Djibouti: The latest chess piece in the Riyadh-Tehran game

 

 

In what seems to be the most serious attempt to negotiate between the two sides since Saudi Arabia’s military coalition began bombing Yemen last March, representatives of the Shia Houthi rebellion are in Riyadh as part of secret “preparatory talks”. While Houthi sources indicate the talks are focused on prisoner exchanges, negotiations make sense for the coalition at this point. International pressure is mounting over the civilian death toll, particularly since Saudi airstrikes are blamed for the majority of the campaign’s 3,000 deaths. Adding to the growing outcry is the fact that more than half of Yemen’s population (about 14.4 million people) is food insecure, the result of years of conflict predating the Arab Spring. Even as negotiations pick up steam, however, Saudi planners appear to have found a new trump card in their proxy war with Iran: building an overseas base in Djibouti.

Djibouti’s ambassador to Riyadh broke the news that the Saudis would be joining the (crowded) club of powers using the pocket-sized East African country as a staging ground. The United States has the largest presence, with over 4,000 troops and other personnelbased at Camp Lemmonier. France and Japan also maintain significant assets for their anti-piracy efforts. Of greatest interest to outside observers was China’s recent announcementsthat it would open its own base (the first Chinese overseas base in the world) in Djibouti, allegedly to help Beijing fulfill its own responsibilities in the anti-piracy fight but in fact an effort to cement the key military component of China’s “One Belt, One Road”. With a foothold in Djibouti, the Chinese government hopes it can protect an estimated $300 billion in Sino-African trade and particularly the $60 billion in loans, credit and grants promised by Chinese president Xi Jinping last December.

Strategically speaking, it is easy to see why Djibouti appeals to the Saudis. Located on the far side of the Bab El-Mandeb, a base gives Saudi air and naval forces room to maneuver and greater control over sea traffic in the waters around Yemen - the same waters Iran allegedly uses to supply the Houthis and smuggle oil shipments through its Yemeni Shia proxies. Control over the narrow strait affects not only Saudi Arabia and Yemen but also the entire global oil supply; 3.8 million barrels of oil pass through it every single day. While fears of Iranian influence in Yemen grow, moves by the Houthis in the vicinity of the Bab El-Mandeb have met with harsh responses from the coalition; the battle between rebels and loyalists over the town of Dhubab and Mayyun Island last October for one, took place with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE actively supporting pro-government forces. Saudi assertiveness on this front is directly related to the perception that the Obama administration is less than fully committed to Riyadh’s interests. Washington’s rapprochement with Tehran has apparently convinced King Salman that his Kingdom needs to look after itself.

The logic behind a permanent base in East Africa goes beyond the Yemen war, however. Even if the conflict with the Houthis comes to a conclusion in the near future (an optimistic assessment, to say the least), a presence on African soil could cement the diplomatic coupSaudi Arabia achieved earlier this year. After Iranian protesters attacked Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia all sided overtly with Saudi by cutting off ties with Iran. These countries had been in the Iranian sphere of influence on at least some level; Sudan once enjoyed Iranian training and support, while Djibouti previously allowed Iran to use it as a conduit for Houthi-bound supplies in exchange for limited aid and trade deals.

The advantages an African base offers to Riyadh are straightforward, but the choice of location might present serious problems in future. Despite being an “island of stability” in comparison to its neighbours, Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh has been forced to govern the country under a state of emergency since last November. With elections due on 8 April, Guelleh (in office since 1999) will be seeking a fourth term in direct violation of promises he made not to stand again. Last December, tensions between the government and its opponents boiled over into violence when security forces attacked a religious gathering and killed 19 people, including a six-year-old girl.

Most worryingly, Djibouti’s elite have shown a willingness to tear up agreements and turn their back on established allies. As recently as November 2014, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani described the country as a “friend and brother”, after attending the inauguration of Djibouti’s new National Assembly, designed by Iranian architects. Djibouti’s relationship with the Americans is also fraught. When Chinese money started pouring in, Guelleh extracted more funds from Barack Obama by doubling the rent paid for Camp Lemonnier. Closer to home, Guelleh turned his back on former ally Abdourahman Boreh, seizing his assets and accusing him of terrorism - a charge overturned by the London High Court after judges proved Guelleh had falsified evidence. Djibouti has joined the Saudi camp for now, but Guelleh’s track record shows he is perfectly willing to keep an eye out for greener pastures.

In another area for concern, moving in alongside the United States (and now China) might seem strategic but could add to a trend of Saudi overreach abroad. Aside from Yemen, Salman and his two key deputies - Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed Bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman -have deeply committed Saudi resources to the war in Syria and to keeping Iran in check in every part of the region. While such adventurism remains within the Kingdom’s budget, the ongoing oil crash is hurting the Saudi economy and forcing Riyadh to draw off foreign reserves for financing. Of course, money on its own is not enough to defend Saudi Arabia’s interests in the region. With Iran re-entering the international community, the pressure felt by the House of Saud is unlikely to subside anytime soon.

Khaled Alaswad is a Jordanian-born risk management consultant who has been working in Abu Dhabi, UAE, for the past five years. He has a degree in public policy from the United States.