Saudi Crapshoot in Yemen
<
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-hearst/> David Hearst
Editor, Middle East Eye
Posted: 09/28/2014 11:35 am EDT
There is a sign on French level crossings for those who consider themselves
to be vigilant. It reads "One train can hide another". This is sound advice
should be erected in Oval Office and Downing Street. Only it should read:
"One intervention can hide another."
While all eyes are on Syria and Iraq, another intervention is taking place
in Yemen. The coalition involved here is more of an understanding than a
military pact, but it is proving to be just as effective.
That Iran should be backing a small Shi'a tribe in the north of Yemen called
the Houthis comes as little surprise. The lightning takeover by the Houthis
of the capital Sana'a has been applauded by Iranian politicians. Tehran city
representative in the Iranian parliament, Alireza Zakani, a loyalist of the
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, boasted that Iran now controls four Arab
capitals - Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and now Sana'a.
"Three Arab capitals have today ended in Iran's hands and belong to the
Islamic Iranian revolution". He noted that Sanaa has now become the fourth
Arab capital that is on its way to joining the Iranian revolution.
Zakani said that Iran considered the Yemeni revolution to be an extension of
its own and that 14 out of 20 provinces would soon come under the control of
the Houthis and that they would not stop there:
"Definitely, the Yemeni revolution will be not be confined to Yemen alone.
It will extend following its success into Saudi territories. The
Yemeni-Saudi vast borders will help expedite its reach into the depth of
Saudi land."
So far, this is business as usual in Yemen. The surprise is to hear how
closely involved Saudi Arabia and its ally the United Arab Emirates were in
the Houthi advance and how it reached a de facto understanding with their
biggest regional rival, Iran. In November last year I first
<
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/21/saudi-power-struggles-
egypt> reported Saudi contacts with their old enemies the Houthis. I wrote
then:
"Bandar's war against political Islam has also made itself felt on Saudi's
troubled border with Yemen. The need to combat the advance of Islamist group
al-Islah in Yemen has led the Saudis to support Houthi militias - with whom
the kingdom once went to war. A prominent Houthi, Saleh Habreh, was flown
via London to meet the Saudi intelligence chief."
In the last few weeks those meetings have intensified. I understand that a
Houthi delegation went to the UAE for a high-ranking meeting and that the
same delegation flew on to Riyadh. There has also been a successful meeting
between Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers in New York a week ago.
The point man for these meetings was the Yemeni ambassador to the UAE, Ahmed
ali abdullah Saleh, the son of the former president who was forced from
office in 2012.
After his meeting with the Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, his
Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif, suggested the talks could lead to
an improvement in relations.
"Both my Saudi counterpart and I believe that this meeting will be the first
page of a new chapter in our two countries' relations," Iran's official IRNA
news agency quoted Zarif as saying.
The Houthis and Iran are staunch enemies of al Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula, the most active branch of the franchise, outside Syria and Iraq.
But the target of this sudden advance is al-Islah, the reformist Islamist
party. In this, the Houthis appear to have been helped by the former
president Saleh, who still remains a key powerbroker. Saleh, from
retirement, has made statements hinting at support for the Houthis. When
they arrived in Sana'a he replaced his profile photograph on his FaceBook
page with one of him smiling.
Yemen's history has been littered with febrile military alliances, which
fracture at the slightest opportunity. Almost everyone has fought everyone
else at some stage. The sectarian element is less pronounced in Yemen than
it is in elsewhere in the Gulf because the split between Sunni and Zaydi
tribes is much less than it is between Sunni and other Shi'a groups.
The Zaydis are often referred to as the most moderate of the Shi'a groups
and closest to the Sunnis in their theology. The Zaydis do not consider Ali
ibn abi-Talib and his descendants as divine as other Shi'a groups do. They
simply preferred his rule. It is a political preference rather than a
theological injunction.
In today's conflict many of the leaders of al-Islah are themselves Zaydi.
They are from the Hashed tribe as is Saleh himself. So to call this conflict
sectarian is misleading.This is a political conflict in which the government
forces, which fought alongside al-Islah against the Houthis, have melted
away or sided temporarily with the small northern tribe from Sadah in North
Yemen.
Islah in Yemen have never been in conflict with the Saudis , but Riyadh
appears to have made a strategic calculation that now is the time to declare
war on all political Islamist factions wherever they happen to be in the
Arab world - Yemen, Egypt, Libya.
When asked in a meeting in Europe recently why the Saudis were so staunch in
their opposition to moderate political Islamists, Turki al Faisal, the
foreign minister's brother, and former ambassador to Britain said they had
made a strategic calculation. He said:" This policy has been thoroughly
thought out."
It may have been thought through, but it is a dangerously short-sighted
calculation particularly when applied to a country like Yemen which
straddles Saudi Arabia's porous southern borders.
It is a high risk strategy on two fronts. Where will Sunni allegiances lie
if Islah is destroyed? A major political Sunni grievance in both Syria and
Iraq created the Islamic State, and the same process is now underway in
Yemen. Just recall what the Saudis did to crush the Arab Spring in Bahrain,
claiming that Iran was at its gates. Today they are using Iranian backed
forces against Sunni Islamists in Yemen. Anything goes, in any Arab country,
as long as the target is political Islam.
But it is also perilous for the Saudis to assume that Iranian influence is a
one way street. The Iranians calculate that after the western-led coalition
crushes the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, its client Bashar al Assad will
be next. The possession of Sana'a is an important card Iran can now play if
Assad is threatened. Zakani's prediction could always come true. If Saudi
Arabia is part of a coalition which then turns on Iran's chief ally in
Syria, the Iranians could threaten the kingdom on its southern front.
Some analysts claim Britain and America are up to its neck in this intrigue.
The Yememi analyst Yassin al-Tamimi wrote:
"What happened in Sanaa had already been planned for by the Americans, the
British and the Saudis and agreed upon by these parties. The evidence is
that the Friends of Yemen meeting which was held last Wednesday in New York
did not condemns the Houthis' armed invasion of the capital. This points to
international collusion with what the Houthis militias did."
The Houthis, whose armed campaign has previously been condemned by the UN
Security Council well before the current campaign, have stormed and looted
houses in Sana'a. They stormed the house of the Noble Peace Laureate and
Yemeni journalist Tawakkol Karman, calling her a Takfiri. Happily she
escaped.
The more pragmatic princes in Saudi Arabia's ruling family should think
about what will happen next. What are the consequences of failure? What if
these "thoroughly thought out" tactics were used against them on home turf?
Received on Sun Sep 28 2014 - 18:50:51 EDT