Killing of al-Shabaab Leader Throws Future of Militant Group into Question
By Gabrielle Reid
30 September 2014
On September 1, the leader of the Somalia-based extremist group al-Shabaab,
Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed in a US-led drone strike in an al-Shabaab
stronghold in Somalia's Lower Shabelle region. The drone strike coincided
with an ongoing military offensive launched August 25 by the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali government forces in southern and
central Somalia, dubbed Operation Indian Ocean.
Godane's death and the simultaneous territorial losses faced by the group in
the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions have raised various concerns over
al-Shabaab's response and how the militant group-which controls most of
southern and central Somalia, and has carried out several terrorist attacks
in the region-will function under its newly-appointed leadership. While the
killing of Godane may represent a significant victory to some, the impact of
his death may result in an increase in terrorist assaults in the region in
the short term. Long-term implications are harder to assess.
Immediate Response
In a statement released on September 6, al-Shabaab confirmed Godane's death
and named Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah as his successor. Although very
little is known about Ahmad Umar, what is apparent is that he had worked
closely with Godane and supported him in both ideology and his jihadist
objectives. Under Godane, al-Shabaab had become increasingly committed to
al-Qaeda and the global jihad, shifting its overall rhetoric away from a
nationalist agenda toward the group's participation in al-Qaeda's global
Islamist campaign. The group's decision to reiterate its commitment to
al-Qaeda in the September 6 statement seems to indicate that the group's
immediate orientation under Umar will unlikely shift in ideology or
objectives, and it is believed that it will not change its modus operandi
nor result in a decline in its ability to conduct attacks.
Even prior to its recent losses, al-Shabaab lacked the capacity to combat
AMISOM and government forces in conventional warfare, and these events make
this even more so. In this increasingly asymmetrical conflict, terrorism is
one of the few means of violence in al-Shabaab's campaign. Thus, rather than
this military offensive immediately hastening the demise of the group, we
are likely to see, at least in the short term, an uptick in al-Shabaab
attacks, many of which will be carried out under the guise of avenging
Godane's death. Since Operation Indian Ocean began, at least 24 people have
died in two separate car bomb explosions orchestrated by al-Shabaab. On
September 14, in Uganda's capital, Kampala, 19 Islamist militants reportedly
were captured and found in possession of explosives.
Al-Shabaab Over the Long Term
Whether or not these events will have an effect on al-Shabaab's ability to
function over the long term is less certain. Umar will have to work hard to
consolidate his position as leader. Faced with significant losses during
Operation Indian Ocean, al-Shabaab perhaps had little choice but to present
a united front. Whether this unity is indeed a reality on the ground has yet
to be fully revealed.
Despite its resilience, al-Shabaab has fallen prey to stifling infighting
before. Although Godane was able to quell potential mutinies by prominent
commanders such as Sheik Mukhtar Robow and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, it is
perhaps too early to tell whether Umar will possess the requisite strength
and support to face such internal belligerence. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab has
proven its capacity to operate as a highly splintered organization and is
likely to remain a key player in terrorist activity on the continent, at
least in the coming year.
The establishment of the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) following the
2014 African Summit held in Washington, D.C. bodes well for a developing a
roadmap to address insecurity, and specifically terrorism, on the continent.
Yet, with an initial budget of only 33 million USD, and the requisite
coordination between the US and the six participating African nations-namely
Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia-we are unlikely to see
immediate results.
In the interim, government forces will need to significantly choke
al-Shabaab cells in Somalia. In this regard, the success of the coordinated
efforts of AMISOM, the Somali government, and US support is indeed
encouraging. Prior to the drone strike, AMISOM forces had recaptured the
strategic town of Bulo Barer in the Lower Shabelle region, as well as
several smaller locations. Should the government forces continue to make
such territorial gains, al-Shabaab is likely to stay on the backfoot,
seeking to withdraw rather than confront military forces directly, and will
likely conduct hit-and-run attacks.
Moving forward, a key objective for the government forces will be the
seizure of al-Shabaab's stronghold at Bararwe-the main supply point and
source of revenue for the group. Although diaspora funding contributes to
al-Shabaab's operations, the group's illicit charcoal exports from Bararwe's
port continue to generate the group's main revenue.
Yet, with AMISOM forces set to depart Somalia in 2016, time is of the
essence. Capturing the town will be vital to crippling the group's financial
capabilities. Facing an impending offensive on the city, al-Shabaab will
need to make key decisions as to whether to secure Barawe and concentrate
its fighters and resources there, or secure a substitute funding source in
the event that Barawe is lost, as it did following the loss of Kismayo to
Kenyan armed forces in 2012.
Of course, with these events, one must be prudent in assessing al-Shabaab,
as it is still reeling from Godane's death. The reality is that both sides
have challenges ahead. But this could be a turning point that determines the
future of al-Shabaab.
Gabrielle Reid is a senior political risk analyst with red24.