Burundi’s former president Pierre Buyoya, currently the High Representative of the African Union (AU) for Mali and the Sahel, speaks to the PSC Report about the latest developments in Mali.
Q: The recent agreement between the government of Mali and certain armed groups in the north of the country, signed in Algiers on 1 March, has been described as an ‘excellent development’. However, the main armed groups have not yet signed the agreement. As the representative of the AU for Mali and the Sahel, what is your opinion about the agreement?
I would like to add a nuance. The agreement was initialled in Algiers and not signed, even if this act signifies one’s readiness to sign the agreement and it normally means a commitment not to seek any changes before signature. My understanding is that the final or actual signature will take place in Mali itself.
Coming now to your question, I would like to say that this agreement is a good compromise. It does not satisfy entirely any single party. It is therefore understandable that parties will be unhappy with one aspect or another of the agreement. But we believe that, taken in its entirety, it provides a good attempt to deal with political concerns, including a model for the sharing of responsibilities between the central government and regional authorities, as well as local communities. It also addresses security, development, justice and humanitarian concerns. In that regard, it is a positive step forward in the resolution of the recurrent crises in the north of Mali.
It is understandable that parties will be unhappy with one aspect or another of the agreement
Q: Are you optimistic that the other armed groups will sign the agreement in due course?
That is our hope and we are doing everything possible to ensure that they do so in due course. I should add that we, the representatives of the international community, support this agreement and we hope that the armed movements would not want to be on the wrong side of that consensus.
Q: Do you believe the implementation of the Algiers agreement could lead to lasting peace in northern Mali?
Of course, the quality and ultimate result of any agreement is in its implementation. As you know, this is not the first agreement signed between the Malian state and armed movements in the north of the country. I think this is the fifth one since the Tamanrasset Agreement of January 1991, the National Pact of April 1992, the Algiers Accords of July 2006 and the Ouagadougou Agreement of June 2013, even though the present one is the completion of the Ouagadougou Agreement, which was just a preliminary one for specific issues. I mention all this because almost all subsequent waves of rebellion since 1992 are blamed on what armed groups consider the failure to implement previous agreements.
Let me add one important difference between this agreement and the previous ones. This difference lies in the strong involvement of the international community in the negotiation and monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the present agreement, unlike the previous ones. I therefore hope that all the parties concerned will honour their responsibilities in ensuring the effective and faithful implementation of this agreement. And if this is the case and there are no other factors behind the recurrence of rebellions, then one would assume that the implementation of the agreement would lead to lasting peace in northern Mali.
Q: In what way can the AU assist Mali to overcome its current challenges: notably in national reconciliation, demobilisation of armed groups and reintegrating them into the army?
We have already started doing that through our effective contribution to the negotiation process that led to this agreement. With regard to the specific issue of national reconciliation, we have been working very closely with the Malians to offer our support and modest contribution. We started doing this as soon as the former Commission on Dialogue and Reconciliation was formed in March 2013, and particularly since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement. We started initially through the African-Led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) that I headed until its transformation into a UN mission in July 2013 and, since then, the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) that I also head. For example, we have organised a number of events to promote the spirit of national reconciliation in the country.
All subsequent waves of rebellion since 1992 are blamed on what armed groups consider the failure to implement previous agreements
Since last year, in cooperation with other partners, we have launched a radio programme called Anka Ben in Bambara, meaning ‘Let’s make peace’, which airs every Saturday for an hour on a local radio station called Radio Kledu. We also organised, in November last year, in partnership with the Francophonie, a high-level three-day workshop for Malian journalists to encourage them to be peacemakers in their reporting and writing. We have specific projects to support the new Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, as well as the ministry in charge of this sensitive issue. We have other programmes targeting religious and traditional leaders, aimed at encouraging them to play an active role in the promotion of peace, dialogue and national cohesion in the country.
We have similar projects for the DDR [disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration] process. Firstly, in close coordination with the competent Malian authorities and our partners, particularly the UN, we contribute to the analytical work aimed at thinking through the appropriate modalities for the DDR and SSR [security sector reform] processes in the country. Secondly, we try to mobilise resources to put at the disposal of the Malian Defence and Security Forces (FDSM) in view of ameliorating their working conditions. It is in this regard that, last year, we provided some 20 vehicles of various categories worth US$1 million to the FDSM through the Ministry of the Interior.
Thirdly, our work in the Nouakchott Process, which aims at promoting regional cooperation in the Sahel in the field of security, will surely make a contribution to Mali, even if it is a regional project. This is why the first meeting of the chiefs of defence staff and of ministers of defence of the 11 participating countries in the process is scheduled to take place in Mali. We hope that other programmes that we have in the development field under the AU strategy for the Sahel region will contribute to the ‘reintegration’ aspect of the DDR process in Mali, particularly development projects targeting the youth.
Q: The AU Peace and Security Council recently conducted a joint visit to Mali with the EU Political and Security Committee. What has been the outcome of this visit?
As you may know, the AU and the EU have a strategic partnership, based on which the two institutions work very closely on several issues. One of these issues is the question of peace and security. The visit you mention falls under this partnership, particularly its peace and security aspect. It was the first such joint mission of the PSC and its European colleagues.
The visit allowed members of the two institutions to familiarise themselves very closely with the realities on the ground in Mali, as they interacted with various stakeholders in the country, including the head of state, the prime minister, several cabinet members, political parties and civil society organisations, as well as international and regional organisations present in Mali. They also travelled to the north of the country.
We have specific projects to support the new Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, as well as the ministry in charge of this sensitive issue
The visit sent a strong message to all those they interacted with that our two organisations work closely together and share more or less the same reading of events in the country. It sent the message that they will act jointly, if necessary, but in coordination to advance issues of peace and security in the country, as well as sanction those that may hinder this.
Q: What are the areas of cooperation between the AU and the EU when it comes to solving the security challenges in Mali?
As I said, there is a strategic partnership between the AU and the EU. On Mali, you may know that we were both members of the mediation team led by Algeria in the negotiation of the agreement referred to previously. We shall continue working together to enjoin the parties to implement the agreement in good faith. There are also many opportunities for MISAHEL and the EU delegation in Mali to work together to support Malian stakeholders in their efforts to solve the security challenges facing their country. The aforementioned joint mission of our peace and security organs illustrates this partnership and collaboration.
Q: During your address to the UN Security Council in December last year, you said that cooperation between the UN and the AU is crucial for peace and security in Africa. Concerning Mali and the Sahel, what are the areas of possible greater cooperation?
I have mentioned that before the UN deployed a peacekeeping operation in Mali, known as MINUSMA, it was AFISMA – deployed by the AU and ECOWAS [the Economic Community of West African States] – that played this role in the country. And because the Malian crisis is not only a security one, but a political and socio-economic one as well, we collaborate with the UN in these areas that MISAHEL is mandated to work on. In the security realm, we are both members of the technical security committee that was established by the Ouagadougou Agreement to ensure respect of the ceasefire agreements. We shall continue to work together for the effective implementation of the just-concluded agreement of the Algiers process and the various monitoring committees for its implementation. It is very crucial that we maintain this partnership, based on the principle of complementarity informed by our comparative advantages.
We also work with the UN and other partners in the coordination of the implementation of our respective Sahel strategies. You may know that in November 2013, a ministerial platform of coordination for the Sahel strategies was established during a meeting in Bamako, and Mali was designated to chair this platform for the first two years. A technical secretariat was also created to support this platform. The AU (through MISAHEL, based in Bamako) and the UN (through the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel [OSES], based in Dakar) co-chair this secretariat. There is therefore close cooperation between our two organisations in Mali and the Sahel as a whole.
You also said funding is one of the crucial elements where the UN can assist the AU. Do you believe the UN is doing enough in this regard, specifically in the Sahel?
I think the UN has deployed important efforts in the Sahel to promote peace and security in the region. Deploying a force like MINUSMA requires hundreds of millions of dollars per year, not to mention other missions, such as the UN Office for West Africa and the one for the Sahel [OSES], both based in Dakar, in addition to the various UN agencies working in the region. Of course the discussion about UN financial support to AU peacekeeping operations is one that is likely to continue. One opportunity for such cooperation will be in the logistical and financial support that the UN may lend to the Multinational Joint Task Force that countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin have decided to deploy against Boko Haram. I’m encouraged by the reported willingness of the UN to provide such support.
I must note, however, that there is a growing realisation of the need for and readiness by African countries to increase African contributions to these operations, for, after all, the victims are Africans and Africa is not the only region affected by conflicts and thus needing UN attention. It is a shared responsibility. It is in this regard that the outcome of the Obasanjo report on alternative sources of funding will be key in increasing African contributions in peacekeeping operations on the continent.
Q: The possible deployment of a robust intervention force, modelled on the Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was evoked during the January AU summit. Do you think such a brigade could be the solution to drive the last remaining armed groups out of Mali?
We make a distinction between armed groups in Mali. There are those that are part of a peace process, who accept non-negotiable principles of respecting Mali’s territorial integrity, national unity and the republican and secular nature of the Malian state. We negotiate with those, as we just did through the Algiers process. There are, on the other hand, those (such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and Ansar Dine) that refuse one or several of these principles and show no sign of readiness to change course; those are legitimate targets for the use of force.
Everyone agrees that there is a need to strengthen MINUSMA’s capabilities. We believe that an intervention brigade is one way of doing so, particularly seeing that MINUSMA’s classical peacekeeping mandate does not seem to allow it to engage in offensive anti-terrorist operations, as was the case for MONUSCO in the DRC prior to the deployment of the Intervention Brigade. We therefore believe that such a brigade in northern Mali, alongside MINUSMA and working closely with the French Operation Barkhane, could achieve what the Intervention Brigade did and is doing in the eastern DRC alongside MONUSCO [the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC].