From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri May 22 2009 - 06:34:13 EDT
AMISOM's Five Challenges
By Paul D. Williams
_____
May 22, 2009
In January 2007, the African Union launched its fourth peacekeeping
operation, the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Now approximately two and a
half years old, AMISOM's short life has not been a happy one. It was
deployed to Mogadishu essentially in support of the Ethiopian government's
preferred faction in Somalia's ongoing civil war. Not surprisingly, and like
the three UN-authorized peace operations deployed to Somalia during the
early 1990s, AMISOM faced serious challenges which severely restricted its
ability to operate. In January 2009 the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the
election of Somalia's new transitional government led by Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed, and the arrival of Barrack Obama's administration in the
United States renewed the debate over how AMISOM should relate to the new
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and how the mission might be brought
to an end.
This article reflects upon AMISOM's five main challenges: the legacy of the
"Black Hawk Down" episode of October 1993; the shadow of Ethiopia's military
campaign; the African Union's capacity problems; the conflict environment in
Mogadishu; and finding an appropriate exit strategy. It concludes that
AMISOM was an ill-conceived mission which attracted few serious political
champions. The predictable results were a dangerously under-resourced
operation that placed several thousand peacekeepers in harm's way for
morally and politically dubious reasons.
The Legacy of Black Hawk Down
All contemporary discussions of peacekeeping in Somalia are colored by the
events of October 3-4, 1993, and the images of a violent country awash with
arms that they left behind. The deaths of American soldiers not only sparked
the Clinton administration's retreat from UN peacekeeping (codified in
Presidential Decision Directive 25) but also acted as a major warning
against putting boots on the ground in African war zones. Second, the
subsequent U.S. disengagement from Somalia left Ethiopia as the central
plank in Washington's regional policy in the Horn. Third, when U.S. troops
did return to the Horn, it was primarily to conduct counter-terrorism
operations initially after the 1998 embassy bombings and then in the
aftermath of 9/11. U.S. policy thus looked at Somali and regional politics
through the narrow and distorting prism of counterterrorism.
The Shadow of Ethiopia's Intervention
Established during Ethiopia's attempt to forcibly install the TFG in
Mogadishu, AMISOM was born into a war zone. Ethiopia's 2006 campaign was the
latest in a long series of military incursions aimed at degrading Islamist
bases in Somalia, initially focused on al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, and more
recently elements within the coalition of local Shari'a courts known as the
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The main sticking point was that the regime
Ethiopia was trying to install was deeply unpopular with many Somalis and
once installed, made little effort to build its political legitimacy or
reach out to its opponents. AMISOM was thus mandated to support a weak,
divided, and (in the view of many Somalis) illegitimate government which was
widely seen as being one faction in the country's ongoing civil war. It
didn't help that the TFG was unable to control many of its security forces
and demonstrated virtually no capacity to govern effectively.
There was also considerable skepticism within the African Union about the
legitimacy and effectiveness of Ethiopia's actions and the wisdom of
deploying into a violent, chaotic vacuum with no apparent peace strategy. As
a direct consequence, few African countries contributed troops to AMISOM. It
was also widely noted that Ethiopia's representative in the Peace and
Security Council's (PSC) had ignored the internal procedures when AMISOM was
established - specifically Article 8.9 of the PSC Protocol (2002) states
that a PSC Member 'which is party to a conflict under consideration . shall
not participate either in the discussion or the decision making process
relating to that conflict or situation.'
AMISOM was seen in Somalia as being a tool of Western interests because of
Washington's support for Ethiopia's campaign and because of a strong
diplomatic push by the Bush administration to get African states to
contribute troops to the mission. Many Somalis were outraged that the United
States had openly dismissed the UIC's achievements during 2006 and acted as
if the courts were dominated by terrorists, did not condemn abuses committed
by Ethiopian troops against Somali civilians, provided intelligence support
to Ethiopia during its operations, and engaged in airstrikes on Somali soil.
The African Union's Lack of Capabilities
The AU's short record of peacekeeping provided little evidence to suggest
that it would be able to find, deploy, manage or pay the 8,000 troops
authorized to form AMISOM. Sure enough, the AU struggled to secure promises
of just over 60 percent of the authorized troops. In practice, approximately
1,600 Ugandan troops were the sum total of AMISOM until December 2007 when a
company of 100 Burundian soldiers arrived. By April 2009 AMISOM had around
4,300 troops from Uganda and Burundi. Nor could the AU pay for its own
peacekeeping mission. Instead, it relied on funds from the U.S., UN, the
European Union and several other states. Deploying them also proved
impossible without Western assistance and when they were deployed they
lacked crucial pieces of equipment and materiel (after mid-2008 these needs
were partly fulfilled by scavenging assets from the defunct UN Mission in
Ethiopia-Eritrea, UNMEE).
These predictable shortfalls confirm the findings of a joint UN-AU panel on
peacekeeping (the so-called "
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/813> Prodi Report"),
which concluded that, "It is simply undesirable to expect peacekeeping
missions to deploy into uncertain situations without the necessary means. It
is a recipe for failure. We are deluding ourselves if we believe that having
something on the ground is better than doing nothing. In the absence of the
necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not
only of failure but also of raising expectations of the people that cannot
be fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peacekeeping and
weakens the organisation that is responsible." (para.16). These are sensible
warnings and there is little evidence to suggest that these concerns will
disappear any time soon.
The Conflict Environment
Instead of bringing peace and stability to Somalia, the installation of the
TFG in Mogadishu brought about a significant deterioration in the security
situation and a renewed phase of warfare. In this context, arguably AMISOM's
most fundamental challenge was how to act as a peacekeeping operation when
there was no peace to keep.
Although the UIC's forces were initially routed from Mogadishu in late
December 2006, elements soon reorganized and attacked Ethiopian and TFG
soldiers as well as AMISOM peacekeepers. The most deadly element was the
youth militia al-Shabaab, which by late November 2008 was estimated by the
AU to be around 2,000-strong and to operate in cells and units of about
300-400 militias. On 22 February 2009, al-Shabaab coordinated the most
deadly single attack on AMISOM, which killed 11 Burundian peacekeepers and
injured another 28. On April 16, 2009, the UN Secretary-General noted that
insurgent attacks against AMISOM were "becoming more sophisticated,
coordinated and lethal."
The ongoing conflict produced an escalating spiral of violence, not least
because Ethiopian, TFG, and later AMISOM forces were often heavy handed in
responding to these attacks. The resulting collateral damage among the
civilian population produced a huge wave of displacement (in 2007, 400,000
of Mogadishu's population of approximately 1.3 million fled the city) and
generated intense levels of anti-Ethiopian and also anti-American feeling.
For AMISOM, this environment meant two main things. First, it was largely
dependent on Ethiopian forces to do the lion's share of security-related
activities. Second, its personnel faced significant restrictions on their
ability to operate. Indeed, AMISOM was largely restricted to helping to keep
open Mogadishu's air and sea ports, and helping to protect the TFG's
president and prime minister. These tasks also meant that AMISOM had to
guard the Kilometer-4 intersection that linked the airport and the
presidential palace. Controlling these sites was also essential for
maintaining supplies and a potential escape route.
Unfortunately, AMISOM did not always respond to this environment in an
appropriate manner, particularly as the peacekeepers themselves become the
target of attacks. Most seriously, its troops engaged in the indiscriminate
use of force which left many civilians dead or wounded. It was not until
April 2009 that AMISOM explicitly recognized this problem and changed
tactics: it would only return fire when its soldiers could visually identify
their attackers, and would only use weapons that allowed for discriminate
fire.
Finding an Exit
AMISOM's final challenge is figuring out how to leave. This became
particularly important in early 2009 after the Ethiopian withdrawal and the
election of the new transitional President, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.
Within Somalia opinion has been divided: some see AMISOM playing a necessary
role in supporting the new TFG and Sheikh Sharif's outreach efforts, others,
including the new Prime Minister, recommended that AMISOM should depart
within 120 days.
Within the AU, the weight of opinion was clearly to hand over the mission to
the UN; the sooner the better. But in the UN Security Council there were
good reasons to be cautious. In November 2007, for instance, Ban Ki-moon had
said that deploying UN peacekeepers to Somalia was 'neither realistic nor
viable'. A year later, however, the Bush administration pushed for a UN
peacekeeping operation for Somalia. It soon discovered that there was no
appetite for such a force among European and African powers. The furthest it
got was resolution 1863 (16 January 2009) which expressed the Security
Council's "intent" to establish a UN peacekeeping operation "as a follow-on
force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Security Council by
June 1, 2009" (para.4). With Barrack Obama's arrival in the White House,
however, the U.S. government began to adopt a more cautious stance.
In his April 16, 2009, report on the modalities of such a transition, Ban
Ki-Moon set out four options intended to help achieve the UN's strategic
objective in Somalia. The "high-risk" Option A, envisaged replacing AMISOM
with a 22,500 strong UN peacekeeping operation with a Chapter VII mandate.
The "pragmatic" Option B was for the UN to devise a support package for
AMISOM until the Somali National Security Force could secure Mogadishu on
its own. The "prudent" Option C was Option B plus a UN Political Office for
Somalia and a UN Support Office for AMISOM within Mogadishu. Option D,
"Engagement with no international security presence," was intended to serve
as a contingency plan in case of an AMISOM withdrawal (either intentional or
forced).
The Secretary-General has advocated an "incremental" approach, divided into
three phases: Phase 1 would entail adopting Option B; during Phase 2, Option
C would be practiced; and during Phase 3, it would be appropriate to enact
Option A. Option D would remain the contingency plan in case of AMISOM
withdrawal. It remains to be seen whether this plan will be adopted and, if
so, whether it will work.
Conclusion
It is difficult to conclude that AMISOM has made a large contribution to
peace and security in Mogadishu during its 30 months. While its personnel
did engage in some humanitarian activities and protection of key
infrastructure, these have to be balanced against the popular outrage
against instances of indiscriminate force, the loss of over 20 peacekeepers,
and the obvious limitations in a hot-conflict of an underequipped deployment
of some 4,000 troops. When a greater degree of stability did return to
Mogadishu in early 2009 this was not because of AMISOM but rather a
combination of the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the wider diplomatic
activity that resulted in Sheikh Ahmed's election and his subsequent ability
to engage a wide range of parties and enact shari'a law. Violence has flared
again in recent weeks, and neither Somalis nor the world's governments
should look to the AU forces to quell it. Whether AMISOM has a future in
Mogadishu is thus primarily a question for the new government, the UN
Security Council, and the AU to answer. Whether AMISOM should have been
deployed at all is a question analysts should debate.
____________________________________________________________________________
_________
Paul D. Williams is Associate Professor of International Affairs and
Associate Director of the Security Policy Studies Program at the Elliott
School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.
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