Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 23:49:43 +0100
Yemen: The World's Newest Failed State
Alessandro Bruno
<http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/author/alessandrobruno/>
February 20, 2015
In Yemen there is no longer a government or a president. On January 22,
after the Houthi, (Zaydi Shiites) militiamen in the north besieged the
presidential palace in Sana'a, both interim President (since 2012) Abdu Rabu
Mansour Hadi and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah (of a caretaker government
which secured parliamentary confidence in December 2014), resigned.
Washington has closed its embassy and many other countries, Western and non,
have done likewise. Four southern governors, including those from Aden and
Abyan, which has been the epicenter of the US drone campaign against
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have refused to resign, in
solidarity with President Hadi. Houthi militias dispersed an impromptu
pro-government demonstration days after the takeover; the occasion served as
an opportunity for the Houthis to wield some power as they brandished
weapons in the streets and made numerous arrests.
The Houthi religious-political-military movement was born in the eighties in
the northern region of Saada under the leadership of Husayn al-Huthi
(deceased), expressing a Zaydi (a Shiite sect which ruled the Imamate in
northern Yemen until 1962) pushback against Sunni dominance in the country,
which is supported by the central government and by Saudi funds. After the
resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, the Houthis have
managed to take over control of a vast area thanks, in no small part, to the
retreat of army units still loyal to Saleh. In doing so they defeated the
Sunni militias linked to the Islah Party (which includes the Muslim
Brotherhood and Salafists). Meanwhile, Ansarullah, the Houthi political
movement, was taking part in the 'national dialogue' process to re-draft the
Constitution; therefore, the Houthis have managed to gain both military and
political ground, not unlike Hezbollah did in Lebanon during the 1990s.
Last August, the Houthi militias exploited the government's reduction of
fuel subsidies to occupy the capital Sana'a. At first, they did this
'peacefully,' but inevitably they clashed with security forces and
pro-government militias. Finally, the Houthis, along with all other parties
in the Yemeni quagmire, signed the National Peace Agreement (NPA) in
September, which managed to reduce the urban violence for a while under the
rule of a temporary government. The NPA established the formation of a
caretaker government, which included the backing of Ansarullah and another
separatist group from the South.
Yet the Houthis have rejected the attempt at federal reform, because under
this plan their strongholds would be grouped into a new macro-region of
Azal, which is densely populated, poor in energy resources, and landlocked.
The Houthis then retaliated by kidnapping Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, Secretary
of Reforms, and holding the presidential palace and the private residence of
the president under siege, which culminated in an attack on the prime
minister's convoy.
A Web of Rivalries
Were Yemen's problems simply confined to Houthi/Sunni rivalries, a solution
could be found. The problem is that Yemen has at least four separate
conflicts within its borders. There is a clash between the northern
insurgents and the central authority (mirrored in the south by the Southern
Movement, which is clearly demanding independence). Then the Islah movement
and the old regime's elite, headed by Ahmed Saleh (son of the exiled former
president Saleh), has been challenging the transitional authority. The Army
has served as the 'battleground' for this conflict, where loyalties are not
to the central government but to tribal leaders and their various
allegiances. This phenomenon has effectively left the central government
with no military forces through which to challenge the much more dedicated
and disciplined factional militias, allowing the Houthis to gain territory
very quickly. The fact that the Sunnis are divided among supporters of the
former president and his clan and the transitional authority has created a
vacuum making the Houthi advance even more dramatic. Ansarullah has, in
fact, taken over territories in the western coastal region (including the
Hodeida, oil terminal), as well as in the central Sunni strongholds of Marib
or Ibb. The vacuum has also allowed al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
to regain some strength against a stripped central military force. AQAP has
attacked police and military installations as well as Houthis (their main
enemy). Amid the accentuated climate of tribal division, the Sunni tribes,
whether against or in favor of former president Saleh, have tended to side
more alongside AQAP than show even the least bit support for the Shiite
Houthis.
There have been accusations that the Houthis have been receiving funding and
weapons from Iran while Saudi Arabia, which had backed Saleh at first and
then the transitional government, has suspended financial aid to Yemen. The
problem for Washington is that the Houthis represent the best way to contain
AQAP in Yemen, given the collapse of the temporary government and the
official armed forces. However, the Houthis are not especially sympathetic
to the United States, given the latter's support for Saudi Arabia - which
has engaged in frequent skirmishes against the Houthis over the past few
years and even before President Saleh's resignation. President Obama will
surely discuss the Yemen situation with the new Saudi King Salman bin
Abdulaziz in order to relaunch regional cooperation; nonetheless, continued
talks between the United States and Iran over containment of the latter's
nuclear program should also leave some room for the Houthis to take up their
struggle against AQAP.
Any issue of US military involvement to try and restore order is very
delicate because Yemenis, according to polls, have shown some of the highest
rates of 'anti-Americanism' in the Arab world. Such interventions, or even
the perception of US support for the temporary government, would only add to
the divisions. Foreign intervention could prompt some people to support the
militants against the 'invader,' which would then truly risk creating
another Afghanistan, albeit one much closer to the world's largest oil
producer.
Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world; it has some oil, but
reserves are dwindling and there is no investment in new exploration because
of high security risks. Recent governments - especially the one led by Saleh
- have not had any economic plan to deal with the 'post-oil' future. Saudi
Arabia is understandably concerned, as it is clear that Yemen has descended
into a situation of chronic instability and militancy.
Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, fears this instability and
the void that has enabled insurgent groups such as AQAP to establish
territorial footholds. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Emirates are concerned by
the prospect of Yemen becoming another Afghanistan, which has had a
destabilizing effect on neighboring Pakistan. Much like Afghanistan, and
adding to security concerns, Yemen is poor; the population faces a number of
health and economic difficulties such that the Yemeni government is always
on the brink of having to confront a disaster. Yemen could yet become
another failed state overrun by extremists in an area already marked by the
presence of that better-known failed state of Somalia. Through the
Bab-al-Mandab, Yemen occupies a strategic position at the entry of the Red
Sea, which is one of the world's leading cargo shipping routes; it is also
the main route for the shipment of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
States. Any unrest in Yemen is a cause of concern in Riyadh, the other
capitals of the Gulf, and inevitably in the West as well.
Saudi Arabia is not only concerned by the growing risk of terrorism from
Yemen, it is also worried by the spillover effects of the Shiite,
specifically the Zaidi Shiite, rebellion in northern Yemen. After suffering
intense bombardment last December, the Zaidi rebels have tried to come to an
agreement with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. Meanwhile, having
incurred heavy bombardments for the past few years, the government of Yemen
has denied the Zaidi rebels request for an unconditional ceasefire. The
government is concerned that the Zaidis have not made an explicit reference
to refusing to attack Saudi Arabia, which is also home to a Zaidi Shiite
community in the areas bordering Yemen. Saudi Arabia became very involved in
suppressing the Houthi revolt in 2010, though the Zaidi rebellion began in
2004 and has so far left thousands dead and driven 200,000 people from their
homes. Ironically, one of the Yemeni social phenomena that is raising
concerns in Saudi Arabia is the spread of Wahhabi or Salafist
interpretations of Islam among Yemeni youth - from Saudi Arabia.
While the United States has already given Yemen at least USD 100 million in
military aid, it would be wiser to target Yemen's socioeconomic problems.
Oil production is expected to end by 2017, while Yemen's population -
already experiencing a 40% unemployment rate - may double by 2035 at current
birth rates. While all Arab countries are characterized by large percentages
of youth, Yemen is the country where this phenomenon is highest, seeing as
45% of the population is below 15 years of age. Considering the stunted
opportunities for economic growth, an imminent oil shortage, and the severe
water problems, Yemen is a social and security time bomb.
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