http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/us-navy-operations-maritime-chokepoint/p38421
U.S. Navy Operations in a Maritime Chokepoint
Interviewee: Captain Clint Carroll, Military Fellow, U.S. Navy
Interviewer: Jonathan Masters, Deputy Editor
October 20, 2016
The U.S. military last week destroyed three radar sites in rebel-controlled territory in Yemen that the Pentagon believes were connected to previous missile attacks on the USS Mason, a warship patrolling the Bab al-Mandeb strait. The episode highlights the U.S. military presence in this volatile region and demonstrates how the Navy responds to an array of threats while patrolling the world’s waterways, says CFR visiting fellow Captain Clint Carroll in this written interview.
What’s the strategic significance of the Bab el-Mandeb?
Roughly five million barrels of oil per year flow through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a narrow waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea that lies between Yemen, to the east, and Djibouti and Eritrea, to the west. It is approximately eighteen miles wide at its narrowest point and, because of the [shallow water] and shipping density found in many chokepoints, uses what is known as a traffic separation scheme (TSS) to improve its overall traffic flow and safety. A TSS is agreed upon internationally through the International Maritime Organization, a specialized agency under the UN's purview.
Why does the U.S. Navy operate there?
The U.S. Navy and other nations’ navies have routinely patrolled the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, either as part of multinational task forces or on independent national tasking, to ensure freedom of navigation for peaceful and productive trade, given the instability in the region and the threat of piracy.
What type of missiles were fired from Yemen?
Over the last two weeks, missiles have been fired at or in the vicinity of the High Speed Support Vessel (HSV) Swift, a vessel leased by the UAE; the USS Mason; and other ships. Analysis is ongoing, but these missiles, according to press reports, were most likely C-802 Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles fired from land-based mobile launchers in a Houthi-controlled area in Yemen.
How do the missiles work?
The missiles are fired based on cuing from coastal radar sites and employ an active radar homing system, meaning that the missile does not need any targeting support once fired. Iran, a country known to support the Houthis, purchased 150 of these missiles from the Peoples’ Republic of China in the early 1990s, though the exact number that Iran took delivery of is unknown. Additionally, Iran reverse engineered the C-802 to indigenously produce the Noor missile.
Have these missiles been fired at U.S. ships before?
No, but missiles damaged both the HSV Swift on October 1, 2016, and the Israeli Naval Ship Hanit, which was attacked by Hezbollah in July 2006.
How did the U.S. ships initially respond?
Reports indicate that the USS Mason, an Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer, used several self-defense measures. Mason fired two SM-2 missiles and one Evolved Seasparrow Missile, and also employed a Nulka missile decoy to intercept the two missiles that were launched the evening of October 9.
What targets did the U.S. strike in response?
According to Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook, the U.S. Navy “struck three radar sites in Houthi-controlled territory on Yemen's Red Sea coast.” Cook noted that the strikes were “authorized by President Obama at the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford, and targeted radar sites involved in the recent missile launches threatening USS Mason and other vessels operating in international waters in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb.” Defense officials have confirmed that the USS Nitze, a ship of the same class as the USS Mason, struck and destroyed the radar sites using Tomahawk missiles.
Will this strike prevent future attacks?
Coastal radar sites of this type are not typically part of a sophisticated, networked system and can be replaced fairly easily, depending on the availability of new or relocated assets. Assessment of the effects of these strikes is ongoing.
What are the rules of engagement in a situation like this?
U.S. policy is consistent with international norms for self-defense and speaks to a commander’s inherent right and obligation to defend his or her unit. The commander—in this case, the ship’s captain—does not need to ask permission to shoot down missiles or engage another unit that has committed a hostile act or is demonstrating hostile intent. Less immediate actions, such as the strikes on the coastal radar sites, are reviewed and authorized at higher levels.
Notably, Iran ordered the forty-five-year-old British-made frigate Alvand and the supply ship Bushehr to the Gulf of Aden within several hours of the U.S. strike on the coastal radar sites. Whether the Iranian vessels will be limited to patrolling the Gulf of Aden or approach the strait of Bab el-Mandeb remains to be seen.
These incidents demonstrate how the U.S. Navy is able to operate in contested environments, establish sea control, and deliver prompt and sustained combat power if and when necessary.
Captain Clint Carroll, U.S. Navy, is a military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government.
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/Yemen_Bab_el-Mandeb_Strait.JPG
Received on Thu Oct 20 2016 - 13:23:26 EDT
