http://www.eurasiareview.com/03092016-the-russian-challenge-to-us-policy-in-africa-analysis/
The Russian Challenge To US Policy In Africa – Analysis
By Gregory Alonso Pirio and Robert Pittelli September 3, 2016
The United States and its Western allies, for the most part, consider
the Cold War long over, and with the sanctions levied against Russia
in 2014 in response to its confiscation of Crimea from the Ukraine,
many in the corridors of Washington tend to discount Russia as a major
player on the world stage. However, the current policies of Russia’s
President, Vladimir Putin, aim to re-establish a polarized world as a
means of reclaiming Russia’s former influence in the international
arena. Under the guise of economic and trade cooperation, President
Putin, along with his fellow oligarchs and Russia’s state-owned
corporations, appear to be acting in a coordinated manner to achieve
geopolitical advantage. This process is clearly underway in a number
of African countries.
Despite the sanctions levied against the Russian Federation by the
West, or perhaps because of them, Russia appears to have methodically
accelerated its efforts to build political alliances and make economic
trade deals with a number of African countries whose political
establishments stand to gain from the promotion of the alternative
global order that Putin is promoting. These include fellow sanctioned
states like Sudan, Zimbabwe and Eritrea; post-coup Egypt and former
Soviet allies such as Angola.
Nigeria stands out as an important example of how Russian readiness to
supply helicopters and other defense assistance to Nigeria effectively
undercut United States efforts to withhold military support to
Nigerian security forces as a way of leveraging human rights
improvements within the Nigerian military. The U.S. had turned down
repeated requests from Nigeria to purchase weapons to fight the
violent extremist organization, Boko Haram, and also blocked the sale
of U.S. made helicopters from Israel to Nigeria. Russia took advantage
of the U.S. arms embargo, offering in late 2014 Abuja a reported
billion dollar line of credit that was used to purchase Russian made
helicopter gunships and other equipment. Russians also sent military
personnel to train Nigerian military in its fight against Boko Haram.
By mid-2016, the Obama administration appeared poised to reverse its
policy citing actions that the new Nigeria president Muhammadu Buhari,
had made within the military to clean up its act.
While the US policy toward Africa is founded on a worldview that leads
it to promote democratic governance, free markets and the rule of law,
Russia, on the other hand, has been courting and furthering the
interests of the power elites within various African countries, often
through shady deals that enrich those in the political, security and
military establishments. In turn, Russian enterprises will often reap
lucrative business concessions from these partner governments. As part
of these political and economic quid pro quo arrangements, Russia
will, on occasion, show its loyalty on the international stage by
vetoing UN resolutions that will upset their African friends, as has
been the case for Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. In this way,
Russian business and political interests become inextricably
intertwined, and done in ways that undermine U.S. pro-democracy goals
and not infrequently specific foreign policy objectives.
To view Russian trade and investment purely through the lens of
business interests is a mistake. These international trade deals and
international political maneuvers appear designed to create an
emerging bloc of international oligarchs that eschews democratic
principles and rule of law. Russia was engaged in this process before
the Western sanctions were imposed on it. However, the process of
building oligarchical alliances appears to have accelerated since the
imposition of sanctions on Russia. These emergent relationships pose a
serious challenge to the West’s post-Cold War pro-democracy, human
rights and good governance agenda in Africa. The Russian courtship of
countries such as Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea, strategically located near
the Red Sea and Suez Canal should be regarded as an effort to can
greater political and military influence in a vital geo-political
region, as we have argued in a 2015 article.1
A common tactic used in the Russian oligarchical system to ingratiate
national elites in some African countries has involved the sale of
military hardware and other commodities that aim to buy the loyalties
of local elites by enriching them. This tactic has been deployed in
Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe. This tactic may have also been deployed in
Mozambique, as emerging details of that country’s secret dealings with
the Russian state-owned VTB Capital bank seem to suggest.
Vladimir Putin spelled out Russia’s business strategy to rekindle
Soviet-era international relationships at a 2012 Russian Federal
Security Council meeting on the defense industry. He said, “. . . a
major part of Russia’s weapons business includes upgrades and
refurbishment of Soviet-era technology and hardware . . . .” Rostec,
Russia’s largest state-owned conglomerate, is usually at the forefront
of most major overseas economic deals. It regards Africa as an
important market for its products, especially military equipment.
Rostec officials have argued that Soviet-era weapons are still in use
across Africa and require repairs. The company intends to satisfy this
demand. Rosoboronexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, is Russia’s key state
company executing major foreign arms transactions.
Using arms sales as a point of entry, Russia has been busy
reestablishing political, military and business relationships across
Africa. Moscow has used this model of arms first, business concession
later in Egypt, Angola, Sudan, Zimbabwe and other countries. In 2016,
Tanzania and Somalia made requests for Russian military equipment; it
is yet to be seen if lucrative concessions will be then made to
Russian enterprises.
Russia has always maintained a cordial relationship with Egypt, a
one-time Soviet-ally. Since the 2013 military coup that ousted Egypt’s
elected government and brought General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power,
relations between Russia and Egypt have significantly warmed; while
relations with the US have shown signs of cooling. Between, 2014-2016,
Russia and Egypt entered into several major, multi-million dollar
business deals across various economic sectors. Most notably, Rosatom
and Rosneft, both subsidiaries of Rostec, are involved in major
development deals involving nuclear energy, oil and natural gas.2 In
2015, after both countries announced their cooperation in building
Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, Russia gave Egypt free-of-charge an
advanced Molniya class missile cruiser.
Later, that same year, Egypt gave its support for Russia’s decision to
strike “terrorist” targets in Syria. In 2016, with the nuclear deal
secured, President Sisi announced plans to depend on Russia to upgrade
its older, Soviet-era, factories, and also concluded another economic
deal, giving Russia an industrial trade zone within the Suez Canal
zone area.
As for Angola -– a staunch Cold War ally of the Soviet Union, in 2013,
Rosoboronexport sold the country 18 aging Su-30K fighter jets -– as
part of $1 billion plus arms deal. Rosoboronexport initially supplied
this fleet of fighters to India in the late 1990s, prior to Delhi
receiving the more advanced multirole Su-30MKI. India returned the
aging fighters to Russia where they had been mothballed before
Angola’s purchase of them. The Angolan investigative press has noted
that these planes are of little, if any strategic value to Angola,
which has no known enemies. Rather, reportedly, the Angolan military
establishment, which is a backbone of support for President Eduardo
dos Santos who has been president of Angola since 1979, reportedly
benefits from hefty kickbacks from military purchases.
The deal also included spare parts for Soviet-made weapons, small arms
and weapons, ammunition, tanks, artillery, and Mi-17 helicopters,
according to the Russian-language business daily, Vedomosti.
Additionally, the two sides agreed to build an ammunition plant in
Angola. In 2015, the Angola military was the only African country to
send observers to the Russian-sponsored international war games.
The $1 billion plus sale of Russian arms to Angola came when the
Angolan state was cash rich, that is, prior to the historic drop in
world oil prices in mid-2014 that greatly affected revenues to the
oil-dependent Angolan government. Later in 2014, the Russian state
majority share bank, VTB Capital PLC, came to the rescue of the newly
cash-strapped Angolan government with a loan of US$1.5 billion to
finance the state budget.
Russian efforts to promote military and political engagement with
Sudan epitomize how U.S. efforts to exert pressure on a country are
undermined by Russia. A number of U.S. Executive Orders, applicable
laws and implementing regulations impose economic sanctions on the
Sudanese government, individuals and business entities. The U.S.
justifies its sanctions largely on the basis of Sudanese government’s
human rights and war crimes violations in its suppression of the
rebellions in its Darfur region.
After the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia in 2014, Sudan and
Russia found common ground as fellow sanctioned states. Sudanese
President Omer Hassan al-Bashir, — himself indicted by the
International Criminal Court for genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes in Darfur — reportedly stressed to the Russian Foreign
Minister, Sergei Lavrov, Sudan’s solidarity with Russia. President
Bashir noted that Sudan also suffers from sanctions. In turn, the
Russian Ambassador to Sudan openly expressed his country’s
appreciation of Sudan’s support of Russia on different issues at the
United Nations and described their bilateral relations as
“distinguished and deeply-rooted.”
The UN had imposed an embargo on arms and military technical
assistance to Sudan unless there were to be a guarantee that the
assistance would not be used in the Darfur conflict. But in apparent
disregard to the spirit of the UN embargo, Foreign Minister Lavrov
pledged increased military technical cooperation with Sudan. Indeed,
Russian military sales and cooperation have helped to enable Sudan to
sustain its position as a regional power player.
In a familiar pattern of Russia using military sales as an entry for
greater political and economic relations, Rosoboronexport had sold,
from 2011 through 2013, two dozen Mi-24 attack helicopters and 14 MI-8
transport helicopters to the Sudanese government. The sales were not a
technical violation of the UN arms embargo against Sudan, as Russia
guaranteed that the helicopters would not be used in the Darfur
conflict. However, the Russian guarantee appears to have been a
slight-of-hand move, as Amnesty International documented that Russian
(and Chinese) arms including Russian-supplied Mi-24 attack helicopters
were fueling the conflict in Darfur. Sudan has also transferred
several of its Russian-made helicopters to the Libyan authorities
after the imposition of the UN arms embargo against Libya, without
notifying the UN; and that ammunition recovered during seizures have
shown the material was produced by the Sudanese State-owned Military
Industry Corporation, which is supported through a cooperation
agreement with Russia.
Russian support for Sudan’s military ambitions and Russian support for
Khartoum in international forums helped pave the way for business
concessions. In mid-2015, the director general of Sudan’s Geological
Research Authority announced that Russian companies would be given
priority in the context of economic cooperation and investment
partnerships between the two countries, especially in gold and
uranium. Shortly after this announcement, President al-Bashir,
presided over signing of an agreement between Sudanese Ministry of
Minerals and the Russian Siberian Mining Company Limited, to extract
gold in the Red Sea and the River Nile states which was described as
the largest investment contract in Sudan’s history in the field of
minerals.
The government’s claim that the Russian-discovered gold reserve was
valued at $1.7 trillion was soon disputed, and others challenged the
credentials of the Russian company to carry out the Sudanese project.
Nonetheless, in 2016 Sudan’s Minister of Minerals Dr. Ahmed Mohamed
Sadiq Al-Karuri stressed Sudan’s intention to build strategic
relations with the Russian state for the benefit of the two countries
and to continue the existing cooperation at all levels; he also
revealed that the largest producer of gold in Sudan was now the Koch
Russian Company.
Moscow came to the rescue of Khartoum in 2016 when it sought to limit
the impact of a UN panel’s investigation into the role of Sudanese
gold in financing the Darfur conflict. Russia, China, and other
non-permanent members of the Security Council opposed an attempt by
the United States and the United Kingdom to adopt investigative
panel’s recommendations of imposing sanctions on individuals and
entities that impose illegal taxes on artisanal gold miners as well as
those engaged in the illegal exploitation and trafficking of gold. The
panel pointed out that between 2010 and 2014, more than $4.5 billion
in gold was smuggled from Sudan to the United Arab Emirates.
Sanctions would have had among its targets Khartoum-supported alleged
war criminal, Musa Hilal. Russia blocked the release of the
confidential UN report that said Hilal was pocketing $54 million a
year from gold sales from a mine located in Darfur. Sudan’s Mineral
Minister, Al-Karuri praised the Russian support to Sudan in
international forums, particularly its cooperation to prevent further
sanctions against Sudan.
Zimbabwe is another sanctioned African state with which Russia has
been cultivating deeper economic and bilateral political relations.
Much of this relationship between the two countries appears to rest on
satisfying Zimbabwe’s military requirements, even if it is cash short,
and creating business alliances between the countries’ military
elites. Similar to what it did for Sudan, Russia came to the defense
of Zimbabwe at the United Nations in 2008, by opposing the imposition
of an arms embargo that was supported by the U.S.
In September 2014, a Russian delegation to Zimbabwe, led by Russian
Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov and Industry and Trade Minister
Denis Manturov, resulted in the signing of a series of key bilateral
agreements and several lucrative joint venture business deals. Most
notably was the historic US $3 billion platinum mining project in
Darwendale that is expected to create jobs and stimulate growth in
various sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. The joint venture, named
Great Dyke Investments, between Zimbabwe’s Pen East mining company and
a Russian consortium made up of three corporations, Rostec (heavily
involved in military production and sales), VI Holdings and
Vnesheconombank. The platinum mining agreement amounted to the largest
joint venture has Zimbabwe entered with a foreign investor since its
independence in 1979.
The presence of Minister Denis Manturov, who is also Chairman of
Rostec’s Supervisory board at the signing (rather than Russia’s
Minister of Natural Resources, Sergy Donskoy) caught the Zimbabwe
business community by surprise. Manturov’s role fueled speculation
that there was an arms deal hidden behind the highly publicized
platinum mining joint venture agreement. Zimbabwe’s Mines Minister,
Walter Chidhakwa, stated he was not aware of any arms deal, but he did
say, “negotiations for this joint venture” (the platinum deal) was in
the planning stages since 2005-2006.
During that earlier period, Zimbabwe was desperate to replenish and
upgrade its military forces that were depleted during the
Congo-Kinshasa war when Zimbabwe intervened to save the late
Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s regime from insurgents in 1998-2002. However,
an arms embargo, which was levied by France and the United Kingdom in
2002 and the US in 2003 in response high levels of political violence,
human rights violations and intimidation perpetrated by government
security forces and the ruling party, hampered President Mugabe’s
efforts to rebuild the armed forces.
Despite the arms embargo, China and Russia continued to supply arms
and military equipment to Zimbabwe, (but on a small scale). In 2008,
the UN Security Council attempted to pass a draft resolution that
would have imposed a UN arms embargo on Zimbabwe, but it was vetoed by
both China and Russia. In 2012, Rosoboronexport identified Zimbabwe as
an African state with which “a promising trade relationship is
developing.”
However, by 2013, Zimbabwe was struggling financially and not in any
shape to purchase such military equipment or even pay for Russian
fighter jets. Some speculated that mineral rich Zimbabwe was paying
China in kind with mining concession and farmland for its arms. Then
in 2014, probably taking a page out of China’s playbook and not to be
outdone, Russia culminated, by signing, the most lucrative joint
venture platinum mining deal in Zimbabwe’s history.
The connection between the platinum deal and the military connection
is clear. The Pan East mining company, the Zimbabwe partner in the
platinum mining joint venture, has links to the Zimbabwe’s military.
And in 2012, the Kommersant, a Russian business daily, reported that
Russia secured an inter-government agreement from Zimbabwe on
“stimulating investment and defense,” under which Rostech would supply
military helicopters in exchange for mineral rights to platinum
deposits in Darwendale. The board chairman of Pan East mining company
is an individual with strong ties to the Zimbabwean military; he is
retired Colonel Tshinga Dube, who is also the chair of Marange
Resources and general manager of Zimbabwe Defense Industries. Dube has
been involved with Pan East dating back to 2005 when the platinum
mining deal was just in its planning stages.
Coincidentally, in September 2014, during the week when the Russian
delegation was finalizing the joint venture deals, Rostec’s subsidiary
Rosoboronexport and Russian Helicopter Company were conducting an arms
expo in Pretoria, South Africa where they showcased the latest
military and multi-purpose helicopters and other military equipment.
Representatives from more than 25 African countries, including
Zimbabwe, were present.
Unconfirmed reports mentioned that some representatives, from
Zimbabwe, behind the scenes were reinforcing reports that the platinum
deal involved an arms agreement. However, it remains to be seen if any
Russian military equipment or any high end military items – such as
attack helicopters, or jets, or tanks, etc., have arrived in country,
openly or hidden from view.
The Russian-Zimbabwe deal will likely yield a good return on the
Russian investments. It underscores the importance to the oligarchs of
ensuring profitability before investing. In the case of Zimbabwe, this
meant cultivating strong relationships with the military establishment
and ensuring that members of that establishment also receive their
share of the profits.
What is apparent, from the above analysis, is that U.S. policy toward
Africa and Russia has to take into account the rise of African power
elites who are fueled by the Russian business oligarchs seeking
political influence and profits. These new relations undermine a lot
of U.S. post-Cold War approaches to African governments that often
placed human rights and pro-democracy conditionality on its
developmental and military cooperation with African states. The
apparent bending of the rules on human rights in the case of Nigeria,
for example, suggests that Washington is likely to weaken its stance
on human rights and pro-democracy conditionality in order to avoid
losing its political, and possibly economic, influence among a
substantial group of African nations.
*About the authors:
Gregory Alonso Pirio directs EC Associates including its research
unit, Africa Analytica. Dr. Pirio is a senior Africanist, an
accomplished researcher and a leader in global health communication.
He is also affiliate faculty at the Center for Narrative and Conflict
Resolution, School of Conflict Resolution and Analysis, George Mason
University.
Dr Pirio is notably author of The African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for
the Horn of Africa (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2008). Dr. Pirio is also
editor of Rebuilding Shattered Nations and Lives: Post-Conflict
Reconstruction and Development in Africa (UNHCR, 2009), for which he
wrote the introduction, “African Conflicts in Historical Perspective.”
Dr. Pirio consecutively held the positions of Director of the
Portuguese-to-Africa and Director of the English-to-Africa Services of
the Voice of America. There, he was the architect of special radio, TV
and media training initiatives in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe
and Latin America on conflict resolution and public health issues,
including youth media projects in conflict zones. He has been
executive producer of several award-winning radio and TV
documentaries. He holds a M.A. in African Studies and a Ph.D. in
African History from UCLA.
Robert C. Pittelli is lead analyst at Africa Analytica. He previously
served as an intelligence analyst focusing primarily on African and
Middle Eastern issues for the U.S. Department of Defense. He possesses
an in-depth understanding of military affairs in Africa, including the
history of Cold-War-era rivalries and post-Cold-War geo-strategic
trends in Africa. He has also studied the complex social and economic
environments that have contributed to the rise of various violent
extremist organizations (VEOs) operating in Africa as well as
challenges in countering the VEO narratives that fuel recruitment.
Mr. Pittelli received a M.A. in Personnel Management and
Administration from Central Michigan University and a B.A. degree in
Psychology, with a minor in Cultural Anthropology from Long Island
University. He also earned a Graduate Diploma in Strategic
Intelligence from the U.S. Defense Intelligence College (currently
known as the Joint Military Intelligence College).
Notes:
1.
http://www.strathink.net/ethiopia/putin-and-his-oligarchs-in-africa-the-scramble-for-economic-and-military-leverage/
2. These transactions build upon the earlier Egyptian military
financing of a surveillance satellite, that Russia’s RSC Energia
developed and launched in 2014. EgyptSat 2 reportedly provided the
Egyptian government with high-resolution imagery of Earth for
environmental, scientific and military purposes. However, the
satellite malfunctioned in 2015. The Russian companies, NPO
Mashinostroenia and Roskosmos, developed and launched into orbit the
South African earth observation satellite Kondor-E, which provides
South Africa’s armed forces with daily high-resolution imagery. In
addition, the satellite is an integral part of Project Condor, a joint
satellite system, between Moscow and Pretoria, that reportedly
provides surveillance of the entire African continent.
Received on Sat Sep 03 2016 - 15:21:34 EDT