As 2016 concludes there is still no end in sight for the Libyan crisis. Although the factions that took part in the UN-sponsored Libyan political dialogue finally signed the Libyan Political Accord (LPA) on 17 December last year, the accord is still extremely fragile in view of ongoing discord over it. In theory, that document ushered Libya into its fourth post-revolutionary interim phase which should culminate in general elections, although there is no sign of those yet. Factions are still battling over the substance of the accord and its mechanisms of implementation. Nevertheless, the sharp polarisation that Libya has experienced during the past two years seems, for the most part, a reflection of regional and international developments during this period.

Many observers of the Libyan crisis maintain that Libya has become an arena for a proxy war between various regional and international powers. They point, for example, to the east-west conflict in Libya and the regional and international relationships and connections of local agents in those conflicts. The eastern camp is supported by Egypt, the UAE and France while Turkey and Qatar support the Libya Dawn camp in the West (the latter coalition appears to have mutated since it was formed in July 2014). These various powers involved in Libya have locked horns in a fierce tug-of-war over the nature of the forthcoming system of government there. The effect has been to fuel local rivalries, hamper attempts to mend rifts and impede the implementation of a unified national project to rescue the country from its current plight.

Of the many developments that occurred regionally during recent years, those emanating from Egypt in the summer of 2013 following the overthrow of the former president Mohamed Morsi, a high ranking Muslim Brotherhood official, had a far-reaching impact on the political and security situations in Libya. Internationally, perhaps the most salient event from the perspective of the Libyan crisis is the electoral success of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump. This is likely to be followed by the success of a candidate similar in outlook to the US president-elect in the French presidential elections in 2017 and a shift further to the right in the German general elections, while in Italy constitutional amendments may lead to important changes in the decision-making centres in Rome. The blow that the EU sustained from the Brexit referendum is also likely to have a profound impact on Libya.

The influence of regional and international stakeholders in the Libyan crisis has grown increasingly distinct and powerful since 2014 when the country plunged into a civil war in which various social, economic, political and ideological dimensions interweaved with regional and international ones.

Libyan activist Mohamed Fouad agrees that the events in 2013 that brought Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi to power in Cairo had “the most profound and extremely clear impact” on Libya. As he explained in interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, the changes that swept Egypt since that date threw the political and military situation in Libya into turmoil. “This was manifested in how the General National Congress (GNC) caved in to the demands of the ‘No to extension’ movement that was led by activists opposed to the Islamist movement and who are closely connected with influential regional forces,” he said. The GNC, located in Tripoli, was the highest legislative authority at the time. Brought into power by popular vote in August 2012 for an 18-month term and tasked with overseeing the transition to a permanent democratic constitution, its term officially ended in February 2014, but a large contingent of that body moved to extend its term, triggering widespread opposition.

According to Fouad, the anti-extension movement compelled the GNC into making “dangerous” concessions. “It was forced to approve the creation of a committee charged with amending the Constitutional Declaration of August 2011 and to approve that committee’s proposal calling for new legislative and presidential elections. These led to the election of the House of Representatives that is currently based in Tobruk, near Egypt and under its protection. They also led to the legitimisation of the military rebellion of General Khalifa Haftar who initiated a military campaign without the approval of any of the existing authorities in the country and who has explicitly stated that he has very strong Egyptian backing and that he intends to emulate its president, Al-Sisi.”

Regarding the international level, Fouad, who is currently residing in Rome, told the Weekly that Libya is in suspense as it anticipates two major events: Donald Trump’s entry into the White House in 2017 and the referendum on the new constitution in Italy. The latter development “is expected to bring the downfall of the current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who has been one of the most important and prominent supporters of the political process in Libya.”

In response to the question as to how divergent regional and international stances will affect Libya in 2017, Fouad said: “The current ambiguity in the positions of regional and international parties concerned with events in Libya makes it difficult to predict how regional and international developments will play out in the near future.” He noted, in particular, the uncertainty that surrounds the question of what the forthcoming Trump administration’s policy on Libya will be, regardless of the fact that President Barack Obama declared his support for the political process and the Government of National Accord (GNA) that is headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj, Nevertheless, Fouad predicted that Washington’s position will be greatly influenced by any change in the Italian position in the event that the Renzi government falls following the forthcoming constitutional referendum in Italy.

In general, the Libyan activist expects that the first six months of 2017 “will be very difficult for Libyans and perhaps the crises in Libya will worsen”. He added that by the end of that first six months, the policies of the new incumbent in the White House will have become clearer and at least Libyans will have an idea as to what extent he intends to get involved in Libya and which side in their country he will support.

As for the possible changes that 2017 might bring at the level of the regional powers involved in Libya, Fouad believes that the Egyptian-UAE camp will continue to give their strong support to General Haftar and his forces in eastern Libya, but he does not rule out the possibility that this stance could be affected by regional or international developments.

In the meantime, Martin Kobler, the UN special envoy to Libya and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), has been shuttling back in force between Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Doha and Rome in an effort to persuade the regional stakeholders in the Libyan crisis to give more constructive support to the political process in Libya and efforts to steer the country out of its crisis. In spite of such efforts, the UN Security Council was due to meet on 17 December to consider whether or not to extend the envoy’s mission or introduce fundamental changes in the work UNSMIL.

In spite of the energetic commitment of the UN and the efforts of Kobler to bridge gaps between opposing camps and factions in Libya, little success has been achieved towards bolstering the PLA that was concluded in Skhirat a year ago. This failure, so far, underscores the extent to which conflicting regional and international positions have affected the efficacy of UN efforts.

Political science professor Khairi Omar believes that UNSMIL’s chief problem has been its confusion over how to handle the controversy over the formation of the political consensus government and the collapse of the Political Agreement timetable. As a consequence, he added, the UN needs to shift position in a manner that takes into account the changes that have occurred during the past months.

Professor Omar also maintained that UN handling of the Libyan crisis contributed to reinforcing the current institutional divide in Libya. The UN was not firm enough in setting rules for dealing with parallel governmental institutions. This further aggravated the deterioration and political fragmentation that was generated during the transitional period, and even caused the LPA to lose the value it could have had in bolstering efforts to reach the consensus to which the Libyan people aspire.

The UN is working to combine efforts with the Arab League and the African Union in the hope of promoting the progress of the political process in Libya. However, these two organisations lack the political efficacy and clout necessary to be able to have any real impact on the crises that concern them. A major problem is that these organisations lack cohesive and effective will, since their members are unable to reach a unified vision on crucial issues. While the UN is controlled by the major powers who, alone, have the power to punish whoever they please, the Arab League and African Union are effectively helpless when it comes to Arab and African conflicts.