------------------------------
The centre holds on
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11754/The_centre_holds_on>
Africa Confidential
26th August 2016 Cooperation between Amhara and Oromo oppositionists
presents the government with one of its most serious challenges in 20 years
The latest major jolt to Ethiopia's security and its ruling elites has come
in the form of a protest in the north-western city of Bahir Dar, the seat
of the Amhara regional government and a destination popular with tourists
visiting Lake Tana's ancient island monasteries. After a large
demonstration that passed peacefully the previous week in the historic town
of Gondar around 110 kilometres to the north, large crowds gathered to
protest in Bahir Dar on 7 August. Grievances included claims that the
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) dominates an authoritarian
government, the arrest of opposition-aligned politicians and journalists,
and complaints that Tigray State annexed Wolkait district in the 1990s (AC
Vol 57 No 15, Another restive region
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11725/Another_restive_region>
).
Significantly, the Amhara demonstrators expressed solidarity with their
Oromo compatriots, of whom around 500 have been killed by security forces
during an uprising that is now into its tenth month in Ethiopia's most
populous province. In keeping with some of the Oromia incidents, the
protest in Bahir Dar began peacefully, but when a security guard at a
government-linked building opened fire on threatening crowds, looting
erupted. Security forces then used lethal force, as they have done
regularly in Oromia, killing perhaps 30 demonstrators (AC Vol 57 No 6, Oromia
erupts <
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11594/Oromia_erupts>).
The day before this violence witnessed what activists tagged the Grand
Oromo Protests. One aim was to test the government's attitude following an
apparently more permissive stance on the Gondar demonstration. However, the
response was unambiguous: police, paramilitaries and soldiers gunned down
around 100 Oromo demonstrators in different places across the region as
protests descended into chaos. Thousands more people were reported to have
been rounded up later and many hauled off to military camps, including some
arrested after a rare demonstration in the capital, Addis Ababa. This
deadly outcome means the Oromo protests may well turn into into something
more resembling an armed insurgency. Still, Ethiopia's security apparatus
is fearsome and it has decades of experience of seeing off disorganised
rebellions.
Events in Bahir Dar and Oromia may not have been the most serious. In
Gondar, there was further violence last week involving security forces and
protestors, some of it directed against Tigrayan businesses. This has led
to the mass exodus of Tigrayans from the city, amid reports of targeted
killings and Tigrayans being told to leave Amhara Region.
Such events have created a rift within the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition of four regional parties that has
controlled Ethiopia since allied rebels overthrew Colonel *Mengistu Haile
Mariam
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3041/Mengistu_Haile_Mariam>*'s
Derg military regime in 1991. TPLF supporters say they are alarmed by the
anti-Tigrayan feelings accompanying the protest, as well as by the ethnic
violence. Amhara party leaders are at the very least complicit, they say,
through their failure to stamp out dangerous rhetoric and combat communal
violence – all of which is exacerbated by a well-armed populace and
proximity to enemy forces across the border in Eritrea.
*Deep-rooted tensions*
The tensions within the country's ethnic politics concern the post-1991
settlement but have deeper roots. Until the EPRDF divided the country into
ethnically defined administrative units, the Amhara were the most powerful
ethnic group ('nationality'), albeit one with major sub-divisions. The
Amharic language is the lingua franca and Amhara settlers and landlords
held sway in Oromia and other areas for decades. Many notable Ethiopian
rulers were Amhara, such as a series of monarchs based in Gondar for two
centuries from 1636; Emperor *Tewodros* II from the *Sudan* borderlands
west of Gondar, who began to forge the nation from 1855; and Menelik II of
Shewa, which encompassed Addis Ababa, who fought off *Italian* forces at
Adwa in 1896 and extended Ethiopia's border through conquest.
The Amhara protests are bolstered by support from diaspora activists, such
as the group Ginbot 7, that are vociferously opposed to the EPRDF's ethnic
politics. Critics say the protest movement is less about democratisation
than about the loss of historic Amhara privileges enjoyed at the expense of
people of other ethnicities (AC Vol 50 No 9, Losing the plot
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3080/Losing_the_plot>).
These fundamentally different interpretations mean the prospects for
compromise look poor.
The Wolkait issue is a prime example of that intransigence at work. Amhara
activists point out that before 1991, the district was part of provinces
ruled from Gondar. TPLF supporters and others observe, correctly, that
almost all its residents are Tigrinya-speakers, so it was legitimately
incorporated into Tigray State when boundaries were set based on
ethno-linguistic demographics. That debate is far from being the only one
emanating from the EPRDF's system of ethnic federalism, which supporters
staunchly defend as redressing the historical marginalisation and
exploitation of Ethiopia's myriad minorities.
Another issue within Amhara illustrates the complexities. As the Oromo
protests were exploding in November, trouble was also brewing among the
Qimant, another Semitic group which lives just to the west of Gondar. A
long-standing claim for autonomy, as promised by the 1995 constitution,
came to a head when the Bahir Dar government offered to give the community
control of 42 local administrations; the Qimant had asked for more than 170
councils. The Qimant duly rejected the offer and Amhara militias and
regional security officials punished them for their assertiveness. By the
time federal forces were deployed to quell the violence, almost 100 Qimant
people were dead.
EPRDF leaders give the impression that they would like such issues to
disappear so that the nation can harmoniously focus on their development
agenda. Prime Minister *Hailemariam Desalegn* has made comments suggesting
that all claims over ethnic autonomy have been settled. However, that isn't
the view held by the Qimant or indeed by others such as the Konso community
in the bewilderingly multi-ethnic south. Hailemariam used to be President
of the Southern Nations', Nationalities' and Peoples' Region.
Although mechanisms for conflict resolution exist, such as the upper
chamber of the federal Parliament, the House of Federation, they suffer
from the same problem as all other political institutions: they are
controlled by the EPRDF and so are not impartial. Other more fundamental
constitutional challenges, most pertinently the Oromo demand for greater
autonomy, are a reiteration of perennial questions about Ethiopian
statehood. As such they can be dealt with only through major political
processes, rather than technocratic fixes.
*Radicalism absent*
As a radical party with a popular base and a history of internal debate,
the EPRDF should in theory be capable of making a credible effort to meet
such challenges. Instead, it is increasingly seen as hollowed out as a
result of recruitment drives over the last decade to boost its membership.
While it may have six million card-carrying members, many of the new
followers are interested only in the material benefits of allegiance,
rather than possessing a belief in the capacity of the party's
'revolutionary democratic' doctrine to transform Ethiopia into a modern
nation through collective action.
There are also major question marks over the leadership. Rather than
producing legions of superb strategists and thinkers in the mould of the
revered late leader *Meles Zenawi
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/355/Meles_Zenawi>*,
the Front instead largely churns out over-promoted cadres who seem to have
arrived at senior positions purely through political loyalty. Deputy Prime
Minister *Demeke Mekonnen*, the head of the Amhara National Democratic
Movement, is a case in point: a politician who doesn't command the respect
of the people and is not known as a sophisticated problem-solver (AC Vol 56
No 7, Easy on the landslide
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11050/Easy_on_the_landslide>).
The President of Amhara Region, *Gedu Andargachew*, appears more likely to
lose his position than to lead a process of healing dialogue.
The problem is most apparent in Oromia, where the ruling Oromo People's
Democratic Organisation has been missing in action since November,
reflecting its huge legitimacy crisis among the 35 million Oromo. The
former Revenue and Customs Authority Director, *Beker Shale*, has been
appointed to shake up the OPDO but the results of his efforts are as yet
unclear. Little has been heard from figures of the Oromo establishment such
as popular former President *Abadula Gemeda*, Speaker of the federal
legislature since 2010 (AC Vol 51 No 18, The new guard steps up
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3654/The_new_guard_steps_up>
).
*Radicalism present*
The radical and spreading nature of the protests, many of which seek regime
change, and the reality of a weakened, bruised EPRDF, mean Hailemariam and
others are very likely to fall back on tried and tested methods. That may
mean more brutal repression, including mass internment, and zero tolerance
for anything but officially backed 'demonstrations'. As well as ploughing
ahead with national infrastructure and industrialisation projects, it also
means an effort to create jobs by supporting small businesses, as well as
attempts to root out corruption and improve public administration. Still,
the politicisation of the civil service, the smothering of the autonomy of
institutions and rising corruption among party-affiliated individuals,
especially in Oromia, work against effective reform. These problems are
systemic and stem partly from the EPRDF's de facto one-party state; they
are therefore difficult for the Front to solve.
Whether opponents can capitalise on the EPRDF's stuttering response is far
from certain. Reports from Bahir Dar suggest that after the massacre there,
local people are in a state of terrified shock rather than defiant revolt.
The unity and organisational skills of the Amhara activists, and the
resolve of the demonstrators, is at this stage untested.
An alliance was formed this month between two exiled parties, the Oromo
Democratic Front and Ginbot 7, whose respective political aims of Oromo
autonomy and national unity are generally seen as incompatible. It has
given the protestors a boost, though. The ODF is a splinter group of the
Oromo Liberation Front, which fought against the Derg alongside the EPRDF
before falling out with the TPLF during the transition and continuing as a
rebel group. Ginbot 7 is headed by *Berhanu Nega*, who was elected Mayor of
Addis Ababa in 2005 before being gaoled after post-election turmoil. He has
fighters based in *Eritrea*. It's unclear at this stage what effect the
strategic alliance will have on the ground but a united front between the
two groups' supporters could certainly have significant propaganda value.
Oromo and Amhara activists are already mounting joint demonstrations
outside embassies abroad, partly with the aim of putting pressure on
Western governments, which support the EPRDF's Ethiopia despite its poor
human rights record. While the *United States *and European Union are
getting nervy about the unrest, donor support is long institutionalised and
the geopolitical calculations that make Ethiopia a key ally in the Horn of
Africa are not about to change.
The various opposition elements also have a long way to go before
convincing the world that they present a better governing option than the
EPRDF. For all its repression and other failings, it has a solid track
record of maintaining relative law and order, improving public services and
overseeing infrastructure-led growth (AC Vol 57 No 14, Dam fine
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11714/Dam_fine>).
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Received on Sat Aug 27 2016 - 07:17:43 EDT