Raimoq.com: WikiLeaks Exposes, Sanctions against Eritrea are Politically Motivated

WikiLeaks Exposes That Sanctions Imposed against Eritrea are Politically Motivated

WikiLeaks Exposes that Sanctions Imposed against Eritrea are politically motivated to divert the attention from Ethiopia’s Occupation of Sovereign Eritrean territory, including the town of Badme. The Sanction was imposed on 23 December 2009, but the concerted and coordinated disinformation campaign started in 2006, way before the Somalia and Eritrea/Djibouti Issues were taken as an agenda item by the UN Security Council

1. On Ethiopia’s 2006 request to the US Government to pressure Djibouti to Sever its relationship with Eritrea and urge it to support Ethiopia’s Agenda

“Meeting of US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Donald Yammoto with Mr. Tekeda Alemu, Ethiopia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Addis Ababa, 16 Sep 2006) The Government of Djibouti’s opposition to IGAD actions in Somalia are the result of its fear of Eritrean President Isaias, Tekeda said, as well as President Guelleh’s personal business interests with Eritrea…. Tekeda maintained that the GOD was “on the wrong path,” and added that Djibouti was not strong enough to take Ethiopia’s continued friendship and forbearance for granted…. Tekeda urged that the USG speak frankly with Djibouti about its role in the region. He said that President Guelleh would pay attention to U.S. concerns given the importance to him of the U.S. military base in Djibouti. “He must be told to choose” whose side he wanted to take.”

2. On US diplomatic activity to Assess for the possibility of imposing sanctions against Eritrea

“US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s Talking Point sent to the USUN Mission in New York on 1 March 2008 Action addressees should assess the utility and level of support for targeted sanctions, and specifically which measures might be most successfully imposed and effectively implemented in this context. Department is especially interested in the views of African members of the Security Council. Potential options include: Imposing a travel ban on key Eritrean government officials. Placing an assets freeze on these same officials and/or other Eritrean assets/resources. Imposing trade, investment, or other restrictions related to Eritrean resources, including mining. Imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea.”

3. On the request by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia for the US to impose economic sanction against Eritrea by restricting the Eritrean Missions from Collecting 2% Rehabilitation and Recovery Tax (RRT) from Eritreans living Abroad

“Meeting Between Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, New York, 17 April 2008 He [Prime Minister Meles] said the only effective way to approach Eritrea would be to go after the flow of remittance money, which he said would get a response from Asmara within two to three months if coupled with other UNSC sanctions…”

4. On an attempt to give the sanctions an “African Face” so that it could be presented to the International Community as an IGAD/African request

“Meeting Between Ambassador Susan Rice And Fesseha Tessema, Ethiopia’s Charge D’affaires, New York 13 August 2009 Ambassador Rice emphasized that any new sanctions resolution should be an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative.. She recalled IGAD’s prior lack of consensus on a sanctions framework for Eritrea during its June visit to New York, and stated that any new resolution should reflect the common ground between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia.”

5. On pretext to be used and how the Sanction resolutions can be formulated

“Ambassador Rice’s Meeting With Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi On September 21, 2009 Ambassador Rice asked Meles, views on a potential UNSC resolution creating a stand-alone Eritrea sanctions regime, separate from the existing Somalia sanctions regime (UNSCR 1844) under which Eritreans can be designated for threatening the peace and stability in Somalia, and violating Djibouti’s border, among other sanctionable actions. Meles strongly backs this approach.”

6. On US officials Active and leading role on imposing sanctions against Eritrea and their attempt to diplomatically isolate it

a) “Meeting Between US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Karl Wycoff and Prime Minister Meles Zinawi, Addis Ababa, 19 November 2009 Wycoff agreed that Eritrea has shown no signs of changing its behavior but suggested that the broadening discussion of sanctions, including Ambassador Rice’s personal involvement at USUN, has caught the attention of Eritrean President Isaias. Wycoff added that the USG has worked to undercut support for Eritrea, including his own visits to Gulf countries to enlist their support in such activities.”

b) “Meeting between Ambassador Rice and French Foreign Minister Kouchner, New York, 7 December 2009.Ambassador Rice urged Kouchner to support U.S. efforts to impose Security Council sanctions on Eritrean officials who are undermining the Djibouti agreement and giving active support to the al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia.”

c) “Meeting Between US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Karl Wycoff and Djiboutian Prime Minister Dileita Mohamed Dileita, Djibouti, 13 December 2009DAS Wycoff said that the U.S. remained very concerned over Eritrea’s “unhelpful” regional role, including its support for al-Shabaab in Somalia and its incursion across the border with Djibout…DAS Wycoff assured Dileita that senior U.S. officialsincluding Ambassador Rice and A/S Carson-were closely following and supporting the draft UNSC resolution on sanction.