links was seemingly the order of the day, and predictable
given the priority the DPRK ascribes to maintaining its few remaining
friends.
As the requests issued by the North Korean delegation to Uganda
demonstrate, winning political support from these governments is still
deemed important. The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister allegedly urged
Kampala to oppose an expected resolution in the United Nations General
Assembly condemning the DPRK’s human rights record, for example. “I will
advise [the President] that we should stand by our friends. We have always
stood by our friends in the region on ICC. Go back with assurance that we
shall stand by you,” promised
<
http://www.nknews.org/2014/11/n-korea-requests-uganda-to-oppose-international-criminal-court-resolution/>
the
Ugandan Foreign Minister. Importantly, these and other long-standing
African partners—including Angola, Zimbabwe and Eritrea—are also
indispensable markets for North Korean goods and services, whether statues
or weapons. Pyongyang’s historical bonds with these governments are still
leveraged to generate needed foreign currency.
More difficult to divine is Uganda’s interest in courting Pyongyang’s
assistance. Why invite North Korea to train Ugandan police in martial arts
or riot control? Why ask for its help in the area of health, given the dire
state of the conditions in that sector in North Korea? And in light of the
strangeness of this marriage, can we be confident that police training or
health collaboration are as far as things go?
*Piecing Together the Past: DPRK-Uganda Historical Cooperation*
For the Uganda-DPRK relationship, security cooperation has been at the
heart of the bilateral friendship. Until at least 2004, ties in the
security field involved regular military training for the Ugandan armed
forces, some weapons transfers, weapons repair services and perhaps even
North Korean assistance in the establishment and operation of a small arms
factory.
During the Cold War, the DPRK-Uganda relationship not only survived
multiple bloody power changes in Kampala, but seemed to be perpetuated by
them. Having attained power through violence and internal divisions, each
new Ugandan government remained painfully aware that it too may one day
have to defend its position with force. The Idi Amin and Milton Obote
governments both arranged for Ugandan forces to be trained
<
http://fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_chp3a.html> by North Korea.
After the latter’s trip to Pyongyang in 1981, North Korea deployed a team
of officers to coordinate equipment maintenance and infantry training in
Gulu. A Library of Congress study
<
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:_at_field%28DOCID+ug0152%29>
asserts
that North Koreans even led combat units in operations against
anti-government guerrillas around this time.
Not long after the current President, Yoweri Museveni, took office in
January 1986, he asked DPRK officers to train police forces and National
Resistance Army fighters to use the weapons that preceding governments had
acquired from Pyongyang. President Museveni ordered new stock as well. A
consignment of North Korean weapons, including surface-to-air missiles and
rocket launchers, arrived in Tanzania in 1987 destined for onward shipment
<
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:_at_field%28DOCID+ug0152%29> to
Uganda. Further arms transactions took place over the next two years.[1]
<
http://38north.org/2014/11/aberger111314/#_ftn1>
Recent reflections on past cooperation suggest that North Korean
delegations continued to provide police training
<
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/643881-north-korea-to-solve-police-housing-crisis.html>
following
the end of the Cold War, as well as instruction for “marine units.” Kampala
may have also sought North Korean assistance with the operation of an arms
production and repair facility in Nakasongola. It seems widely accepted
that China provided assistance <
http://www.senate.be/crv/GR/gr-35.html> with
the construction and operation of the factory, which is owned by Luwero
Industries Ltd. Some unconfirmed reports
<
http://www.irinnews.org/report/5863/uganda-kampala-reportedly-increasing-arms-manufacturing-capacity>,
however, point to North Korean involvement as well. Limited evidence is
available to support this claim. Discussion forums for Ugandans, for
example, reveal complaints dating to 2004 from residents living near the
Nakasongola complex. North Koreans reportedly living on Luwero Industries
land had been given free rein to fish in nearby lakes, sending the price of
certain fish types skyrocketing at local markets. If true, North Korean
personnel may have been involved in the day-to-day execution of Luwero
Industries business, at least until 2004. The Government of Uganda denied
UN inspectors access to the facility until 2007, when it allowed them to
view the ammunition production line only.[2]
<
http://38north.org/2014/11/aberger111314/#_ftn2> It is thus difficult to
verify claims of foreign involvement, and further investigation would be
worthwhile.
Between 2004 and 2007, the United States also consistently requested access
to the Government of Uganda’s classified budget, out of suspicion that it
would contain information on the sale of man-portable air defense systems
between Uganda and North Korea, but was rebuffed. According to leaked
cables, “The [Government of Uganda’s] military sales relationship with
North Korea might hinder engagement.”[3]
<
http://38north.org/2014/11/aberger111314/#_ftn3>
*The Picture Today*
More recently, Uganda has emphasised
<
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/04/18/359075/uganda-thanks-n-korea-for-force-training/>
that
its ties to the DPRK are “transparent” and benign, focusing on training and
expertise for internal security forces, as well as the provision of
“non-lethal” equipment. Training allegedly includes: martial arts, marine
rescue, capacity building for the police construction unit, and “security
and technical training courses for the Ugandan Police Special Force, Police
Construction Unit, Criminal and Forensic Investigation.”[4]
<
http://38north.org/2014/11/aberger111314/#_ftn4>No specifics have been
offered about the non-lethal equipment. However, in 2013, DPRK People’s
Security Minister Ri Song Chol was photographed
<
http://www.nknews.org/2013/06/exclusive-north-korean-minister-inspects-ugandan-police-force/>
holding
tear-gas guns and canisters which can be presumed to be of some relevance
to the DPRK-Uganda relationship. A contract
<
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/643881-north-korea-to-solve-police-housing-crisis.html>
for
new police housing units was also signed at that time, apparently because
North Korea could build these facilities more quickly and inexpensively
than other suppliers.
None of this activity directly crosses the boundary into sanctions
territory, but does touch on areas where further clarity is needed from the
UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718.
Ambiguity primarily stems from diverging interpretations of “arms and
related materiel and services.” While the training of Ugandan police in the
use of (lethal) arms could be considered sanctions-relevant activity,
training police units in taekwondo would not. Similarly, while providing
lethal arms would be sanctions-relevant activity (with the exception of
small arms, which can be transferred so long as notification is provided in
advance to the UN Security Council), providing ‘non-lethal equipment’ would
probably not. Official DPRK-Uganda cooperation thus sits close to the
defined boundaries of the existing sanctions regime, and closer still to
the grey areas where clarification from the 1718 Committee has not yet been
forthcoming. That proximity suggests that Uganda is not a case of sanctions
ignorance, unlike some governments whose lack of staff and financial
resources, and whose national priorities direct their attention elsewhere.
Yet official DPRK-Uganda cooperation could be argued to cross a normative
boundary. The *raison-d’être *of UN restrictions on DPRK trade in weapons
and military services is to prevent Pyongyang from earning revenue that can
be channelled towards its domestic nuclear and missile development.
Contracting Korean People’s Army officers to provide training for police or
marine units, or asking the DPRK defense industrial machine to produce
‘non-lethal’ internal security equipment, could therefore still undermine
the intent behind the UN sanctions regime.
*Resilient and Recalcitrant*
At best, what has been disclosed by Uganda represents a welcome effort at
transparency: activity that is legal, but could still be argued betrays the
intent of UN measures. At worst, its transparency regarding existing
cooperation may be in hope of deterring outsiders from probing further into
illicit interactions that could lie beneath.
Either way, the relationship appears here to stay. In reaction to scrutiny
over their dealings with North Korea, Ugandan officials have emphasised
that they have a right to engage with whichever country they choose. If
that does not indicate the resilience of DPRK-Uganda ties, history should.
The security relationship has outlasted numerous changes of power in
Uganda, as well as the taboo around security cooperation with North Korea
that has accompanied the strengthening of UN sanctions. If past behaviour
can serve as a predictor of future behaviour, Uganda’s cooperation with
North Korea will continue to warrant questions over its legitimacy and
legality.
Received on Fri Nov 14 2014 - 08:26:54 EST