https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/river-runs-through-african-rivalry
A River Runs Through an African Rivalry
Analysis <
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis>
January 3, 2017 | 12:10 GMT
The dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is only the most
recent expression of a longstanding conflict over the Nile. (ZACHARIAS
ABUBEKER/AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast
- *The competition to secure water from the Nile River will create
problems for Egypt and Ethiopia, much as it has for centuries.*
- *The countries will, however, probably find some common ground despite
the ongoing construction of the divisive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.*
- *Distrust still defines relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa, and
Egyptian-Ethiopian competition over water resources will not end.*
Analysis
Egypt and Ethiopia have been at odds for much of their modern history,
perhaps nowhere more so than in their attempts to secure water of the Nile
River basin <
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/nile-water-wars>. This
particular struggle has been on full display in recent negotiations over
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is situated on the Blue Nile.
The history of competition over the critical waterway provides the context
for regional dynamics that will endure long into the future.
Troubled Waters
Treaties lie at the center of controversy between Egypt and Ethiopia over
the Nile River, primarily because most of these agreements never included
Ethiopia as a signatory. The treaties were tools British colonial officials
used in the 19th and 20th centuries to manage relations between their
Egyptian and Sudanese holdings. Ethiopia, which was not a colony, at times
negotiated with the British government but never had the same say in
regulating the use of the Nile. Understandably, Addis Ababa has often
rejected the legal framework established in this period for managing the
river. One of Ethiopia's main concerns is the fact that it, as an upstream
country, is not protected in the same way as downstream countries such as
Egypt.
The Geopolitical Impact of the Nile
<
https://www.stratfor.com/video/geopolitical-impact-nile>Free
>From Ethiopia's perspective, all countries in the basin depend on the water
resource. Addis Ababa argues that it should have been invited to take part
in initial agreements that set water use terms. Because it was sidelined
from the process that laid down the management of the river, Ethiopia has
instead pursued self-development projects such as the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam. These kinds of projects are a problem for Egypt: the Nile
is the desert country's primary source of fresh water and of irrigation for
agriculture. For that reason alone, Egypt has and will continue to dominate
in use of Nile River water. Without it, Egypt could not survive.
Subtle Means
The most recent major agreement on managing the Nile was reached in 1959,
marking the start of the modern history of Nile River relations. It was
signed soon after the independence of Sudan in 1956 and Gamal Abdel
Nasser's 1956 rise to power
<
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-modern-egyptian-republic-special-report>
in Egypt. It dictated the amount of water that could be used by each
country and established a number of joint projects to limit loss of water
from evaporation in certain sections of the Nile. But once again, the
agreement did not include Ethiopia.
Of course, Nasser was not oblivious to Ethiopia's concerns — or to its
importance to Egyptian water security. Even before Nasser, Egypt had
attempted to gain more control over the Blue Nile, one of the Nile's major
tributaries. During the 19th century, Egypt tried to invade Ethiopia to
gain control over this portion of the basin. But Ethiopian armies deflected
the invasion in the coastal areas of modern day northern Eritrea. Even
after the failed invasions, Egypt maintained forces in the port city of
Massawa (now part of Eritrea) to maintain military options against
Ethiopia. By the time Nasser came to power as Egypt's president in 1956,
Egypt's military no longer held these areas because the United Kingdom had
given up control of the territory. And, in 1952, Eritrea had entered into a
federacy with Ethiopia.
Rather than try to force Ethiopia's hand militarily, Nasser attempted to
work with Addis Ababa diplomatically. Moreover, Nasser had a direct
connection with Ethiopia's rulers. During his career as a military officer,
he had been stationed in Sudan and had interacted closely with Ethiopian
officials. Nasser failed, however, to convince the Ethiopian emperor to
visit Egypt. Despite the interest Ethiopia may have had in collaborating
with Egypt on Nile River issues, the style of Arab nationalism Nasser
propagated in his country and the region drove a deep wedge between the two
countries. Ethiopia considered the ideology a threat to monarchies such as
its own. Furthermore, Ethiopians were Africans, not Arabs, so Addis Ababa
was suspicious of any potential ulterior motives that may have been guiding
Nasser's attempts to initiate dialogue.
The Ebb of Conflict
In addition, both countries were implicated in Cold War politics. While
Nasser's Egypt was supported by the Soviet Union, Ethiopia was supported by
the United States. For Ethiopia, this allegiance presented an existential
threat. Communism, of course, staunchly opposes the concept of a monarchy,
and Ethiopian rulers rejected communism and all of its agents. Eventually,
communism did indeed bring down Ethiopia's monarchy when the Coordinating
Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army (a
Marxist-Leninist military council often referred to simply as the Derg),
took control of the country in 1974. Before then, the monarchy held off
interacting with Nasser, forcing Egypt to explore other means of
establishing influence over the Blue Nile.
Consequently, Nasser's government began to undermine the Ethiopian
government. By supporting Eritrea and Somalia, Egypt attempted to distract
and weaken Addis Ababa by inspiring the Muslim population of Ethiopia to
resist the Christian emperor, in part through propaganda operations out of
Radio Cairo. They also provided facilities to Eritrean revolutionaries to
broadcast their own propaganda, and even provided military training to
Eritreans, many of which went on to become part of the current ruling class
following Eritrea's independence in 1991. Nasser also exploited the ethnic
Somali struggle
<
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/rise-and-fall-somali-state> to unify
greater Somalia, which spans across southeastern Ethiopia
<
https://www.stratfor.com/blog/letter-ethiopia-down-mountaintop>. Egypt
provided military support here as well.
However, this interference eventually led to war between Ethiopia and
Somalia over the disputed Ogaden region. By this time, communists had come
to power in Ethiopia, and Nasser no longer ruled Egypt. Ethiopia's military
eventually defeated Somalia after the Soviet Union sided with Addis Ababa,
beginning an era of communism in Ethiopia. During this period, Anwar Sadat
became president of Egypt, and the country's priorities changed. Ethiopia
was in no position to continue its competition with Egypt regardless: It
was distracted by internal conflict, not to mention Eritrea's war of
independence. And so, for a time, the two countries' attempts to undermine
one another declined markedly.
Precious Water
But tensions rekindled in 2011, when Ethiopia started the construction of
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam near the Sudanese-Ethiopian border
<
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ethiopia-makes-progress-nile-dam-project>.
Seeking reassurances that the dam will not endanger the crucial flow of the
Nile River, Egypt has taken part in round after round of negotiations. The
construction of the dam — and the diplomatic process surrounding it — has
since progressed at a slow but steady pace.
Despite collaboration
<
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypt-forced-negotiate-nile-dam>,
partially explained by the fact that Egypt simply has few alternatives to
halt the dam's construction
<
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypts-limited-military-options-stop-ethiopian-dam-project>,
historical concerns between Cairo and Addis Ababa endure. Even now,
Ethiopia faces internal unrest driven by ethnic discontent, and accusations
of Egyptian support to opposition fighters have again emerged. Countries
such as Saudi Arabia have also reached out, hoping to use the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a lever to influence Egypt, which has recently
sought greater independence in its Middle East foreign policy
<
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypt-looks-help-where-it-can-get-it>,
resisting any attempts to bring it further under outside influence.
Geography dictates that Egypt and Ethiopia will continue compete.
Received on Sat Jan 07 2017 - 20:25:19 EST