Leveraging State-Building in Somalia: learning from Somaliland's Non-Roadmap
- By Dr Dominik Balthasar
Posted on
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/11/19/leveraging-state-building-in-somalia
-learning-from-somalilands-non-roadmap-by-dr-dominik-balthasar/> November
21, 2014
Hope and optimism accompanied the installation of the new Federal Government
of Somalia (FGS) in September 2012, but today, the administration appears to
be drifting towards failure once again. Al-Shabaab remains far from
defeated, social fragmentation within Somalia is on the rise, and while
corruption continues unabated, political infighting paralyzes the country.
Despite initial progress, considerable international support, and the
endorsement of a "New Deal Compact" for Somalia at an EU-Somalia conference
held in Brussels in September 2013, the joint efforts of the government and
its international partners have been unable to translate burgeoning progress
into a more sustainable trajectory away from perpetual conflict and
fragility.
Although its record is hardly spotless, the self-declared Republic of
Somaliland - which declared its independence from Somalia in May 1991, but
has not yet gained recognition as a sovereign state by the international
community - has fared noticeably better in establishing basic levels of
peace and stability. While it is inadvisable to simply transpose alleged
lessons learned from Somaliland to Somalia, the former's experience provides
useful insights for the latter's state-building endeavour. Somali
policymakers and their international partners might benefit from taking a
closer look at Somaliland's trajectory, which followed a somewhat
unconventional path.
' <
http://csis.org/publication/thinking-beyond-roadmaps-somalia> Thinking
Beyond Roadmaps in Somalia - Expanding Policy Options for State-Building'
juxtaposes Somaliland's state-building project with the one envisioned for
Somalia. Depicting that there are a broad range of possible state-building
avenues to follow, the by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) published report argues that the road-maps devised for Somalia thus
far have been both too prescriptive and constrictive. At its most basic, the
report aims at opening up much needed policy space for Somali state-builders
and their international counterparts.
After analysing the TFG's performance since its inception in 2012, the
report investigates the case of Somaliland and synthesizes the insights that
can be gleaned from it. It talks to the generally perceived need to adopt a
permanent constitution and hold popular elections, two priorities in
Somalia's state-building framework that have come to dominate the scene.
Yet, Somaliland's development shows that neither a permanent constitution
nor democratic elections are decisive preconditions for initiating
state-building. In fact, it took Somaliland a decade after having
established a government to author and adopt a constitution, which, by the
way, lacked any prior popular consultation. And it took the polity even
longer to hold first elections, witnessing a strong executive with
significant traits of authoritarian governance in the interim. Meanwhile,
elections to the Upper House of Parliament still need to be conducted.
Another observation that can be made in the context of Somaliland's
trajectory is that peace-building and state-building do not follow a linear
succession, nor do they necessarily go in tandem. While aspects of
peace-building and reconciliation at the 'grassroots' have frequently been
highlighted as key components of Somaliland's state-building project, its
state-building progress during the 1990s was at least as much marked by
violent conflict. Although the latter frequently upset the newly won peace,
it also allowed for the institutionalization of particular 'rules of the
game'. Against the backdrop that dominant development paradigms in general
and the "New Deal Compact" in particular assume that peace-building and
state-building are mutually reinforcing processes, it might be important to
realise that this might not always be the case.
The report provides numerous other insights to illustrate the fact that
Somaliland's trajectory diverged significantly from the one envisioned for
Somalia. Certainly, these observations are not to propagate a violent,
corrupt, and authoritarian approach to state-building in Somalia, but they
carry a powerful implication: namely, that there is more than one path that
leads to Rome. In light of such a broad range of state-building experiences,
the report encourages bolder policies. Rather than being too dogmatic and
uninspired, the FGS and its international backers should adopt greater
affinity towards innovation, experimentation, and risk-taking. As there is
no 'playing safe' when it comes to state-building, the Somaliland case
advocates for going beyond the conventional tool-kit.
What does this mean in tangible terms, and how can the insights that emerge
from Somaliland be translated into concrete policies to advance Somalia's
state-building endeavour? Among others, the report advances the following
recommendations:
First, fighting Al-Shabaab should no longer take centre stage in Somalia's
state-building effort - at least not in its current military form. Besides
several other drawbacks, this locks both Somali state-builders and the
international community at large into a mind-set in which countering violent
extremism is confused with state-building. Yet, they are fundamentally
different. Moreover, Al-Shabaab is a symptom rather than cause of fragility
and needs to be addressed in socio-economic and political terms as well. And
while the extremist movement may well be the most immediate and obvious
challenge to stability in Somalia, it is by no means the most important one.
One much greater challenge for Somalia's immediate progress, the report
argues, lies in the continued fragmentation of its society. Somalia not only
faces ineffective institutions and a fragile state, but also a very fragile
society. As simply building institutions and enhancing their capacity is
insufficient for state-building, Somalia and its international partners must
do more to augment social cohesion and build national unity. Classical
state-building approaches need to be amended by components of
nation-building in order to be effective. This would not only boost
Somalia's reconstruction effort, but would also deprive Al-Shabaab of much
of its nurturing grounds.
Third, and related, there needs to be a significant effort to establish
genuine political parties that run across clan lines. Political jockeying
ahead of the 2016 elections has already begun in Mogadishu and Minnesota.
But as long as there is a dearth of political parties with distinct,
coherent and reliable party programs, rooted in the needs of certain
constituencies, political mobilization is prone to run along age-old kinship
parameters. In turn, this is likely to spur social fragmentation, enhancing
the risk of violent conflict. Building genuine political parties with
tangible political programs and a diverse followership in terms of clan
affiliation is key not only for holding elections in less than two years and
realizing Vision 2016, but also to advance and deepen national dialogue on
federalism and other salient issues.
Fourth, and finally, the report postulates that the international community
should place greater emphasis on enhancing agricultural productivity and
manufacturing. As long as there is no productive economy, it will be
difficult to establish genuine political parties and other interest groups,
overcome social fragmentation, enhance national unification, and counter
Al-Shabaab. Rather than focusing on top-heavy, legalistic and procedural
issues to state-building as is currently the case, the FGS and its
international partners should consider stepping up their efforts of creating
and improving livelihoods, which is foundational for an educated and
politically engaged citizenry.
State building is a conflict-prone, high-risk, protracted, and haphazard
process, in which not all good things necessarily go together. As past
approaches to reconstruct a Somali state have had a mixed record at best, we
need to think beyond roadmaps and expand policy options for state-building
in Somalia.
Dr. Dominik Balthasar is a researcher, policy analyst, and international
development consultant. Holding a position with the Transatlantic
Post-Doctoral Fellowship for International Relations and Security, he has
worked with Chatham House, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the European
Union Institute for Security Studies. Balthasar's work focuses on issues
pertaining to peace, conflict, and state fragility, as well as international
efforts toward state reconstruction and development, particularly in
Somalia. He can be reached under dominik (at) balthasar-online.de.
Received on Fri Nov 21 2014 - 15:16:12 EST