OCPPC.ma: China faced with the proliferation of the terrorist phenomenon in Africa

China faced with the proliferation of the terrorist phenomenon in Africa

The expansion of the terrorist phenomenon in Africa puts China in a dilemma: to remain true to its non-interference policy in the internal affairs of other States, even if Chinese citizens and interests are threatened or; adopt a more interventionist policy to protect its investments in Africa even at the cost of making certain corrections to the principles that have, until now, underpinned its foreign policy.

On the Tanzanian coast near Dar es Salaam, the discovery of Chinese porcelain bowls and coins attest to the ancient relations between China and Africa. A recent excavation of a Chinese coin, dated to the fifteenth century, also confirms the historical nature of this relationship. These ties are thus very old and some date them to Admiral Zheng He’s expedition around 1418.

Subsequently, China withdrew into itself and its relations with Africa faded. They eventually resumed in the second half of the twentieth century.

Some date the resumption of Chinese-African relations to May 1956 when diplomatic relations were established between China and Egypt; others argue that it was rather the Bandung Conference in 1955 that revived the relationship. The third date suggested as marking the real resumption of relations between China and Africa is Zhou Enlai’s African tour (December 1963 - January 1964) from Egypt to Tanzania where he visited a dozen African countries and gave a boost to Chinese activities in Africa. Suffice to say that the entire period from the Bandung Conference to Zhou Enlai’s visit is a renaissance period for China-Africa relations. It was during this period that the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association (CAPFA) was born, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened an Africa section.

By evoking this relationship, especially its nature, it is clear that it is predominately economic. According to the 2014 statistics, the trade volume between China and Africa exceeded $220 billion and China's investment in Africa exceeded $30 billion, an increase of 22 and 60 times respectively compared to 2000. Moreover, the share of China-Africa trade within Africa’s total foreign trade increased from 3.82% at the beginning to 20.5% in 2014.

A better understanding of China-Africa relations, however, requires an understanding of the nature of these relationships, or whether they are purely economic. If yes, should they or can they stay purely economic? Do they need to be strengthened, maintained and preserved for support by political and security aspects? In other words, events and conditions that Africa is now experiencing and that reinforce the destabilization threats, will they have an impact on China-Africa relations? Will they change their nature?

The recent history of relations between China and Africa is dynamic. Since the fifties when it was initiated until now, they have changed in intensity and nature. We can thus distinguish two periods:

• The first period from the Bandung Conference to the beginning of the seventies, marked by political and ideological ties.

• A second period from the early seventies to the present day, noted for the establishment, development and strengthening of strong and close economic ties.

There is not however a strict dividing line between the two periods. During the era of ideological relations, economic exchanges were already taking place. Current relations are, though predominantly economic, spiced with political and security ties. The interpretation of the current economic situation, marked by the resurgence of violence, incites the question of whether or not we are on the verge of a third and new era of China-Africa relations? Should China not, despite its sacrosanct principle of non-interference, strengthen its security efforts?

I. Status of the security context: Terrorism in Africa

1. Terrorism in expansion

The focus here is on African areas where terrorism prevails more than in other areas. Therefore, attention will be given to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and to some countries in the Horn of Africa and the African northwest. In these areas, terrorism embodied in organizations such as Ansar Beit al Maqdis, Daech Libya, Boko Haram, AQIM, MUJAO, Al-Shabaab and others seems to have found asylum.

a) The Al Qaeda Zone: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso

The Al Qaeda zone, affiliated with Al Qaeda terrorism, mainly covers the area within Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Until 2014, French operations, first Serval and then Barkhane, seemed to have neutralized these terrorist groups. However, their gradual return is evident and has been increasingly intense since late 2014. The attacks against hotels in Bamako, Mali; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast are the clearest evidence. These groups now lead attrition actions against the States of the region, where African, International, Malian and French forces experience no respite.

In spirit and action, these organizations mingle religious terrorism, banditry and organized crime and are based on four major trends: Ansar Eddine; the MUJAO; Al-Mourabitoun; and residues of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

AQIM is returning to the Timbuktu region; Ansar Eddine is relocating to its favorite area in Kidal and establishing cells near the Ivorian border; and Macina Liberation Front is in central Mali. To the east of the country, in Gao, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) is especially known for its deadly incursions in Niger.

b) Boko Haram’s zone of evolution: Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger

Originating in Nigeria, the Boko Haram organization has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and has taken the name the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Driven from some areas it occupied in Nigeria, Boko Haram has spread to the Lake Chad region. Despite efforts led by the authorities, Boko Haram is very active not only in Nigeria but also in Chad, Cameroon and especially in southern Niger. These countries, also attacked by MUJAO, are experiencing great difficulties. In the Diffa region in the south near the border with Nigeria, the country is losing some villages to Boko Haram. Neither the army nor Niger’s gendarmerie can provide the troops needed to secure the villagers in this region.

The cooperation between these four countries in matters of security also suffers from a lack of appropriate means, namely a lack of coordination and tension on the prerogatives of sovereignty. Moreover, Boko Haram has recently found another destabilization method in Nigeria: It has begun to attack the Shia community.

c) The Al-Shabaab movement: Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya

This area is destabilized by the presence of the Al-Shabaab movement, which is the youth version of old Islamic courts affiliated with Al Qaeda. The death of their former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godan, killed in November 2014 by a US strike and AMISOM military action, has not shaken the organization even after it was kicked out of Mogadishu. It continues to have a large capacity for harm: the attack against the University of Garissa in April 2015 (142 students were murdered by a terrorist commando), or the February 2016 bombing in Baidoa in south-western Somalia. Al-Shabaab even takes action against armies. In January 2016, an attack against the Kenyan military reportedly caused between 100 and 180 deaths, according to Somali officials. The organization is growing by creating cells in countries within the region (Uganda and Kenya).

d) Islamic State organization (IS or Daech): Libya and Egypt

In Egypt, the Ansar Beit Al Maqdis organization, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State organization, also known as Daech, continues expanding its presence in the Sinai where it tries every day to consolidate its presence despite the almost daily operations by the Egyptian forces. Further east, on the Libyan coast, Daech has troops of over 5,000 fighters after settling in the city of Sirte and installing more cells to the west, in Sebratha, and to the east, in Derna and Benghazi. It is also trying to push its presence further south to Sebha. This area increasingly tends to be the Islamic State’s future territory in the event of defeat in the Middle East. From Libya, it would then have access to many gray areas in the Sahara and the Sahel, where the geography would allow it to better challenge the international community forces.

Map showing the location of terrorist organizations in Africa.

Source: http://www.voicesofyouth.org/fr/posts/ce-terrorisme-qui-d-truit-l-afrique

Read t in PDF Attachment below: