Army splits that let Yemen's capital fall augur new risks
By Mohammed Ghobari
SANAA Thu Nov 27, 2014 10:12am EST
(Reuters) - As fighting raged at the First Armored Division's base in
central Sanaa, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar arrived in a motorcade at the
general staff headquarters and entered the building shouting "Treason!
Treason!".
He grabbed some documents from a desk and left in a hurry, a defense
ministry official said. Half an hour later, the commander of the Fourth
Brigade Presidential Security turned up, collected his car and sped away.
"I knew then that Sanaa had fallen and that it was over," the officer, who
asked not to be named, told Reuters.
"General al-Ahmar was angry and felt utterly betrayed."
While many details of the surrender of Yemen's capital by 100,000 Republican
Guards to some 5,000 Houthi fighters on Sept. 21 remain murky, the nature of
the capitulation bodes ill for President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi's fragile
grip on power.
Home to an al Qaeda branch held responsible by Washington for three
attempted bombings of aircraft in the United States,
<
http://www.reuters.com/places/yemen?lc=int_mb_1001> Yemen is close to
becoming a failed state, thanks in part to covert maneuvering from its own
ousted ruler and <
http://www.reuters.com/places/iran?lc=int_mb_1001> Iran.
Corruption, internal splits and competing loyalties in the army began before
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted by protests in 2011 and are
now reaching a critical stage.
Those ailments are partly based on the country's patchwork tribal, sectarian
and regional splits, but also on a history of wrangling between powerful
political players that came to a head during the Arab spring.
"What happened was not the result of Hadi's mismanagement, but as a result
of undermining the essence of the Yemeni state during Saleh's rule over the
past 20 years," Yemeni analyst Abdelghani al-Iryani said, referring to the
fall of Sanaa.
"The Yemeni state is now at risk of unraveling and falling."
DIVIDED LOYALTIES
Saleh created a rival power base when he put General Ahmar, a close ally of
the Sunni Islamist Islah party, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood branch, in charge
of his 2004-10 crackdown on the Shi'ite Muslim militias Houthi militias who
now dominate <
http://www.reuters.com/places/yemen?lc=int_mb_1001> Yemen.
When mass protests broke out in 2011, Ahmar's forces sided with the
protesters, including Islah supporters, and clashed with army units loyal to
Saleh, who was forced to step down in favor of his deputy Hadi, who had no
power base of his own.
Hadi tried to reunite the army in 2012, removing Ahmar from the First
Armoured Brigade's command and appointing him as a military adviser. But at
the rank-and-file level, the Brigade stayed loyal to its old leader, while
many other divisions retained ties to former president Saleh, insiders said.
The Houthis emerged early last decade demanding more rights for the fifth of
Yemenis who follow Shi'ite Islam' Zaydi branch. They have since cast
themselves as a national revolutionary movement, and have fought the army
six times from 2004-10.
Analysts say two developments helped their rise to power: A tactical
alliance with Saleh and a more strategic tie-up with Shi'ite power
<
http://www.reuters.com/places/iran?lc=int_mb_1001> Iran.
The Houthis have sought to replicate the strategy of Iran's Lebanese ally,
Hezbollah, using popular support among Zaydis combined with a muscular
military presence to dominate politics.
Iran denies interference in Yemeni politics. But an Iranian official told
Reuters Tehran had "always backed the Houthis".
As the Houthis began their drive southwards from their power base in Yemen's
far north last year, they mostly fought army brigades and tribal fighters
loyal to Ahmar and Islah, while the rest of the army remained reluctant to
join in.
"When these forces are despatched to fight al Qaeda in the south, they fight
valiantly. But the tribal affiliation takes precedence when they are sent to
fight at home," an advisor to Hadi told Reuters.
He said the army had repeatedly refused to fight the Houthis, first in July
when the president ordered reinforcements to forces in the northern city of
Amran battling the militia.
He attributed their reluctance to regional and tribal loyalties, but
politics may have played a part too.
HIJACKED
Yemeni officials say Saleh, known for political maneuvering skills that he
once compared to dancing on the heads of snakes, had intended to get rid of
Islamists he views as being responsible for his downfall after 33 years in
office.
According to a U.S. government document seen by Reuters, Saleh "had
reportedly become one of the primary supporters of the Houthi rebellion" in
the hope that instability would allow him to regain power via a coup.
Soldiers and officers loyal to Saleh and discharged by Hadi's army
restructuring since 2012 joined the 'popular committees' set up by the
Houthis to capture Sanaa and keep order in the city, Yemeni officials said.
Fighting during the 2011 uprising between army units loyal to Saleh, and
those loyal to Ahmar, had also played a part.
"How can one expect us to come to their aid, even against the Houthis?" said
Shayef Mohammed, a Republican Guards officer whose army camp had been
besieged by Ahmar's First Armoured Brigade.
The Houthis argue that Yemeni army and security forces, fed up with
corruption and mismanagement, have chosen to be neutral.
An aide to Hadi, speaking on condition of anonymity, said officers in charge
of special forces guarding southern Sanaa had forced their commander to sign
a non-aggression pact with the Houthi field commander on the eve of the
battle for the capital.
Hadi ultimately decided that an attempt to block the Houthis would risk a
wider catastrophe, the aide said, comparing the president's task to that of
the pilot of a hijacked airplane.
"It doesn't make sense to abandon the cockpit and go to quarrel with the
hijackers, even if they kill some of the passengers," he said.
(Additional reporting and writing by Sami Aboudi; editing by Angus McDowall
and
<
http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=philippa.fletch
er&> Philippa Fletcher)
Received on Thu Nov 27 2014 - 16:52:29 EST