http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11754/The_centre_holds_on
Vol 57 No 17
Published 26th August 2016
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ETHIOPIA
The centre holds on
26TH AUGUST 2016
Cooperation between Amhara and Oromo oppositionists presents the
government with one of its most serious challenges in 20 years
The latest major jolt to Ethiopia's security and its ruling elites has
come in the form of a protest in the north-western city of Bahir Dar,
the seat of the Amhara regional government and a destination popular
with tourists visiting Lake Tana's ancient island monasteries. After a
large demonstration that passed peacefully the previous week in the
historic town of Gondar around 110 kilometres to the north, large
crowds gathered to protest in Bahir Dar on 7 August. Grievances
included claims that the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
dominates an authoritarian government, the arrest of
opposition-aligned politicians and journalists, and complaints that
Tigray State annexed Wolkait district in the 1990s (AC Vol 57 No 15,
Another restive region).
Significantly, the Amhara demonstrators expressed solidarity with
their Oromo compatriots, of whom around 500 have been killed by
security forces during an uprising that is now into its tenth month in
Ethiopia's most populous province. In keeping with some of the Oromia
incidents, the protest in Bahir Dar began peacefully, but when a
security guard at a government-linked building opened fire on
threatening crowds, looting erupted. Security forces then used lethal
force, as they have done regularly in Oromia, killing perhaps 30
demonstrators (AC Vol 57 No 6, Oromia erupts).
The day before this violence witnessed what activists tagged the Grand
Oromo Protests. One aim was to test the government's attitude
following an apparently more permissive stance on the Gondar
demonstration. However, the response was unambiguous: police,
paramilitaries and soldiers gunned down around 100 Oromo demonstrators
in different places across the region as protests descended into
chaos. Thousands more people were reported to have been rounded up
later and many hauled off to military camps, including some arrested
after a rare demonstration in the capital, Addis Ababa. This deadly
outcome means the Oromo protests may well turn into into something
more resembling an armed insurgency. Still, Ethiopia's security
apparatus is fearsome and it has decades of experience of seeing off
disorganised rebellions.
Events in Bahir Dar and Oromia may not have been the most serious. In
Gondar, there was further violence last week involving security forces
and protestors, some of it directed against Tigrayan businesses. This
has led to the mass exodus of Tigrayans from the city, amid reports of
targeted killings and Tigrayans being told to leave Amhara Region.
Such events have created a rift within the Ethiopian Peoples'
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the coalition of four regional
parties that has controlled Ethiopia since allied rebels overthrew
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam's Derg military regime in 1991. TPLF
supporters say they are alarmed by the anti-Tigrayan feelings
accompanying the protest, as well as by the ethnic violence. Amhara
party leaders are at the very least complicit, they say, through their
failure to stamp out dangerous rhetoric and combat communal violence –
all of which is exacerbated by a well-armed populace and proximity to
enemy forces across the border in Eritrea.
Deep-rooted tensions
The tensions within the country's ethnic politics concern the
post-1991 settlement but have deeper roots. Until the EPRDF divided
the country into ethnically defined administrative units, the Amhara
were the most powerful ethnic group ('nationality'), albeit one with
major sub-divisions. The Amharic language is the lingua franca and
Amhara settlers and landlords held sway in Oromia and other areas for
decades. Many notable Ethiopian rulers were Amhara, such as a series
of monarchs based in Gondar for two centuries from 1636; Emperor
Tewodros II from the Sudan borderlands west of Gondar, who began to
forge the nation from 1855; and Menelik II of Shewa, which encompassed
Addis Ababa, who fought off Italian forces at Adwa in 1896 and
extended Ethiopia's border through conquest.
The Amhara protests are bolstered by support from diaspora activists,
such as the group Ginbot 7, that are vociferously opposed to the
EPRDF's ethnic politics. Critics say the protest movement is less
about democratisation than about the loss of historic Amhara
privileges enjoyed at the expense of people of other ethnicities (AC
Vol 50 No 9, Losing the plot). These fundamentally different
interpretations mean the prospects for compromise look poor.
The Wolkait issue is a prime example of that intransigence at work.
Amhara activists point out that before 1991, the district was part of
provinces ruled from Gondar. TPLF supporters and others observe,
correctly, that almost all its residents are Tigrinya-speakers, so it
was legitimately incorporated into Tigray State when boundaries were
set based on ethno-linguistic demographics. That debate is far from
being the only one emanating from the EPRDF's system of ethnic
federalism, which supporters staunchly defend as redressing the
historical marginalisation and exploitation of Ethiopia's myriad
minorities.
Another issue within Amhara illustrates the complexities. As the Oromo
protests were exploding in November, trouble was also brewing among
the Qimant, another Semitic group which lives just to the west of
Gondar. A long-standing claim for autonomy, as promised by the 1995
constitution, came to a head when the Bahir Dar government offered to
give the community control of 42 local administrations; the Qimant had
asked for more than 170 councils. The Qimant duly rejected the offer
and Amhara militias and regional security officials punished them for
their assertiveness. By the time federal forces were deployed to quell
the violence, almost 100 Qimant people were dead.
EPRDF leaders give the impression that they would like such issues to
disappear so that the nation can harmoniously focus on their
development agenda. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has made
comments suggesting that all claims over ethnic autonomy have been
settled. However, that isn't the view held by the Qimant or indeed by
others such as the Konso community in the bewilderingly multi-ethnic
south. Hailemariam used to be President of the Southern Nations',
Nationalities' and Peoples' Region.
Although mechanisms for conflict resolution exist, such as the upper
chamber of the federal Parliament, the House of Federation, they
suffer from the same problem as all other political institutions: they
are controlled by the EPRDF and so are not impartial. Other more
fundamental constitutional challenges, most pertinently the Oromo
demand for greater autonomy, are a reiteration of perennial questions
about Ethiopian statehood. As such they can be dealt with only through
major political processes, rather than technocratic fixes.
Radicalism absent
As a radical party with a popular base and a history of internal
debate, the EPRDF should in theory be capable of making a credible
effort to meet such challenges. Instead, it is increasingly seen as
hollowed out as a result of recruitment drives over the last decade to
boost its membership. While it may have six million card-carrying
members, many of the new followers are interested only in the material
benefits of allegiance, rather than possessing a belief in the
capacity of the party's 'revolutionary democratic' doctrine to
transform Ethiopia into a modern nation through collective action.
There are also major question marks over the leadership. Rather than
producing legions of superb strategists and thinkers in the mould of
the revered late leader Meles Zenawi, the Front instead largely churns
out over-promoted cadres who seem to have arrived at senior positions
purely through political loyalty. Deputy Prime Minister Demeke
Mekonnen, the head of the Amhara National Democratic Movement, is a
case in point: a politician who doesn't command the respect of the
people and is not known as a sophisticated problem-solver (AC Vol 56
No 7,Easy on the landslide). The President of Amhara Region, Gedu
Andargachew, appears more likely to lose his position than to lead a
process of healing dialogue.
The problem is most apparent in Oromia, where the ruling Oromo
People's Democratic Organisation has been missing in action since
November, reflecting its huge legitimacy crisis among the 35 million
Oromo. The former Revenue and Customs Authority Director, Beker Shale,
has been appointed to shake up the OPDO but the results of his efforts
are as yet unclear. Little has been heard from figures of the Oromo
establishment such as popular former PresidentAbadula Gemeda, Speaker
of the federal legislature since 2010 (AC Vol 51 No 18, The new guard
steps up).
Radicalism present
The radical and spreading nature of the protests, many of which seek
regime change, and the reality of a weakened, bruised EPRDF, mean
Hailemariam and others are very likely to fall back on tried and
tested methods. That may mean more brutal repression, including mass
internment, and zero tolerance for anything but officially backed
'demonstrations'. As well as ploughing ahead with national
infrastructure and industrialisation projects, it also means an effort
to create jobs by supporting small businesses, as well as attempts to
root out corruption and improve public administration. Still, the
politicisation of the civil service, the smothering of the autonomy of
institutions and rising corruption among party-affiliated individuals,
especially in Oromia, work against effective reform. These problems
are systemic and stem partly from the EPRDF's de facto one-party
state; they are therefore difficult for the Front to solve.
Whether opponents can capitalise on the EPRDF's stuttering response is
far from certain. Reports from Bahir Dar suggest that after the
massacre there, local people are in a state of terrified shock rather
than defiant revolt. The unity and organisational skills of the Amhara
activists, and the resolve of the demonstrators, is at this stage
untested.
An alliance was formed this month between two exiled parties, the
Oromo Democratic Front and Ginbot 7, whose respective political aims
of Oromo autonomy and national unity are generally seen as
incompatible. It has given the protestors a boost, though. The ODF is
a splinter group of the Oromo Liberation Front, which fought against
the Derg alongside the EPRDF before falling out with the TPLF during
the transition and continuing as a rebel group. Ginbot 7 is headed
byBerhanu Nega, who was elected Mayor of Addis Ababa in 2005 before
being gaoled after post-election turmoil. He has fighters based in
Eritrea. It's unclear at this stage what effect the strategic alliance
will have on the ground but a united front between the two groups'
supporters could certainly have significant propaganda value.
Oromo and Amhara activists are already mounting joint demonstrations
outside embassies abroad, partly with the aim of putting pressure on
Western governments, which support the EPRDF's Ethiopia despite its
poor human rights record. While the United States and European Union
are getting nervy about the unrest, donor support is long
institutionalised and the geopolitical calculations that make Ethiopia
a key ally in the Horn of Africa are not about to change.
The various opposition elements also have a long way to go before
convincing the world that they present a better governing option than
the EPRDF. For all its repression and other failings, it has a solid
track record of maintaining relative law and order, improving public
services and overseeing infrastructure-led growth (AC Vol 57 No 14,
Dam fine).
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Received on Sat Aug 27 2016 - 20:15:27 EDT