Yemen's warring factions are coming up against a deadline. Representatives of both sides have been mired in peace talks in Kuwait for three months. Now, Kuwaiti Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Khaled al-Jarallah has told the parties that they must reach an accord by the first week of August or be expelled from the country. U.N. special envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed said July 16 that the next two weeks of talks could be Yemen's last chance for peace, at least according to the shaky framework set up three months ago.

But a peace agreement has remained elusive, and both sides are becoming increasingly frustrated. Houthi rebels allied with former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh are demanding direct talks with Saudi representatives, who have a great deal of influence over the followers of President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi. Saudi Arabia is also the primary force in the coalition launching airstrikes in Yemen. But while Riyadh is backing Hadi's delegation in the Kuwait talks, the Saudi government itself has little presence in the negotiations. Even so, the Houthis believe that the Saudis are the ones who have the real decision-making power.

The actions of Houthi forces on the ground indicate that their leaders likely believe the talks will amount to nothing. A Houthi spokesperson issued an ultimatum July 19: Houthi border offensives will continue until Saudi airstrikes halt. And indeed, cross-border shelling by militants into Saudi Arabia's southern districts, including Jizan, have increased. In response, troops loyal to Hadi have launched an offensive into Hajja province in northwest Yemen to erode the Houthis' ability to carry out attacks in the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran. They now reportedly hold the city center of Harad District in Hajja.

The battlespace is made more complicated by the fact that the militants operating under the umbrella of both parties often act independently of the negotiating representatives in Kuwait City. For instance, in the past few weeks, rebel groups struck a local bilateral agreement with Hadi loyalists to allow for the provision of urgently needed aid. This suggests that even if a deal is made in Kuwait, individual factions might not adhere to it.

In fact, some groups are attempting to build up local loyalties in anticipation that the Kuwait talks will be ineffectual. In Taiz, for instance, the chief of the Houthi Revolutionary Command ordered militants to provide medical care for residents. In the south, the United Arab Emirates has focused its strategy on giving the population aid while targeting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. For its part, the local al Qaeda affiliate has managed to thrive and establish a stronger hold in the southern portion of the country, providing its own assistance to local populations. The United States and the United Arab Emirates have discussed the dire need to back more counterterrorism operations in the south, and U.S. Army Gen. Joseph Votel announced July 15 unspecified plans to deploy more U.S. forces to Yemen to help such counterterrorism measures.

The forces loyal to Hadi now face two choices. In the coming weeks, they could launch an offensive to seize control of the capital, Sanaa, which is now in the hands of Houthi rebels and Saleh's troops. A decision to do so would lead to fierce fighting with rebel forces. (Though the United Arab Emirates is still part of the fight, it is primarily focused on building up relationships and stabilizing the precarious security situation in southern Yemen.)

Alternatively, Hadi could decide to strike a deal in Kuwait in the next two weeks. Doing so would mean accepting that each step of the negotiating process will be slow and arduous. Implementing the key demand that the Houthis leave occupied cities and surrender their weapons, for example, would first require establishing provisional ruling councils.

Regardless of what Hadi's side chooses, the outcome will depend on what the Houthis and Saleh deem acceptable. And even if the two parties align, there is little guarantee that the disparate militant factions on the ground will abide by their decision.

Throughout Yemen's civil war, the United Arab Emirates has contributed ground forces to the Saudi-led coalition backing the government against the Houthi insurgent movement and fighters loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Now, the UAE armed forces are shifting their military role in Yemen. The commander of the UAE armed forces announced June 16 on Twitter that the war in Yemen "is practically over" for his country's ground forces.

The announcement was light on details, sparking speculation before more information surfaced. Other UAE officials clarified that the country will continue to be a capable and honest Saudi ally in Yemen, suggesting that it is not planning to withdraw.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have different preferred local partners in Yemen. For instance, Saudi Arabia has collaborated with the Islah party, a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in Yemen. The United Arab Emirates, which has been active mostly in south Yemen, has balked at this partnership, allying instead with the separatist Hirak and Southern Resistance movements. The June 16 statements referred to a UAE transition to security and assistance, which could mean that the country's local partners will assume the lead role in direct combat, with UAE forces backing them up.

Like Emirati participation, most Yemeni military ground activity has occurred in southern Yemen. Forces there have tried to secure the port city of Aden while supporting the Southern Resistance in its effort to expel al Qaeda from population centers under the militant group's control. Riyadh, meanwhile, is more concerned with northern Yemen, interpreting the Houthi movement as a direct threat to Saudi interests and partnering with Islah to quash it.

Most of the fighting in southern Yemen has died down. Reconstruction and mopping up the remnants of al Qaeda are now the main order of business. But clashes rage on in the north, where Houthi forces are mounting a fierce resistance in Taiz, Sanaa and al-Hudaydah. The UAE commander's initial announcement, therefore, was an admission by the United Arab Emirates that the conflict it cares about is winding down. Follow-up statements explained that the United Arab Emirates will likely continue security operations in southern Yemen to avoid a resurgence of al Qaeda forces. Even so, with less at stake in northern Yemen, UAE forces will probably avoid direct involvement in the ground operations moving on Sanaa.

Peace talks are slowly unfolding in Kuwait City, but fighting in Yemen continues unabated. In some areas, including the country's central regions to the east and southeast of Sanaa, the conflict has even intensified over the past few weeks. The provinces of Marib, Shabwa, Dali and Nehim have been largely unaffected by the loose cessation of hostilities that was supposed to blanket Yemen for the duration of negotiations. Fighting along the country's border areas has lingered, too. Saudi Arabia intercepted a missile fired from Yemen on May 30, and several skirmishes were reported in the Najran area earlier in the month. For the most part, the cease-fire has only tenuously held in Sanaa, where the pace of Saudi airstrikes has slowed considerably since talks began in mid-April.

The persistent fighting can be attributed in part to the Houthi rebels, who are trying to seize as much territory as possible should negotiations lead to a deal that could erode their standing in Yemeni politics. The rebels have made piecemeal gains in northwest Shabwa, including recapturing parts of Usaylan from coalition forces. They are also vying for control Bayhan, which lies near a critical road to Sanaa.

The presence, however, of militants belonging to Yemen's Southern Movement, known colloquially as Hirak, has added to the instability in Shabwa, Taiz and Aden to the south. Though the organization initially aligned itself with the coalition of forces backing Yemeni President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, the relationship between the two is marred by constant tension. The internal feud boiled over on May 31 when coalition security forces clashed with Hirak fighters who swarmed a security administration building in Aden.

Meanwhile, in southern Hadramawt and Lahj, raids led by the United Arab Emirates against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have become less frequent. But Abu Dhabi's mission to clear the group's members from positions of authority in the province and reduce their territorial holdings is not over. Attacks by AQAP and the Islamic State continue to endanger Yemen's southern cities. On May 15, an assault on Mukalla left 47 people dead; a week later, an attack in Aden killed dozens of Yemeni army recruits.

Despite the ongoing violence, there are some indications that Yemen's peace talks may be yielding fruit, however slowly. Hadi's coalition continues to insist on full adherence to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216, which requires the Houthis to surrender weapons seized from the state and withdraw from all of their territorial holdings. On June 2, a Houthi spokesman expressed the rebels' willingness to lay down their weapons, pull out of some cities and possibly even allow Hadi's return to office at the head of a transitional government — the first time the Houthis have offered such a concession. A prisoner swap involving thousands of fighters is also scheduled to take place before Ramadan begins June 5. Meaningful progress has yet to occur, however, even though small-scale exchanges have taken place. If the peace talks in Kuwait grind to a halt, the Houthis have made it clear that they will move forward with the formation of their own government.

Yet the peace talks have not faltered, though many of the thorniest issues — the formation of a transitional military and of presidential councils to oversee the handover of power, to name a few — will not be decided for months. And as Ramadan begins, the tempo of negotiations and fighting on the ground will slow to a crawl.

The Saudi-led coalition is creeping toward Sanaa, hoping to hold the high ground before mustering to retake the rebel-occupied capital. They are now around 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) from Sanaa International Airport. From there it is only 8 kilometers to the city center. Emirati media is already heralding the start of "Operation Free Sanaa," citing various tribal meetings meant to bolster support for the coalition in the capital.

Yemeni President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, based out of Aden, appointed Brig. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar as his armed forces deputy commander in late February. Hadi hopes to use him to garner support from local tribes to compete with similar efforts by Hadi's opponent, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his Houthi allies. Al-Ahmar has a longstanding rivalry with Saleh but is also a polarizing figure within the tribal landscape. Thus, his support could just as easily backfire.

There are signs that Hadi's advance is working. Republican Guard units loyal to Saleh have reportedly ordered the withdrawal of forces from Ibb, Dhamar and Al Bayda — located southeast of Sanaa — and have redeployed these troops to fortify the city's defenses.

The drive toward Sanaa has been a slow march generally favoring the Saudi-led coalition. But in Taiz and Marib districts, the results have been mixed, and coalition opponents have had numerous successes. Allied Houthi and Saleh forces attacked Saudi Arabia's Sahn al-Jen military base in Marib, reportedly killing and injuring dozens of soldiers. Fighting and Saudi airstrikes continue in Taiz, and coalition forces are still engaged with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula across the south.

Saudi airstrikes have continued in the cities of Bani Hashish, Nihm, Al Ghayl and Hairan. However, major airstrikes in Sanaa city have not been reported in a week. Additionally, a Houthi delegation crossed the Alab port, without the accompaniment of pro-Saleh forces, for a Saudi prisoner swap that traded one Saudi for seven detained Yemenis. Talks are also allegedly taking place between Saudi representatives and the Houthi delegation for a partial cease-fire along the border to allow humanitarian aid to pass. This will not extend anywhere else in the country.

The border cease-fire negotiations have conspicuously excluded representatives of Saleh's forces. This could mean one of several things. It may indicate that the Houthis and the Saudi coalition are considering a plan that would cut Saleh and his loyalists out of the future of the country. The Houthi-Saleh union was always a marriage of convenience and has been showing cracks as the Saudi coalition approaches Sanaa. The former president's goal is to fully restore the control over Yemen that he lost in 2011. The gulf states in particular oppose such an outcome, as do many Yemenis resentful of his oppressive rule. The Houthis would not lose a great deal were they to surrender. They would likely return to their stronghold in northern Saada, with the Saudi stipulation that the tribal group halts cross-border aggression and tolerates Hadi's government. That Houthi and coalition interests can mesh does not mean that a separate peace is imminent but that negotiations could have some success in shaping a future that is palatable to one major wing of the rebel movement, albeit to the detriment of the other.

The coalition march on Sanaa continues unabated. Forces loyal to President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi took control of a major Yemeni Republican Guard base northeast of Sanaa on Feb. 1. The base is about 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the edge of Yemen's capital city. Though pockets of Houthi fighters are scattered throughout the large military complex, the clearance operation is well underway, heavily supported by Saudi-led coalition air power. Coalition air support, which included the use of Emirati Mirage aircraft in the ground attack role, aided the advance on the base and the subsequent break-in battle. Over the past few days, coalition forces gained control of the mountaintops overlooking the complex, putting Hadi's forces in a dominant, elevated position. From there, it was a case of coordinating the assault and overpowering the Houthi defenses.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of Sanaa, 76 Republican Guard soldiers previously loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh surrendered. Then, in a blow to the morale of Saleh's remaining forces, they defected to the Hadi camp. Within the city itself, coalition aircraft have bombarded warehouses containing weapons and ammunition, further diminishing the defensive capabilities of forces in the capital.

Having taken a key strongpoint on the approach to Sanaa, coalition forces could reach the outskirts within days. The initial entry point for ground forces is likely to be Sanaa International Airport, roughly 8 kilometers north of the city center. A move to take the airport could happen sooner, if prompted, but the coalition may choose to slow its advance, taking control of crucial high ground along their axis of advance. Controlling the mountainous terrain overlooking their approach affords the attackers a degree of protection.

In a separate incident, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took control of the town of Azzan in Shabwa province Feb. 1. Although this was touted as an expansion of AQAP toward the oil and natural gas fields in Marib, the reality is that AQAP has dominated the area for some time, certainly since earlier in the current Yemen crisis. Local militias are simply too weak to confront the strength of AQAP in this particular region. As a result, they withdrew their checkpoints and personnel; AQAP took control of the town without having to fight for it.