From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed Apr 15 2009 - 07:28:43 EDT
Somalia: Situation Brief #3 [Analysis]
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
Apr 15, 2009 - 8:05:57 AM
In a brutal and accurate assessment of the political dynamics of southern
and central Somalia delivered in an interview with Voice of America's Petter
Clottey on April 8, local analyst Abdullahi Ali described a balance of power
in which the country's weakening Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.)
confronts a confident armed opposition that believes that it has the
advantage and is, therefore, unwilling to bargain for a power-sharing
agreement.
According to Ali, whose trenchant analysis deserves wide dissemination, the
T.F.G. is weak, "doesn't have any constituency," and has neither the
intellectual sophistication nor military force "to challenge the opposition
as it is now." As a result, notes Ali, the armed opposition sees no reason
to reconcile, a move that would threaten its predominance in Somalia's
southern and south-central regions. In addition, were there to be power
sharing, it would have to be done within the framework of the T.F.G., which
was expanded recently to include the conciliatory faction of the
Islamist-dominated Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.), and
is now an amalgam of the old warlord-dominated T.F.G., the conciliatory
A.R.S., and diaspora technocrats and intellectuals imposed by the Western
powers and international organizations that
finance the T.F.G. What power is left to be shared when the new T.F.G.'s
parliament already has 550 members, its cabinet has already had to
accommodate the elements of its coalition, and its lack of political
momentum is obvious?
Beset by the "technical" weakness, as Ali calls it, of its internal
divisions, and its determined armed opposition, and lacking in broad popular
support cutting across sub-clans in Somalia's capital Mogadishu (confirmed
by a source on the ground), the T.F.G. does not have the capability to take
initiative as a coherent power center. Its agenda was set for it in the
winter by the Islamic Clerics Council (I.C.C.), the religious base of the
T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, who is the former leader of the
conciliatory A.R.S. The I.C.C. demanded that, in return for its backing a
cease fire, the T.F.G. implement Shari'a law in Somalia within 90 days from
March 31, and order the withdrawal of the 4000 strong African Union
peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), which provides security for the T.F.G. in
Mogadishu and guards key infrastructure in the city,
within 120 days from March 31.
The T.F.G.'s behavior has been consistently determined by pressure on it to
meet the I.C.C.'s demands and counter-pressure from the donor powers to
resist them. At present, attacks by the armed opposition on AMISOM and
uncoordinated T.F.G. forces continue; the T.F.G., having committed to
implementing Shari'a, has not moved on the issue; and Sh. Sharif has decided
to let AMISOM remain in Mogadishu, pending the establishment of an effective
"national security force," which could not conceivably be in place by the
I.C.C.'s deadline for AMISOM withdrawal. Aware of the pressures that are
sapping the T.F.G., the armed opposition, including elements of it that are
willing to observe a cease fire within the timetable set by the I.C.C., have
adopted the I.C.C.'s demands for Shari'a and AMISOM withdrawal as their
program.
With its foreign and domestic backers at cross-purposes and their support
provisional, yet essential, the T.F.G. tends toward a state of paralysis and
dearth of resources that prevent it from winning popular support that would
come from progress in providing security and undertaking reconstruction
projects.
Despite the attempts of the I.C.C. to mediate between the armed opposition
and the T.F.G., the former responded to Sh. Sharif's decision to allow
AMISOM to remain beyond July by stepping up attacks against the
peacekeeping force. In early April, a ship carrying supplies for AMISOM
docked at Mogadishu's seaport, prompting mortar fire directed at the port
and assaults on AMISOM and T.F.G. positions in Mogadishu that have lasted
for more than a week. Local media attributed the operations either to the
militant al-Shabaab movement, which forswears negotiations with the T.F.G.
and aims at establishing an emirate in Somalia governed by a strict
interpretation of Shari'a, or the militant wing of Hizbul Islam (H.I.), an
alliance of four armed groups that also espouses an Islamic state - both
groups, which often cooperate on a tactical level, were probably involved.
At first, AMISOM forces refrained from returning fire, but by April 12 they
had shelled neighborhoods in Mogadishu's southern districts, from which they
believed the attacks had originated.
The I.C.C. repeatedly condemned the attacks as contrary to Islamic law and
called for the armed opposition to observe the cease fire. "The Islamic
religion does not allow launching such attacks and we cannot describe the
current attacks as Jihad," said I.C.C. chair, Sh. Bashir Ahmed Salad. He was
joined by Mohamed Hassan Haad, the chair of the Tradition and Unity Council
(T.U.C.), an umbrella group of powerful Hawiye sub-clans in Mogadishu that
works in tandem with the I.C.C., who said, "We cannot accept wars in
Mogadishu." On April 12, the T.F.G. warned, through its information
minister, Farhan Ali Mohamoud, that it would attack "armed groups that fire
mortars." Al-Shabaab leader and spokesman, Sh. Mukhtar Robow, responded by
urging the "mujahideen" to continue shelling the seaport, and condemning the
I.C.C. Sh. Da'ud Abtidon, spokesman for the wing of H.I. that opted to
accept the I.C.C.'s temporary cease-fire demand, said that firing mortars is
"un-Islamic."
As its cease-fire demand failed to move the armed opposition, the I.C.C.
continued its efforts at mediation in conjunction with the T.U.C. After a
meeting on April 7 with the T.U.C., the chair of H.I.'s pro-cease fire
faction, Sh. Muhammad Amey, welcomed mediation, but urged the I.C.C. to
address the issue of foreign forces, concluding that his group would obey
the I.C.C. and cease fire or fight at its direction. Faction member and
former warlord Yusuf Indha'ade denied having joined the T.F.G. or having
received promises from it, saying that the faction would work with the
T.F.G. if it implemented Shari'a and would fight it if it did not.
Efforts to bring H.I. into the I.C.C.'s camp have hinged on convincing the
leader of the militant A.R.S., Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, whose group is the
strongest in H.I.'s alliance, to agree to participate in mediation. Reports
surfaced in early April that Aweys had left his base in Eritrea for Sudan
where he held talks with the latter's president, Gen Umar Hassan al-Bashir.
On April 6, the Sudanese Media Center reported that al-Bashir had succeeded
in "containing" the rift between Sh. Aweys and Sh. Sharif, and the Puntland
Post reported (unconfirmed elsewhere) that Sh. Aweys had issued a statement
that he would return to Mogadishu and would engage in talks if he was
removed from U.N. and U.S. "terrorist lists," adding that "the only way to
peace is implementing Shari'a and removing foreign troops." Garoweonline
reported that a closed source said that the Arab League had made a grant of
U.S.$18 million to the T.F.G. conditional on Sh.Sharif's pursuing
negotiations with the armed opposition, particularly Sh. Aweys. There have
been no further reports since then.
As the security situation has worsened for the T.F.G. and the split in H.I.
seems only to have emboldened its militant wing, the issue of implementing
Shari'a has taken a back seat, but still remains alive. On April 5, the
transitional parliament's acting speaker, Osman Elmi Boqore, accused T.F.G.
prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, of failing to send a proposal
for implementing Shari'a to parliament, although his cabinet had approved
such a measure. Boqore warned that if a bill is not presented quickly, "we
will lose the people's confidence and they will never believe that the
Somali government is committed to administering the nation under Islam." On
April 11, Sharmarke promised that a bill to introduce Shari'a would be
delivered to parliament, but did not specify a date.
None of the events of the first half of April bode well for the T.F.G. Were
even the pro-cease fire faction of H.I. to be brought into power sharing, it
would carry with it demands for the implementation of Shari'a and withdrawal
of AMISOM, which would strengthen the I.C.C.'s hand and provoke greater
counter-pressure from the donor powers. In addition, it is unclear that the
uneasy coalition that comprises the T.F.G. would accept a diminution of
power that would follow from an unlikely deal. In particular, local analyst
Ali believes that Sh. Aweys would demand a major role that would not be
acceptable to Sh. Sharif.
As the T.F.G. falters, the donor powers remain silent for the time being.
They are committed to helping to finance a national security force, yet they
are not providing, as yet, sufficient support to train it in a timely
fashion. The day of reckoning for the T.F.G. continues to draw closer.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
<mailto:weinstem@purdue.edu> weinstem@purdue.edu
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----