Federalist Moves Heighten Somalia's Natural Resources Debate
Analysis
By Liban Ahmad
18 September 2014
Two years have passed since Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected the President
of the Federal Republic of Somalia. He came in to office with a view that
federalism in the country needed more debate.
The federalism debate revolves around two main pillars: the sharing of
political power with the federal government and the sharing of national
resources among 'Federal Member States'. It is the resources part of the
equation that is now getting more traction.
The Federal Government of Somalia has already warned the regional
administrations of Puntland and Somaliland about the exploration deals they
have struck with oil companies.
Somaliland views itself as an independent country not affected by decisions
made in Mogadishu, whereas Puntland considers itself to be part of Somalia
but argues that resource-sharing agreements among federal member states have
not been finalised. Successive Puntland administrations have argued that the
regional administration is entitled to sign agreements with oil companies,
and cites the Provisional Constitution.
The Provisional Constitution adopted on 2nd August 2012 does not give
Puntland or any other regional administration the right to enter into oil
exploration agreements with foreign companies. It does however, require the
Somali Federal Government to consult member states on resource allocation.
The current territorial dispute between Somaliland and Puntland is partly
about acquiring or retaining the privilege to sign agreements with foreign
oil companies. The resource element of the conflict has been brought to
light
<
http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/09/will-somalias-hydrocarbon-boom-oil-o
r-spoil-its-future-dominik-balthasar/> in a report the Heritage Institute
for Policy Studies has published recently.
When the Provisional Constitution was being adopted in Mogadishu there was a
widespread belief among 'stakeholders' that, although the new Somali
government would no longer be a transitional one, it woulld not have the
right to usurp the privilege of existing regional administrations to enter
into agreements with oil prospecting, foreign companies.
This argument allayed Puntland's and to some extent Somaliland's fears that
the new government in Mogadishu would not allow Garowe and Hargeisa to make
deals without approval or consultation with Mogadishu.
Since September 2012 the Somali Federal Government has signed two major
agreements with Soma Oil and Gas and Somalia-Fishguard. In the past,
regional administrations awarded fishing licenses to foreign companies.
The number of foreign fishing vessels in Somali seas is not known. The
agreement between the Somali government and Somalia-Fishguard will affect
existing contractual relationships between foreign fishing companies and
regional administrations.
Neither Puntland nor Somaliland has the domestic or international legal
recourse to challenge decisions the Somali Federal Government makes about
natural resources.
And no future Somali government will be able to revoke major agreements
between the federal government and foreign companies. This legal and
political reality in Somalia constrains the ability of regional
administrations to behave as independent entities capable of signing
agreements without the input of the federal government.
There is little the Somali government can do about how regional
administrations go about their business domestically but its authority,
codified in the Provisional Constitution and empowered through
post-transition institutions, give the federal government a major say in the
management of natural resources in Somalia.
Many people in areas affected by resource-related conflicts in Somalia
believe that only a national government can avert war between regional
administrations over natural resources. The belief that those with an
unparalleled access to resources and political power will fare well in new
Somalia cannot be wished away.
Both unchecked political power at the federal government level and the
absence of transparent political institutions at federal member states level
delay the process of recovering from two decades of statelessness in
Somalia.
The Somali political elite need to choose between protecting clan interests
or protecting the national interest. The language of political conflict
needs to be replaced with the language of political accommodation and human
rights because Somalis are not in disagreement with each other over abstract
ideas but over concrete, resource and governance-related ones.
A change in outlook begins when each group strives to understand the
perspective of the other. The outlook of the 'pro-strong government' group
has been shaped by 15-year reign of warlords in many parts of Somalia,
whereas the outlook of the 'pro-weak government' group has taken root in
response to, among other issues, unequal resource distribution by the last
pre-1991 central government of Somalia.
The group of Somalis whom those two politically dominant groups have lumped
into minority status (aka 'the others') for not belonging to an armed clan,
have a different perspective which is worth exploring and understanding.
This group can also make a meaningful contribution to the debate about
governance and sharing of resources in Somalia. The sooner this group is
allowed to join the debate the better for Somalia.
Liban Ahmad is a writer based in the United Kingdom.
Received on Thu Sep 18 2014 - 12:59:37 EDT