From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Jun 05 2009 - 04:47:15 EDT
Somalia: Hardline assault threatens Djibouti process
Date: 05 Jun 2009
EVENT: Government fighters launched a counter-offensive on June 2 against
hardline Islamist militant groups, Hisbul Islam and al-Shabaab.
SIGNIFICANCE: The government has barely survived a concerted assault on
Mogadishu, which threatens to derail the Djibouti peace process.
ANALYSIS: Since it moved to Mogadishu in February, the expanded Transitional
Federal Government (TFG-Djibouti) has made only limited progress in
increasing coherence among the unwieldy coalition of which it is formed. The
arrival of the government was followed by a few weeks of relative calm in
the capital, and some revenues started to flow into TFG coffers, allowing
payment of some key civil servant salaries, and in particular soldiers and
police.
Yet the joint security committee, established under the Djibouti Peace
Agreement to oversee the process of integrating former Alliance for the
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and TFG security forces, has not made much
progress. Problems have been compounded by the division of responsibility
for internal security between at least three ministerial portfolios --
Sheikh Abdulqadir Ali Omar (Interior), Omar Hashi Aden (Internal Security)
and Mohamed Abdi 'Gandi' (Defence).
Hardliner assault. A turning point was reached in late April, when donors
within the International Contact Group on Somalia pledged 213 million
dollars to support the African Union (AU) peace-keeping mission (AMISOM) and
the TFG-Djibouti's security forces. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has
been asking for funds to bolster his security forces since he came to power
in January. Some funding is now flowing, including at least part of the 10
million dollars the United States pledged.
The prospect of international funding for the TFG-Djibouti concentrated
minds among hardline Islamist hold-outs:
Representatives of Sheikh Sharif's government met Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys,
the leader of the Eritrea-based hold-out ARS faction, in Sudan in April.
However, Aweys returned to Somalia as the aid package was announced, and
soon thereafter publicly rebuffed overtures from the TFG-Djibouti for
reconciliation (rejecting the advice of his Hebr Gedir Ayr clansmen).
Aweys took a lead role within the Hisbul Islam alliance, and in coordination
with al-Shabaab, launched an assault on Mogadishu in early May. Al-Shabaab
and Hisbul Islam appeared to encircle Mogadishu as fighters took key
positions in southern and northern parts of the capital, as well as some
strategic towns on the main route north from the city. Hisbul Islam fighters
from Kismayo under Sheikh Hassan Abdallahi Turki also moved towards
Mogadishu.
Former ARS fighters were in the forefront of TFG-Djibouti response to the
initial clashes, but collapsed under the onslaught -- Ethiopian-trained TFG
troops provided stiffer resistance. However, it was only the presence of
AMISOM -- whose mandate has been extended until the end of 2009 -- that
prevented Sheikh Sharif's government from being ousted.
Counter-offensive. Sheikh Sharif launched a largely ineffectual
counter-offensive on May 22 -- amid reports of clashes between Hisbul Islam
and al-Shabaab fighters, as well as news that Sheikh Yusuf 'Indha Cadde'
Mohamed Siad had defected from Hisbul Islam to the TFG-Djibouti (days after
he had re-pledged his support to Aweys, a fellow Ayr). On June 2, the
TFG-Djibouti launched a more robust effort to assert control over
south-western Mogadishu. Reports indicate that Omar Hashi Aden has assembled
another government force in Beledweyne with the aim of opening a second
counter-offensive. Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam already face a challenge from
the militarised faction of the Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a in central
Somalia.
Humanitarian consequences. The latest violence has displaced tens of
thousands from and within Mogadishu, many of whom had returned during the
relative calm which followed the TFG-Djibouti's return. Civilians are
bearing the brunt of casualties from the violence. Relief operations along
the road to Afgooye (just outside the capital) are overstretched and
underfunded.
Foreign fighters. Al-Shabaab has called for foreign fighters to join its
jihad against the TFG and AU peacekeepers, and an indeterminate number are
in the country (reports range from dozens to hundreds). Many of these are
probably ethnic Somalis from the region and the wider diaspora (as well as
other ethnic Ethiopians and Kenyans). Others may be Arab, South Asian or
other jihadist fighters. Evidence is scarce, but the influence of these
fighters -- even within al-Shabaab -- is probably very limited.
Regional response. Some of Somalia's neighbours have taken fairly forceful
positions against the latest violence:
- IGAD. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Horn of
Africa's regional body, met on May 20 to discuss the rapidly deteriorating
security situation. The group called for tough sanctions on Eritrea, which
it accused of supporting forces opposed to the TFG. Days later, this call
was echoed by the African Union, which similarly condemned Eritrean
influence.
- Eritrea. Eritrea -- which suspended its membership in IGAD in 2007 as a
result of long-standing tensions with Ethiopia, and in protest against
Ethiopian military intervention -- has rejected these calls, and denies
supporting Islamist militants. Nevertheless, Asmara had hosted Aweys since
2007, and multiple UN reports say that it has provided monetary support and
arms to his fighters. Evidence of Eritrean support for al-Shabaab is weaker,
but cannot be dismissed.
- Ethiopia. Reports of Ethiopian troop movements just inside the Somali
border have become more persistent and credible since mid-May. Ethiopia has
probably also provided support -- including arms -- for anti-al-Shabaab
forces, particularly Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (and possibly assorted warlords
who have also become 'Sufis' recently). The internal security minister -- a
leader in the 2007-09 anti-Ethiopian insurgency -- has since repaired
relations with Addis Ababa, and may allow Ethiopian strategic support for
his counter-offensive. Robust intervention can be expected if Aweys or
al-Shabaab topple the TFG-Djibouti.
- Kenya. In recent weeks, Nairobi has stepped up its rhetoric against the
militant resistance to the TFG, particularly against al-Shabaab. The
government has pledged to help the Somali government defeat al-Shabaab,
although in principle it is unlikely that Kenya will deploy troops inside
Somalia. Nevertheless, Kenya has been the location of two terrorist attacks
organised by al-Qaida's East Africa cell -- the 1998 US embassy bombing in
Nairobi and the 2002 attacks on Israeli interests in Mombassa -- and the
government is keen to avoid becoming the victim of another, amid reports of
a growing al-Shabaab presence inside the country. Kenyan intervention will
probably be limited to bolstering its border presence.
Two important trends may come out of this regional posturing:
Eritrea's continued isolation ultimately stems from and feeds into its
lingering tensions with Ethiopia. In the run-up to Ethiopia's May 2010
general election, Eritrea will play on these tensions by increasing its
support for Ethiopian opposition groups, armed or otherwise -- raising the
risk of a return of hostilities (see ETHIOPIA: EPRDF tightens control as
polls loom - May 14, 2009).
The regional (and international) focus on al-Shabaab has further
internationalised the group's agenda. Having carried out coordinated attacks
in Somaliland and Puntland in November last year, including on UN and
Ethiopian offices, the Kenyan and Ethiopian mainland are increasingly at
risk of being targeted by al-Shabaab.
Outlook. In late May, Aweys took over the formal leadership of Hisbul Islam.
He appears to be growing more antagonistic towards the leadership of
al-Shabaab. He and al-Shabaab parted ways ideologically during the run-up to
Ethiopia's December 2006 invasion. Aweys rejected attempts by al-Shabaab's
leadership to assume full command of the current offensive. With their
assault stalled, their coordination is already fraying. The next question is
whether the two organisations -- neither of which is monolithic -- can
maintain their own cohesion.
CONCLUSION: The recent hardline Islamist offensive against the TFG-Djibouti
may have demonstrated the limits of those groups' cohesion. However, the
government remains under military pressure, and is no less susceptible to
internal divisions. Moreover, overt Western support risks undermining the
TFG-Djibouti's domestic credibility. The future of the Djibouti process is
in serious doubt. Republished on ReliefWeb with the permission of research
and consulting firm Oxford Analytica Ltd. Copyright 2007 Oxford Analytica
Ltd. All rights reserved. For additional information, please visit
<http://www.oxan.com> Oxford Analytica or write to
enoel@oxford-analytica.com
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----