<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/browse-by-country/id/25/KENYA> KENYA-
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http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5792/Security_changes_mark_a_
sombre_anniversary> Security changes mark a sombre anniversary
A year after the Westgate Mall siege, President Kenyatta is reorganising the
security services as Somali and local jihadists continue their attacks
26th September 2014
The wide-ranging calls for a full inquiry into the handling of the attack by
Al Haraka al Shabaab al Mujahideen on the Westgate Shopping Mall a year ago
have been met with a confusing silence. Amid claims of debilitating
inter-service rivalries, unheeded intelligence warnings and crass
criminality by security officers, the public's concerns have been left
unanswered (AC Vol 54 No 20,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5066/Shockwaves_after_the_sho
ot-out> Shockwaves after the shoot-out). The government flatly rejected the
idea of a public enquiry, like the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Nor, we hear, has it launched a
far-reaching internal investigation of what went wrong and why.
Just as disturbing is the deteriorating political climate. At the height of
the Westgate siege, in which 67 people died, President
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/389/Uhuru_Kenyatta>
Uhuru Kenyatta's appeal to national unity, regardless of ethnicity or
religious faith, had great resonance with the people. Since then, Kenya's
searing political and ethnic divisions have resurfaced and are undermining
efforts to improve security and popular support for the security agencies.
During the past few months, Kenyatta has pressed ahead with restructuring
the security services, which will give the armed forces more power and
influence over domestic policy. Out of these changes, the Kenya Defence
Forces Chief, General Julius Karangi, has become the dominant figure in the
security system. He is due to retire in 2015. There are no plans to have him
go quietly. In April, Senator Kithure Kindiki, a lawyer previously linked to
the reformist camp and now a fast-rising Jubilee legislator, introduced the
National Emergency Security Bill. Its main thrust is to create an agency on
US Homeland Security lines, directly answerable to the President (AC Vol 51
No 24,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3765/Ruto_takes_on_the_courts
> Ruto takes on the courts). Many insiders say Karangi will head that new
body and few believe that he will retire next year.
Last December, there was a clear signal that the military would be far more
involved in domestic counter-terrorism and fighting crime: Cabinet Secretary
for Defence Raychelle Awour Omamo issued a gazette notice announcing the
creation of a Nairobi Metropolitan Brigade, in addition to the KDF's Eastern
and Western brigades. There has been no announcement yet about who will run
the NMB but it will be an important extension of Karangi's remit (AC Vol 54
No 25,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5146/Counter-terrorism_force_
under_attack> Counter-terrorism force under attack).
Extending military clout
Another sign that some politicians are pushing to extend the military's
clout in domestic affairs was the attempt last month to amend the Kenya
Defence Forces Act to allow the KDF to deploy troops internally without the
authority of Parliament. The bill was introduced in Parliament by Majority
Leader Aden Duale, a loud cheerleader for the governing Kenyatta-
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3056/William_Ruto>
William Ruto coalition, known as UhuRuto. However, it was withdrawn after a
public furore. Some members of parliament, however, think the matter is
unlikely to end there.
For now, it seems, Gen. Karangi has emerged as the power behind a civilian
government that wants to use the military to plug the holes in its domestic
security system. Yet the government has been unable to produce a
comprehensive response to the terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab, as well
as suspected copycat lower-level attacks in urban areas. After lengthy
consideration of demands for the dismissal of high-ranking security staff,
the President acted in August. In the first major reshuffle of his 17 months
in office, Kenyatta announced the resignation of the Director of the
National Security Intelligence Service, Major Gen. Michael Gichangi, and
demoted Interior Ministry Principal Secretary Mutea Iringo, replacing him
with the former Ambassador to the African Union, Monica Kathina Juma. Also
shown the door were Nancy Gitau, Kenyatta's Political Advisor, and Jane
Waikenda, who was briefly Director of Immigration, a department long seen as
a weak point for would-be insurgents who could bribe their way into the
country.
These changes are seen as political rather than as aimed at the security
problem. Gichangi, Iringo and Gitau had caused friction between Kenyatta's
National Alliance faction of the Jubilee coalition and his deputy Ruto's
United Republican Party. Indeed, the URP accused the trio of providing the
International Criminal Court in the Netherlands with evidence against Ruto
(AC 55 No 1,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5170/Chickens_come_home_to_ro
ost> Chickens come home to roost).
Kenyatta inherited the three from President
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/43/Mwai_Kibaki> Mwai
Kibaki's government and there was much talk that he did so reluctantly,
viewing them as necessary baggage that came with his own ICC case. Nor did
it help that, alongside other Kibaki government insiders, they were quietly
sceptical of Kenyatta's candidature in March 2013, fearing the diplomatic
repercussions of his victory and the threat of Western economic sanctions.
With the ICC case against Kenyatta floundering badly, their exits came with
little political risk.
Their successors in the security department point to Karangi's increasing
influence in State House. Maj. Gen. Phillip Wachira Kameru, a close ally of
Karangi, replaced ex-spy chief Gichangi, who vied with him for State House's
attentions, even in Kibaki's day. Another Karangi man, Maj. Gen. (Retired)
Gordon Kihalangwa, now heads Immigration.
That the character of the new security order remains unambiguously
pro-Kenyatta and pro-Kikuyu comes as no surprise but the pressure to
distribute the key posts is one of the problems in managing the coalition.
That accounts for the placatory gesture made to Ruto's camp, which is
predominantly Kalenjin and has benefited from a slew of favourable
ambassadorial appointments. There is some irony in the choice of URP
Chairman Francis ole Kaparo to head the almost-moribund National Cohesion
and Integration Commission, which is meant to monitor ethnic or other
favouritism in government appointments.
Power struggle
The reshaping of the domestic security agenda appears to stem from State
House's suspicion of security sector reform, a creature of the new
constitution. The reforms have sought to transform a brutal colonial-era
outfit into one closer to the liberal democratic ambitions of the 2010
constitution. This was to be achieved mainly by creating the National Police
Service Commission (NPSC), a civilian authority, to oversee appointments to
the force and the Independent Police Oversight Authority to handle public
complaints and deal with internal malfeasance.
The reform process ran into trouble almost as soon as it started. The
vetting of senior officers, televised live for public consumption, rapidly
degenerated into farce. Police veterans could explain neither their bloated
bank accounts nor their dubious sources of income.
Finally, the power struggle between NPSC Chairman Johnston Kavuludi and
Police Inspector General David Kimaiyo over who could appoint and deploy
senior officers sank the reform project. Kavuludi enjoyed constitutional
authority; Kimaiyo had the backing of powerful individuals. As the status
quo ante returned, the stalemate appears to have favoured the Inspector
General, who now seemingly has unfettered control of police appointments and
deployments.
Kimaiyo's victory over his civilian counterpart soon proved Pyrrhic: all it
granted him was an embarrassing exposition of police frailties. It was
revealed during Westgate that the police had not acted on intelligence about
an impending attack. The force defended itself by saying that the
intelligence was too general to be used. That claim eventually cost Gichangi
his job.
Police failures were starkly exposed during the attacks on the northern
coastal town of Mpeketoni in June (AC 55 No 13,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5667/Confused_response_to_ter
ror_attacks> Confused response to terror attacks). The KDF eventually took
over the hunt for the militants even as Kenyatta, facing heavy criticism,
insisted that opposition politicians and not Somali jihadists were to blame.
That was despite claims from Al Shabaab that it had carried out the attacks.
The subsequent search, including helicopter sweeps over the nearby Boni
Forest, yielded little but does not appear to have shaken the President's
faith in the military. Many believe that if Gen. Karangi's position in the
Jubilee government can survive the devastating Westgate attack, his
relations with State House are strong enough to withstand almost any
security crisis.
The problems are far wider than security. The attacks on Westgate and
Mpeketoni have hugely damaged Kenya's reputation as a secure tourist
destination, as their authors intended. There is also growing resentment
against those Western governments that put out general advisories warning
their nationals of the risks of attacks and abductions. The resulting
shutdowns and unemployment along the coast reinforce the vicious circle of
destitution and desperation among young people. Jihadist groups are stepping
up recruitment there as the government again insists that it will keep its
troops in Somalia, whatever attacks these groups try to launch within Kenya.
Opposition leader
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http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/261/Raila_Odinga>
Raila Odinga's campaign against Kenyatta's intervention in Somalia was in
fact launched four years ago when Kibaki was President. Odinga knows that
some in Kenyatta's own Mount Kenya support-base question the wisdom of that
strategy and he may hope to exacerbate those divisions. The costs of the
Somalia intervention to Kenya's security and its political fabric look set
to be the main test of Kenyatta's presidency for the rest of its term.
Jubaland, the solution or the problem?
Politicians and activists still debate the real motives for Kenya's decision
to send troops to Somalia in 2011 to fight Al Shabaab. Alongside Uganda and
Ethiopia, Kenya has become a mainstay of the African Union's military
operations in Somalia: it has also borne the highest domestic price by far.
Prior to Kenya's intervention, there had been a spate of attacks across the
Somali border in northern Kenya but locals say that the fighters did not
appear to be linked to Al Shabaab. Some see the intervention as a
pre-emptive move to establish a buffer zone and semi-autonomous state to be
known as Jubaland, at the southern tip of Somalia, hard against the border
with Kenya. Such a plan is absolutely unacceptable to the Mogadishu
government, still struggling to enforce its writ in southern Somalia.
If the idea was to cushion Kenya from the conflict, it has failed, as shown
by the terrorist attacks on the Westgate Mall and the northern coastal town
of Mpeketoni. Now, Interior Minister Joseph ole Lenku has reiterated the
government's aim to close down the Dadaab refugee centre in north-eastern
Kenya, home to about 500,000 Somalis, some of whom have been living there
for over two decades. Kenyan officials say they are willing to build the
necessary schools, clinics and housing to accommodate all the refugees in
Jubaland. This week, United Nations' officials are adamant that closing
Dadaab and repatriating the refugees is impractical. Any forced repatriation
would violate international protocols on refugees to which Kenya is a
signatory. So, the Jubaland initiative remains frozen.
Received on Fri Sep 26 2014 - 16:48:35 EDT