From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Tue Jun 16 2009 - 02:52:05 EDT
Stratfor
---------------------------
WESTERN MISCONCEPTIONS MEET IRANIAN REALITY
By George Friedman
In 1979, when we were still young and starry-eyed, a revolution took place
in
Iran. When I asked experts what would happen, they divided into two camps.
The first group of Iran experts argued that the Shah of Iran would certainly
survive, that the unrest was simply a cyclical event readily manageable by
his
security, and that the Iranian people were united behind the Iranian
monarch's
modernization program. These experts developed this view by talking to the
same
Iranian officials and businessmen they had been talking to for years --
Iranians who had grown wealthy and powerful under the shah and who spoke
English, since Iran experts frequently didn't speak Farsi all that well.
The second group of Iran experts regarded the shah as a repressive brute,
and
saw the revolution as aimed at liberalizing the country. Their sources were
the
professionals and academics who supported the uprising -- Iranians who knew
what former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini believed, but didn't
think he had much popular support. They thought the revolution would result
in
an increase in human rights and liberty. The experts in this group spoke
even
less Farsi than the those in the first group.
Misreading Sentiment in Iran
Limited to information on Iran from English-speaking opponents of the
regime,
both groups of Iran experts got a very misleading vision of where the
revolution was heading -- because the Iranian revolution was not brought
about
by the people who spoke English. It was made by merchants in city bazaars,
by
rural peasants, by the clergy -- people Americans didn't speak to because
they
couldn't. This demographic was unsure of the virtues of modernization and
not
at all clear on the virtues of liberalism. From the time they were born, its
members knew the virtue of Islam, and that the Iranian state must be an
Islamic
state.
Americans and Europeans have been misreading Iran for 30 years. Even after
the
shah fell, the myth has survived that a mass movement of people exists
demanding liberalization -- a movement that if encouraged by the West
eventually would form a majority and rule the country. We call this outlook
"iPod liberalism," the idea that anyone who listens to rock 'n' roll on an
iPod, writes blogs and knows what it means to Twitter must be an
enthusiastic
supporter of Western liberalism. Even more significantly, this outlook
fails to
recognize that iPod owners represent a small minority in Iran -- a country
that
is poor, pious and content on the whole with the revolution forged 30 years
ago.
There are undoubtedly people who want to liberalize the Iranian regime. They
are to be found among the professional classes in Tehran, as well as among
students. Many speak English, making them accessible to the touring
journalists, diplomats and intelligence people who pass through. They are
the
ones who can speak to Westerners, and they are the ones willing to speak to
Westerners. And these people give Westerners a wildly distorted view of
Iran.
They can create the impression that a fantastic liberalization is at hand --
but not when you realize that iPod-owning Anglophones are not exactly the
majority in Iran.
Last Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with about
two-thirds of the vote. Supporters of his opponent, both inside and outside
Iran, were stunned. A poll revealed that former Iranian Prime Minister Mir
Hossein Mousavi was beating Ahmadinejad. It is, of course, interesting to
meditate on how you could conduct a poll in a country where phones are not
universal, and making a call once you have found a phone can be a trial. A
poll
therefore would probably reach people who had phones and lived in Tehran and
other urban areas. Among those, Mousavi probably did win. But outside
Tehran,
and beyond persons easy to poll, the numbers turned out quite different.
Some still charge that Ahmadinejad cheated. That is certainly a possibility,
but it is difficult to see how he could have stolen the election by such a
large margin. Doing so would have required the involvement of an incredible
number of people, and would have risked creating numbers that quite plainly
did
not jibe with sentiment in each precinct. Widespread fraud would mean that
Ahmadinejad manufactured numbers in Tehran without any regard for the vote.
But
he has many powerful enemies who would quickly have spotted this and would
have
called him on it. Mousavi still insists he was robbed, and we must remain
open
to the possibility that he was, although it is hard to see the mechanics of
this.
Ahmadinejad's Popularity
It also misses a crucial point: Ahmadinejad enjoys widespread popularity. He
doesn't speak to the issues that matter to the urban professionals, namely,
the
economy and liberalization. But Ahmadinejad speaks to three fundamental
issues
that accord with the rest of the country.
First, Ahmadinejad speaks of piety. Among vast swathes of Iranian society,
the
willingness to speak unaffectedly about religion is crucial. Though it may
be
difficult for Americans and Europeans to believe, there are people in the
world
to whom economic progress is not of the essence; people who want to maintain
their communities as they are and live the way their grandparents lived.
These
are people who see modernization -- whether from the shah or Mousavi -- as
unattractive. They forgive Ahmadinejad his economic failures.
Second, Ahmadinejad speaks of corruption. There is a sense in the
countryside
that the ayatollahs -- who enjoy enormous wealth and power, and often have
lifestyles that reflect this -- have corrupted the Islamic Revolution.
Ahmadinejad is disliked by many of the religious elite precisely because he
has
systematically raised the corruption issue, which resonates in the
countryside.
Third, Ahmadinejad is a spokesman for Iranian national security, a
tremendously
popular stance. It must always be remembered that Iran fought a war with
Iraq
in the 1980s that lasted eight years, cost untold lives and suffering, and
effectively ended in its defeat. Iranians, particularly the poor,
experienced
this war on an intimate level. They fought in the war, and lost husbands and
sons in it. As in other countries, memories of a lost war don't necessarily
delegitimize the regime. Rather, they can generate hopes for a resurgent
Iran,
thus validating the sacrifices made in that war -- something Ahmadinejad
taps
into. By arguing that Iran should not back down but become a major power, he
speaks to the veterans and their families, who want something positive to
emerge from all their sacrifices in the war.
Perhaps the greatest factor in Ahmadinejad's favor is that Mousavi spoke for
the better districts of Tehran -- something akin to running a U.S.
presidential
election as a spokesman for Georgetown and the Lower East Side. Such a base
will get you hammered, and Mousavi got hammered. Fraud or not, Ahmadinejad
won
and he won significantly. That he won is not the mystery; the mystery is why
others thought he wouldn't win.
For a time on Friday, it seemed that Mousavi might be able to call for an
uprising in Tehran. But the moment passed when Ahmadinejad's security
forces on
motorcycles intervened. And that leaves the West with its worst-case
scenario:
a democratically elected anti-liberal.
Western democracies assume that publics will elect liberals who will protect
their rights. In reality, it's a more complicated world. Hitler is the
classic
example of someone who came to power constitutionally, and then preceded to
gut
the constitution. Similarly, Ahmadinejad's victory is a triumph of both
democracy and repression.
The Road Ahead: More of the Same
The question now is what will happen next. Internally, we can expect
Ahmadinejad to consolidate his position under the cover of anti-corruption.
He
wants to clean up the ayatollahs, many of whom are his enemies. He will need
the support of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This election
has
made Ahmadinejad a powerful president, perhaps the most powerful in Iran
since
the revolution. Ahmadinejad does not want to challenge Khamenei, and we
suspect
that Khamenei will not want to challenge Ahmadinejad. A forced marriage is
emerging, one which may place many other religious leaders in a difficult
position.
Certainly, hopes that a new political leadership would cut back on Iran's
nuclear program have been dashed. The champion of that program has won, in
part
because he championed the program. We still see Iran as far from developing
a
deliverable nuclear weapon, but certainly the Obama administration's hopes
that
Ahmadinejad would either be replaced -- or at least weakened and forced to
be
more conciliatory -- have been crushed. Interestingly, Ahmadinejad sent
congratulations to U.S. President Barack Obama on his inauguration. We would
expect Obama to reciprocate under his opening policy, which U.S. Vice
President
Joe Biden appears to have affirmed, assuming he was speaking for Obama. Once
the vote fraud issue settles, we will have a better idea of whether Obama's
policies will continue. (We expect they will.)
What we have now are two presidents in a politically secure position,
something
that normally forms a basis for negotiations. The problem is that it is not
clear what the Iranians are prepared to negotiate on, nor is it clear what
the
Americans are prepared to give the Iranians to induce them to negotiate.
Iran
wants greater influence in Iraq and its role as a regional leader
acknowledged,
something the United States doesn't want to give them. The United States
wants
an end to the Iranian nuclear program, which Iran doesn't want to give.
On the surface, this would seem to open the door for an attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities. Former U.S. President George W. Bush did not -- and
Obama
does not -- have any appetite for such an attack. Both presidents blocked
the
Israelis from attacking, assuming the Israelis ever actually wanted to
attack.
For the moment, the election appears to have frozen the status quo in place.
Neither the United States nor Iran seem prepared to move significantly, and
there are no third parties that want to get involved in the issue beyond the
occasional European diplomatic mission or Russian threat to sell something
to
Iran. In the end, this shows what we have long known: This game is locked in
place, and goes on.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to
www.stratfor.com.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
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