Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 14:11:06 +0200
When Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni took a surprise mid-September trip to Khartoum to meet his Sudanese counterpart, Omar al-Bashir, it solidified the unexpected rapprochement in what had been one of Africa’s thorniest relationships. Two of the continent’s longest-serving leaders, Museveni and Bashir have spent much of the past two decades sniping at one another publicly as each secretly worked to destabilize the other’s government.
What is bringing them together, curiously, is one of the issues most responsible for this enduring animosity: South Sudan. Uganda provided consistent support to the southern Sudanese rebellion, which ended with South Sudan’s official secession in July 2011. Less than three years later, a dispute within South Sudan’s political elite sparked a bloody conflict that has left tens of thousands of people dead and consumed much of the country’s northeast. Now Museveni and Bashir find themselves reunited by an economic interest in bringing this nearly two-year conflict to an end, but also realizing they have much more to discuss than just that.
Museveni came to power in 1986 following a successful insurgency and was immediately tasked with reuniting Uganda. It would prove particularly daunting in the country’s north, the birthplace of Museveni’s two most noteworthy predecessors, Milton Obote and Idi Amin. For years, the region remained a bugaboo for his administration, harboring political dissidents and birthing armed rebellions.
One of those groups was the Joseph Kony-led Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Though short on ideology, Kony and his commanders used anti-administration rhetoric to justify the horrific atrocities they began committing in the mid-1980s, including the forced conscription of thousands of children across northern Uganda.
It would take nearly two decades for the government to drive the LRA from the north, in part because of Bashir’s efforts to prop up the terror group. First elected in 1989, Bashir, at the very least, turned a blind eye as Kony’s forces set up bases in what was then southern Sudan—an act of retaliation for Kampala’s backing of the ongoing southern rebellion.
When Museveni took over, Sudan’s south was three years into its second major revolt. Southerners were fighting decades of political and economic neglect by Khartoum. They found a natural ally in Uganda, calling on historical ties between communities in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. Though he has never admitted it, Museveni allegedly lent troops to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, the guerrilla movement that later became independent South Sudan’s formal army. Over the years, Museveni has also offered refuge to Sudanese rebel leaders.
The relationship between Museveni and Bashir reached a nadir with the severing of diplomatic ties in 1995. Their hostility doomed former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s efforts to mediate a resolution starting in 1999. Though the two countries restored diplomatic relations three years later, there was little reason to anticipate the recent reconciliation—until South Sudan caught fire.
The conflict began in the middle of December 2013 as a battle between government troops and forces loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar, who had been politically exiled by President Salva Kiir. In the early days of the rebellion, Machar’s troops were amassing to advance on the capital, Juba. Museveni quickly dispatched Ugandan soldiers to defend Juba and drive back Machar’s forces, a move that likely saved Kiir’s regime.
Though involved in few engagements since, Ugandan forces have remained on the ground. And their presence has prolonged a war that appears increasingly unwinnable by either side. Alongside the cost in human life, this protraction is also starting to hurt Uganda’s bottom line. Even before South Sudan’s independence, Sudan—and particularly the south—was Uganda’s leading trading partner.
Uganda’s economic presence in South Sudan has only increased in the years since the latter’s independence, but traders have had to flee the fighting alongside civilians. In this year’s budget background paper, Ugandan officials warned that “the unrest in South Sudan has exerted further pressure on Uganda’s export performance.” Museveni, who is gearing up for an early 2016 re-election campaign, wants desperately to avoid an economic downturn.
Sudan is hurting, as well. When South Sudan split, it took 75 percent of Sudan’s oil reserves with it. The South, however, remains dependent on a pipeline running through Sudan to export the crude. And Khartoum has made Juba pay, demanding nearly 25 percent of revenue in return for its use. But South Sudan’s oil reserves lie in the same area where fighting has centered; production is down significantly, which means less money accruing to Khartoum. That does not bode well for Bashir’s administration, which saw protests only two years ago when the government was forced to cut fuel subsidies.
Frontier Economics, a European consulting group, estimated that even in a situation where a moderate conflict in South Sudan continued for five years, it could end up costing Uganda 3.6 percent of its 2014 GDP—nearly $950 million. Sudan would lose 1.1 percent, or more than $800 million. Which helps explain why both Bashir and Museveni rallied behind the peace deal Kiir and Machar signed in late August. Museveni’s September visit to Khartoum centered around discussions about implementing the deal. Earlier this week, Ugandan troops began pulling out of South Sudan, in accordance with the agreement, and Kampala said it expects to have all troops out within two weeks.
Once they got together, Bashir and Museveni realized that “Uganda and Sudan have a lot of things that bind them together” beyond South Sudan, according to Uganda’s official statement following the meeting. That includes an interest in limiting international meddling in their spheres of influence, especially by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bashir is under indictment by the court, charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for his administration’s role in Darfur’s armed conflict. Museveni, once a regional champion of the ICC, has reversed himself, citing concerns that the court’s prosecutors have demonstrated a specific bias against Africans. He has called on African countries to drop out of the treaty establishing the court.
Despite his rhetoric, Museveni still remains a key security partner of Western powers, especially the United States. That also serves Bashir’s interest. Long viewed as a pariah, he has been seeking to rehabilitate his country’s image. He was already successful in easing some U.S. sanctions earlier this year. Museveni could prove critical to future efforts.
Buoyed by their agreement, the two have shown a willingness to engage on legacy flashpoints as well. During a high-level diplomatic meeting in February, Ugandan officials offered to expel Sudanese rebel leaders from their country, and both countries have reopened discussions about ending their respective support for rebel groups.
Still, as if to emphasize that this is a process, the Ugandan government’s official communication following Museveni’s September trip seemed to lay the blame for previously sour relations on Khartoum. Old habits, it seems, die hard.
Andrew Green is a foreign correspondent based in East Africa. He writes often from the region on issues of health, human rights and politics, and his work has appeared in Foreign Policy, The New Republic and The Washington Post, among other outlets. You can view more of his reporting at www.theandrewgreen.com.