Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 14:34:00 +0200
The Morality of Intervention by Waging Irregular Warfare
Does the US military need to understand the moral justifications for waging
irregular and unconventional warfare better than it does? Absolutely, says
Daniel Hodne. Waging both irregular warfare and an insurgency within another
country raises a unique set of moral dilemmas for combatants.
By Daniel Hodne for Military Review
15 September 2014
This article was
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_
20141031_art016.pdf> originally published in the September-October Issue of
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/> Military Review.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2
0141031_art016.pdf
United States defense strategic guidance issued in 2012 establishes defense
priorities to support U.S. security objectives.1 Among the ten primary
missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, the strategic guidance calls for
capabilities to wage irregular warfare—defined as “a violent struggle among
state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population(s).”2 While the United States wages irregular warfare against
enemies such as al-Qaida, policy options to achieve U.S. security goals may
entail projecting U.S. landpower among other nonstate and state actors in
volatile, complex, and ambiguous environments.3
Depending on the context, coming to the aid of nonstate actors, such as a
group resisting oppression at the hands of its government, may be deemed
prudent to advance, secure, or protect U.S. national interests. Where
committing conventional forces may not be appropriate, policymakers still
may decide to intervene with special operations forces; this decision would
amount to choosing war by supporting a revolt. The intervention would be an
initial strategic offensive.
Before the United States decides to initiate such an offensive, it must know
how and when the intervention may be considered morally just, legal, and
prudent. Establishing moral and legal justification is necessary because
strategic goals, and the actions taken to achieve them, must meet the
standard of legitimacy. The nature of irregular warfare could seem at first
glance tocounter principles of justice of war (jus ad bellum) and justice in
war (jus in bello). For example, the character of resistance movements,
insurgencies, and revolutions varies considerably; sometimes a nonstate
entity, such as al-Qaida, is seeking unjust ends using criminal and
terrorist means.
Considering the just war principle that only a proper authority, usually
interpreted as a nation-state, can wage a just war, how could the use of
violence by any nonstate entity against a state be considered just?
Moreover, how can one nation supporting—or fighting against—an insurgency or
revolt within another sovereign nation be considered just war?
The respected theorist Michael Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars,
originally published in 1977, discusses just war theory from a 20th-century
perspective.4 He makes what can be considered a logical case for the
legitimacy of certain kinds of violent movements and for intervening to
support them. Walzer’s ideas do not represent the only possible point of
view on the morality of war. They can, however, provide a baseline for
examining arguments justifying insurgencies and other violent movements
against a government, and outside military support for them. This paper
outlines some of Walzer’s key ideas and then goes further by proposing a
model for deciding whether military support to a violent movement in another
nation could be considered morally justifiable and prudent. The discussion
focuses on the moral justification for an initial strategic offensive in
support of an organized violent movement.
It is assumed that U.S. strategic policymakers can assess if military
actions are likely to support the nation’s strategic goals. Nonetheless,
they would not make decisions to intervene in another country based on
national interest alone. Among other considerations, they need to understand
the moral issues. They need a decision-making model that could help them
determine if military intervention would constitute just war; this paper
proposes such a model. In addition, military leaders need to understand both
practical and moral issues from a military standpoint so they can advise
policy makers.
Irregular Warfare and Unconventional Warfare
The dissimilar nature of the strategic purpose and character of the
adversaries makes irregular warfare very different than traditional (or
conventional) warfare.5 Joint doctrine describes traditional warfare as “a
violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and
alliances of nation-states.”6 When U.S. special operations forces organize,
train, and support a nonstate group, it is known as unconventional warfare:
“activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating
through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied
area.”7 Special operations forces, rather than conventional forces, conduct
unconventional warfare because they are organized, trained, and equipped to
do so; and its activities are likely to occur when and where use of
conventional forces would not be appropriate. As unconventional warfare is a
core task of U.S. Army Special Forces, the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command takes the lead in preparing its special operations forces to conduct
unconventional warfare.
When U.S. special operations forces conduct this type of action offensively,
the United States violates the territorial integrity and political
sovereignty of another nation. The perceived need to protect U.S. interests
does not appear to justify the action morally. Nevertheless, other
circumstances may justify going to war in this manner. The next three
sections analyze traditional justifications for war articulated by Walzer as
a legalist paradigm, key concepts of legitimacy, and a theoretical moral
basis for nonstate groups to use violence against their government and for
other nations to intervene. Then, the discussion uses the proposed moral
basis for intervention to develop a decision-making model designed to help
U.S. policy makers integrate a timely moral analysis with policy decisions.
Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm
Any list of just war principles contains the foundational idea that
nation-states hold a monopoly on the use of force. According to joint
doctrine, nation-states choose to wage war against other nation-states to
satisfy a wide range of national interests.8 Walzer guides a nation-state’s
decision making when considering war as a policy option—up to a point.
While aggression is never justifiable, according to Walzer, two types of
force can be justified morally: defense from state aggression, and support
to another state that becomes a victim of aggression.9 Walzer describes a
theory of aggression he refers to as the legalist paradigm, in which he
assembles six propositions he considers widely accepted—if not always
articulated— by the international community. Walzer’s six propositions are
excerpted here (minus the intervening paragraphs):
1. There exists an international society of independent states.
2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its
members—above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political
sovereignty.
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the
political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes
aggression and is a criminal act.
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense
by the victim; and, a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other
member of international society.
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.
6. Once the aggressor state has be militarily repulsed, it can also be
punished.10
Finding moral justification for nonstate groups waging war—and especially
for nations supporting them by waging war within another nation-state’s
boundaries— under this framework may seem difficult if not impossible.
However, Walzer makes the case for several exceptions he calls revisions. In
addition to sovereign nation-states, Walzer recognizes that international
society contains independent political communities, nonstate entities, and
geopolitical conditions that at times may legitimately counter state or
international order. His justifications for intervention can be paraphrased
as—
• responding to imminent threat,
• assisting secessionist movements of legitimate political communities,
• balancing prior nation-state interventions in civil wars,
• rescuing those threatened by massacre,
• and applying prudence by limiting war aims.11
Beyond these exceptions, Walzer discusses the exception of supreme
emergency, but only under strict criteria of a danger’s imminence and the
nature of the threat.12
Concepts of Legitimacy
In addition to terms such as the legalist paradigm and its revisions,
defining ideas such as legitimate political community and self-help helps
understand how concepts of legitimacy relate to the morality of war.
Legitimate communities and self-help. According to Walzer, understanding
what constitutes a legitimate political community within a nation-state can
help another state determine when an intervention on a community’s behalf is
morally justified. According to his theory, a legitimate community passes
what he calls the self-help test: “a community actually exists whose members
are committed to independence and ready and able to determine the conditions
of their own existence.”13 For example, Walzer argues that intervening on
behalf of a secessionist movement under the second revision of the legalist
paradigm requires sufficient evidence that the movement has demonstrated
forward progress in its “arduous struggle” for independence.14
Acceptable purposes for intervention. Just war theory prescribes that
deciding when to intervene also requires knowing the ends for which a state
has a moral right to intervene. The purpose of establishing democracies or
liberal political communities does not meet just war theory’s acceptable
ends; only the establishment of independent communities does. Intervening
states do not have the moral authority to carry out their own political
goals with respect to a political community they might be aiding. Moreover,
Walzer says that “domestic tyrants are safe [from offensive action],” so
long as they have no intent or designs on posing an immediate threat of
aggression against another state in the international system.15 While
domestic tyrants may be considered safe, from a moral standpoint, from other
nations waging war to overthrow them, when communities within their states
decide to revolt, and the revolt meets certain threshold conditions, then
intervention by another state on behalf of that community may be justified.
Legitimacy of a political group as an acceptable strategic purpose for
irregular warfare. I believe the threshold conditions set by Walzer’s
self-help test are too high. For instance, a resistance movement that
represents a legitimate community committed to the cause of independence
might not pass this test because it is not capable of carrying out its
intent.
Attempting to morally justify resistance movements and insurgencies must
begin with understanding their strategic purpose. State and nonstate actors
wage irregular warfare “for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population.”16 Policy makers should consider the movement’s strategic
purpose in any moral analysis.
A Moral Basis for Revolt and Intervention
Walzer’s first four revisions to the legalist paradigm weigh the
relationship between a nation-state and the rights of its people. These
revisions allow that conditions within a state may provide moral grounds for
insurgency, guerrilla war, and intervention by an outside entity.
Conditions within a state—a contract and protected common life. Walzer views
the rights of nation-states as originating from the individual rights of
their citizens. The state, therefore, has obligations to defend its citizens
from outside state aggression and to protect their rights, lives, and
liberties, or “common life.”17 A state’s failure to meet these obligations
means relinquishing the moral justification for its own defense. 18 This
assertion lays a foundation for justifying revolt and intervention. By
governing responsibly and protecting individual rights states derive their
legitimacy from their people. This represents a functioning contract and a
protected common life. In contrast, governing oppressively causes a state to
lose legitimacy in the eyes of its population; however, the state’s ability
to wield power and influence still enables it to enforce the contract,
albeit without any guarantee that it will safeguard the common life of its
citizens.
Such a circumstance may leave no recourse for the population other than
forcibly changing the government or its policies. When a state becomes
tyrannical and oppressive, a population’s violent struggle against the state
should be considered morally justifiable. In just war terms, a state’s
deliberate efforts to oppress and harm its citizens constitute a form of
aggression that should justify an internal response to it.
Coercion as a form of state aggression. A prominent just war theorist named
Brian Orend, author of The Morality of War, recognizes violation of human
rights using coercion as a form of aggression. He concludes, “either states
or nonstate actors can commit aggression, which we have seen is what roots a
morally justified resort to war.”19 Tyrannical governments might confront
their citizens with a choice equivalent to state aggression: “your rights or
your lives.”20 The citizens’ attempt to compel a government to alter its
policies through the use of force, even if it means overthrowing the
government, is arguably a kind of independence movement.
A proposed sixth revision to the legalist paradigm. As our own nation arose
from revolution, our values “give us the credibility to stand up to
tyranny.”21 Therefore, I believe there is room for exception in just war
theory’s treatment of domestic tyrants and suggest adding one more revision
to the legalist paradigm.
This revision should allow for aiding violent resistance movements of
peoples victimized by government harm and persecution, even if their
political community has yet to fully gain the ability to determine its own
existence. This means that intervention in a nation- state to stop its
oppression of, or deliberate harm to, its citizens may be a morally prudent
and justified policy choice.
Decision-Making Models for Choosing Just War
Walzer navigates between two moral extremes for choosing to wage war, either
when it is never justified or when survival is at stake. The latter refers
to responding to aggression or helping another state in its response to it,
which are both the only morally justified reasons under the strict
conditions of the legalist paradigm.
A decision-making model under Walzer’s legalist paradigm. The decision model
under the principles in the legalist paradigm may look something like figure
1. The moral decision point for war becomes absolute under a national
interest of survival or when coming to the aid of another state in its
struggle for survival.
Walzer’s first four revisions to the legalist paradigm allow some room
between these two poles. For example, Walzer describes cases that justify
outside intervention, such as when a state’s violation of the rights of its
citizens stands out as “so terrible that it makes talk of community or
self-determination or ‘arduous struggle’ seem cynical and irrelevant.”22 He
also allows for humanitarian intervention and rescuing people from massacre
where the goal is limited solely to rescue without any additional political
objectives.23
Decision making under Walzer’s revisions to the legalist paradigm. These
kinds of cases for intervention are consistent with the core principles of
The Responsibility to Protect as laid out by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001)24 . Depicted graphically, the
scale might look something like figure 2. The decision point becomes less
absolute. While intervention may be morally justified and legal, national
interests will determine whether or not intervention may be deemed prudent.
When a guerrilla war is considered just for reasons such as government
tyranny, oppression, and deliberate harm to citizens, and when considering
state-sponsored intervention in support of such a revolt, even with Walzer’s
revisions the moral decision point comes too late. I propose a sixth
revision that would establish a new decision point: Should one nation find
it morally just, legal, and prudent (in that order) to intervene by coming
to the aid of a violent resistance movement or guerrilla war in another
nation, intervention may tip the scales towards that political community’s
achievement of self-help status, thereby earning its legitimate political
community rights.
A temporal decision-making model under the proposed sixth revision to the
legalist paradigm. Wars of self-determination, civil wars, and guerrilla war
pose especially complex moral issues. From Walzer’s point of view, guerrilla
war might only be considered justified if it passed a high threshold. Walzer
refers to this as a “continuum of increasing difficulty.”25 Within this
continuum, at some point guerrillas may acquire war rights. Conversely, at a
later point, the government attempting to counter them may ultimately lose
its war rights. Moreover, Walzer says that some of these endeavors will
reach a tipping point, specifically when they garner the overwhelming
majority of popular support and achieve the condition of leveé en masse, or
mass mobilization.26 He asserts that when guerrilla war achieves that degree
of backing, an antiguerrilla war can no longer be won; therefore, waging war
against the guerrillas can no longer be morally justified.27
Logically, Walzer’s tipping point appears synonymous with an insurgency or
guerrilla war passing the self-help test. When insurgencies, resistance
movements, and guerrilla activities emerge in response to government
oppression and deliberate harm of its subjects, an outside state-sponsored
intervention in support of these activities enables Walzer’s tipping point
to be reached earlier. Therefore, should U.S. policy makers believe an
intervention on behalf of an internal community waging war against a tyrant
is morally just and in the U.S. national interest, deciding when to
intervene may differ from deciding to intervene under Walzer’s first four
revisions, primarily due to the requirements of the self-help test.
The proposed sixth revision accounts for the gap. Moreover, it seems
consonant with Walzer’s “continuum of increasing difficulty.” The sixth
revision also provides a moral basis for responding to an internal
community’s suffering due to “deliberate state action” when there is not a
“large scale loss of life” to trigger “the just cause threshold” described
in TheResponsibility to Protect.28 Decision making under this proposal might
appear as figure 3.
It is within this space where I suggest that moral justification for
state-sponsored unconventional warfare emerges. Of note, understanding how
and when to determine moral justification for this type of irregular warfare
policy option still requires adherence to strict just war theory criteria to
sustain this validation and ultimately, legitimacy. The purpose of the
unconventional warfare operation must be limited to defeating the military
capabilities of the oppressive state, not imposing new political systems.
After a political community rises from oppression through achieving military
victory, its struggle for legitimacy is not complete, but it must build its
own sovereign political identity.
The intervening nation would find no moral basis for pushing its own
political agenda during this process. Doing so delegitimizes the key element
of independent self-help and, consequently, places the legitimacy of the
entire effort in jeopardy.
Choosing to assist a resistance movement requires a distinct decision-making
process. Moral reasons alone do not justify intervention. The culture of the
oppressed group and a practical assessment of its ability (with assistance)
to carry out its intent to become independent must be considered. In
addition, the joint force must be prepared to help assess the groups
military capabilities so senior defense leaders can make informed
recommendations to policy makers.
Opposing views. Critics might argue that a sixth revision to the legalist
paradigm is a convenient way to justify interventions meant only to achieve
national interests—or even to mask their intent behind a façade of morally
just language. They might insist that the proposed revision serves to
justify preemptive wars and forcible regime change. Opponents might also say
that the clandestine nature of unconventional warfare makes it morally
suspect from the outset.
My response to these arguments rests on the legalist paradigm.
Unconventional warfare is a means to support what should be regarded as
legitimate communities in their violent struggles against government
oppression and deliberate harm. The overarching moral intent is to foster a
better future environment and better peace for them, and possibly for us.
Additionally, unconventional warfare methods emphasize economy of force with
small special forces operational detachments helping indigenous resistance
movements. In contrast, the larger scale of operations to be conducted by
conventional forces to support such an undertaking would raise doubts about
U.S. goals as well as the legitimacy of the resistance movement. Any
resistance movement needs to struggle and achieve its own ends—legitimacy
and influence—rather than having an outside military force do the fighting
on its behalf.
The initial campaign in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks is an
example of unconventional warfare. This campaign enabled the Northern
Alliance to topple the Taliban government. It demonstrated the effectiveness
of conducting unconventional warfare as an initial strategic offensive
through the specialized landpower capabilities of the U.S. military.
Conclusion
National interests guide the choices of U.S. policy makers. When
contemplating the use of the military instrument of national power to
achieve policy objectives through war, either traditional or irregular,
three considerations should remain at the forefront: moral, legal, and
prudential. The questions resulting from these deliberations should be
sequenced as follows:
• Are we justified?
• Are we following the law?
• Can we actually do what is proposed?29
Reflecting on these questions also contributes to the moral, ethical, and
intellectual development of the members of the profession of arms.
Moving forward in accordance with defense strategic guidance, the Army will
continue to play a major role in the joint force’s robust foreign internal
defense, theater security cooperation, and theater engagement efforts. It
should find itself well-suited for this effort. These capabilities should be
augmented by maintaining the Army’s unconventional warfare competency.
Ultimately, intervening by waging irregular warfare alongside an insurgency
within and against another country would come with moral dilemmas for the
United States and its military forces. As the Department of Defense builds
its capacity to perform this primary mission against enemies such as
al-Qaida, understanding what constitutes moral justification for irregular
and unconventional warfare should be part of our joint and Army discourse.
To be grounded in irregular warfare principles to the same degree as
traditional warfare requires deeper understanding of irregular warfare’s
purpose and moral standing. Before establishing a policy of intervention or
ordering the military to take action, U.S. policy makers would need to weigh
the moral implications of intervention to ensure their rationale and the
military’s actions were legitimate. Otherwise, the United States could be
violating the principles that help determine when an entity has a legitimate
right to wage war.
See
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_
20141031_art016.pdf> original for images and footnotes.
A soldier with gun in Mindanao, courtesy Keith Bacongco/flickr
(image/jpeg attachment: image002.jpg)