From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Mon Jun 15 2009 - 05:36:01 EDT
Somalia on the Brink of Civil War
by Prof. Michael A. Weinstein
15 Jun 14, 2009 - 3:07:02 PM
In the most perceptive analysis of the status and balance of forces in the
conflict in the southern and central regions of Somalia that has been
published
in the period between mid-May and mid-June, Bernard Jopson of the Financial
Times described on June 11 "a bloody stalemate in which no one wins."
Jopson bases his conclusion on the fact that an offensive by the armed
opposition to Somalia's internationally engineered Transitional Federal
Government (T.F.G.) in Somalia's capital Mogadishu in mid-May succeeded in
driving the T.F.G. into the restricted areas protected by the African Union
peacekeeping force (AMISOM), but then stalled, producing a stand-off that
has
prevailed since then. As Jopson reports, the opposition, which is a tactical
alliance between the internationalist Islamist Al-Shabaab movement and the
nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam (H.I.), lacks the military power to break
through the shield of AMISOM's heavy weapons, whereas the T.F.G. does not
have
the capability of push back the opposition in Mogadishu, much less to extend
its
control to the other regions in southern and central Somalia where the
opposition has military and political dominance.
Jopson's analysis, which cuts through the heated and often triumphalist
propaganda of all sides in the multi-faceted conflict, is taken here as the
starting point for a more structural commentary that attempts to determine
the
conditions of the aptly characterized "bloody stalemate."
The Conditions of Stalemate
Although the armed opposition failed to win the battle for Mogadishu in its
first round, the success of the offensive in revealing the T.F.G.'s severe
political and military weakness was a wake-up call to all domestic and
external
actors with an interest in preventing a takeover by the militant Islamists.
The
basic political dynamic from mid-May through mid-June has been efforts to
reverse the momentum of the armed opposition, and attempts by the opposition
to
consolidate and expand its positions. The most important development in the
situation, which makes it new, is that all of the interests that could
conceivably be involved in the conflict are now mobilized with no actor
remaining on the sidelines. The condition of complete mobilization brings
the
current cycle of civil conflict in the southern and central regions to the
brink
of civil war (as it has been characterized by the editors of Garoweonline),
in
which the will to compromise vanishes, the space for negotiation disappears,
and
no honest brokers are to be found.
In a communication to this writer in June, a Somali source provided a keen
understanding of the evolving domestic power configuration that sets the
conditions for multi-faceted civil war. The source reports: "What I can see
is a
formation of two competing convenient alliances between opposition radical
Islamists, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab, against opportunist warlords, clan
militias allied to the T.F.G., the T.F.G., Islamic Courts Union and now
A.S.W.J.
[Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama'a - the traditional Sufi Islam organization, which has
become militarized]." The source's assessment, which is fully consistent
with
independent daily monitoring of open sources, can be expanded to include
external actors - Ethiopia, Kenya, the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (I.G.A.D.), the African Union (A.U.), the United Nations, and
the
Western donor powers ranged in the International Contact Group (I.C.G.) -
that
have adopted a line supporting a T.F.G. military push back against the
"extremists."
The key phrase in the Somali source's assessment is "convenient alliances."
On
both sides of the superficial polarity are fragmented competing interests
that
render each coalition fragile. If the southern and central regions plunge
into
civil war, the conflict will not be a clear confrontation between two sides,
but
a multi-faceted struggle, in which each faction on each side will seek to
gain
its own advantage at the expense of both its "allies" and adversaries. The
result is likely to be a parceling out of southern and central Somalia into
contested and contesting fiefdoms, as was the case prior to the Islamic
Courts
revolution in 2006, which was aborted by an Ethiopian invasion at the end of
that year and a subsequent occupation that was terminated a year later in
the
wake of an Islamist resurgence. The new wrinkle, as the Somali source notes,
is
that "with the involvement of political Islam, a once clan oriented conflict
has
now been further complicated by extreme Saudi influenced Wahabism and also
not
to forget traditional Somali Islam (Sufism)."
Signs of a looming civil war are ubiquitous. On the ground, armed conflict
and
preparations for it have spread throughout the regions of southern and
central
Somalia.
In the central region of Hiraan, clashes have erupted between militias loyal
to
the Islamic Courts Union (I.C.U.) administration, which is loosely allied to
the
T.F.G., and Al-Shabaab and H.I. forces; the region's capital Beledweyne is
divided between the I.C.U. and H.I.; and the T.F.G.'s minister of internal
security, Col. Omar Hashi Adan - a former I.C.U. commander and colleague of
the
T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad - has returned to the region
leading a
militia trained in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa has admitted to conducting
"reconnaissance" operations in Hiraan and other regions bordering its ethnic
Somali Ogaden region, and has been reported by local and international media
to
have based its troops in the regions. Former governor of Hiraan and warlord,
Yusuf Dabaged, has also returned to the region, sparking disputes within the
I.C.U. over whether to cooperate with him.
In the neighboring Galgadud region, there have been clashes between A.S.W.J.
forces and Al-Shabaab and H.I. militants, with reinforcement of both sides
reportedly underway. Again, Ethiopian troops have reportedly based
themselves in
areas currently controlled by A.S.W.J. On June 14, Shabelle Media Network
reported that Ethiopian forces claimed that they had entered Galgadud to
track
down "foreign enemies" of Ethiopia.
In the Middle Shabelle region, which had been controlled by the I.C.U. and
was
the base of Sh. Sharif's support, Al-Shabaab and H.I. captured the region's
capital Jowhar and other towns, and set up an administration, leaving the
armed
opposition, according to local media, dominant in four out of the region's
five
districts. Middle Shabelle is Sh. Sharif's birthplace and his only base
outside
the few areas in Mogadishu protected by AMISOM.
In the southwestern Gedo region, forces of warlord Barre Hirale were
reported to
have crossed the border from Ethiopia, promising to challenge Al-Shabaab and
H.I. administrations throughout Somalia's deep south. To the north of Gedo,
the
former T.F.G. administrations of the Bay and Bakool regions were reported to
be
mobilizing forces on the Ethiopian border. Ethiopian troops were reported to
have crossed into Bakool and to have set up bases. The Al-Shabaab and H.I.
administrations in the two regions have been reported to have mobilized for
armed conflict.
In the southeastern Lower Jubba region, the tripartite Islamist
administration
has accused Kenya of mobilizing dissident militia on the border and has
threatened to attack bases in Kenya's Northeastern province, which has a
majority ethnic-Somali population.
The broadening of the battle for Mogadishu into the regions, the return of
the
warlords, and the active intervention of frontline states is clear evidence
of a
building civil war. Taken together, the developments in the regions show
that
any pretense of reconciliation has been abandoned by the T.F.G. and its
domestic
and foreign supporters. Pushed against the wall, the desperate Sh. Sharif
and
Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke seem willing to welcome anyone
into
their fold on an expedient basis, or at least to acquiesce in their
initiatives.
In Mogadishu, the pattern is the same. The despised warlord and former
governor
of the Banadir region, Mohammed Dheere, has returned to the city to mobilize
his
Mudolud sub-clan to support his former enemy and fellow clansman, Sh.
Sharif. In
response, other sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family, ranged under the
Tradition
and Unity Council (T.U.C.), which had been attempting to mediate between the
T.F.G. and the armed opposition, denounced Sh. Sharif for playing clan
politics
and Al-Shabaab for sending fighters from southern clans into Mogadishu. The
other presumptive mediator - the Islamic Clerics Council - has not been
heard
from. A source on the ground reports that Sh. Sharif has become increasingly
dependent on narrow clan support.
On the military front, a counter-offensive by I.C.U. militias in Mogadishu
on
May 22 appeared at first to have made headway, but then stalled and was
reversed. Since then, the "bloody stalemate" described by Jopson has
prevailed,
with the T.F.G.'s survival in Mogadishu dependent on AMISOM.
As Sh. Sharif desperately reached out to anyone who might help him, the
T.F.G.'s
weakness and loss of coherence became obvious. An editorial in the
Somaliland
Times on June 11 pointed out the T.F.G.'s fundamental problem - a lack of
domestic legitimacy: "...it is easy to see that most members of the
so-called
government do not have local constituencies from the fact that they cannot
rally
supporters. ... The bottom line is that most Somalis see the Sh. Sharif
government as the weakest faction among several factions, and that by
throwing
their weight behind this faction, the U.S. and the international community
are
disenfranchising the rest of Somalis."
Allowing for the position of the Somaliland Times in favor of Somaliland's
independence and for its opposition to the T.F.G.'s unionist policy, the
editorial is a precise statement of the T.F.G.'s condition that is borne out
by
monitoring. In the face of the propaganda from external actors that the
T.F.G.
is "legitimate" and has the Somali people behind it, one must ask: If the
T.F.G.
is popular, why has there not been a wave of support for it throughout the
southern and central regions? Why have the people not pressured their clan
leaders to support the T.F.G.? Why have militia failed to put themselves
squarely behind the T.F.G.? Why has there had to be a resort to despised
warlords, Addis Ababa and now Nairobi, which has irretrievably lost its
claim to
its traditional policy of "equidistance"? The Somaliland Times is simply the
little boy in the fairy tale announcing the obvious fact that the emperor
has no
clothes. The T.F.G. is indeed the "weakest faction among several factions,"
some
of which are its supposed "allies."
As for the international and regional organizations, and foreign powers upon
which the T.F.G. depends militarily and financially for its existence, they
have
responded to the T.F.G.'s decline by holding a series of meetings marked by
rhetorical support for their protege and denunciations of the armed
opposition,
and promises of practical aid, which has yet to materialize. In quick
succession
the sub-regional Inter-Governmental Authority of Development (I.G.A.D.), the
African Union, the U.N. Security Council, and the Western-dominated
International Contact Group (I.C.G.) have met and issued communiques and
resolutions. In a telling indication of decreasing levels of support for the
T.F.G. from the weakest external actors to the strongest, I.G.A.D., which is
composed mainly of frontline states, took the hardest line, appealing for an
air
and sea blockade of airports and seaports controlled by the opposition, to
be
enforced by the warships currently trying to suppress piracy off Somalia's
coast; and calling for robust military support of the T.F.G. The African
Union
echoed I.G.A.D., but did not emphasize international military support. The
U.N.S.C. extended the mandate of AMISOM and failed to promise its
replacement by
a U.N. mission. The I.C.G. stated that I.G.A.D.'s proposals deserved
consideration and repeated its tired call for the T.F.G. to reach out to
reconcile with the armed opposition, while denouncing the latter.
It is clear that the most important of the external actors - the ones with
the
guns and money - are not eager to throw all their weight on the side of the
T.F.G., whereas the dependent actors in the international coalition are
experiencing severe strain. Despite their pledges of funds for AMISOM and
for
training T.F.G. security forces, the big players continue to drag their
feet,
uncertain of the T.F.G.'s viability. As has been the case since the
Ethiopian
occupation, the Western powers' half-heartedness opens the way for continued
armed conflict and factionalization in southern and central Somalia. It is
not
worth detailing the (qualified) rhetorical optimism of the international
coalition (to call it an "international community" is deeply misleading). In
a
strictly descriptive sense, the international coalition is simply
hypocritical.
None of the above is meant to suggest that the armed opposition is deeply
popular - although its successful establishment of administrations in the
regions indicates minimally acquiescence and underlying clan support, at
least
in an expedient sense - and unified. H.I. is itself a coalition of
resistance
groups, each with its own interests; Al-Shabaab is increasingly described by
journalists as a loose coalition; and H.I. and Al-Shabaab are opposed in
terms
of their ideological programs. Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, who returned to
Mogadishu
after the armed opposition's offensive and took over as H.I.'s leader, was
reported by local media to have attempted to negotiate with Al-Shabaab on
forming a unified organization, and to have failed when the two sides could
not
agree on which group would fill key positions and how the organization would
be
named. Nonetheless, during the period from mid-May through mid-June,
tactical
cooperation between the two groups appears to have held up; both have a
common
interest at the present time in preserving their control in the regions and
fending off counter-offensives. The claim that they have no program and are
simply spoilers, as the T.F.G., I.G.A.D., the A.U., and the U.N.'s special
representative to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, tiresomely repeat to the
donor
powers, borders on political psychosis.
Conclusion
Piece together Jopson's characterization of "bloody stalemate;" the Somali
source's description of factionalized "convenient alliances;" disruptive
Ethiopian and possibly Kenyan intervention; and the half-hearted response of
the
donor powers, and the picture that emerges is one of incipient multi-faceted
civil war. That picture, which is confirmed by monitoring of open sources
and
supplemented by contributions from closed sources, is likely to remain
fixed, at
least in the short term.
All the possible actors are mobilized, some more and some less. For the
extant
balance of power to change, an injection of momentum into one faction or
another
will have to occur; at present, there is little prospect for that. One
should
bear in mind the Somaliland Times' observation that the T.F.G. is "the
weakest
faction among several factions." Commenting on the I.C.G. meeting, Ould
Abdallah told Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on June 12: "Surely, the international
community
will not allow any attempt to revolt against this legitimate authority and
the
elected president, as was the case last month." Also on June 12, the
T.F.G.'s
deputy prime minister, Abdirahman Aden Ibbi, told the Mareeg website: "The
international community promised $256 million for the Somali government and
the
government did not get that amount of money so far. So they are too late for
handing over that money to the transitional government of Somalia."
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