From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Mon Jan 04 2010 - 06:27:15 EST
Al-Shabab Implements its Encirclement Strategy [Intelligence Update]
Jan 4, 2010 - 1:17:51 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
On January 2, Somali and international media widely reported that the forces
of the Salafist-jihadist Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.) had attacked
and gained control over the town of Dhusamareb, the capital of Somalia's
central Galgadud region, which had been held by its rival in the region, the
Sufi movement Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (A.S.W.J.), which is backed by local
militias and is reportedly supplied and supported by Ethiopia.
Reports were contradictory, with some news outlets saying that H.S.M. had
prevailed after heavy fighting, others saying that H.S.M. had met with
little resistance from A.S.W.J., and others saying that A.S.W.J. had mounted
a counter-attack and had regained control over parts of the town. On January
3, there were reports that A.S.W.J. had retaken Dhusamareb, but that
tensions in the area remained high as both sides prepared for further armed
conflict.
Whatever the outcome of the conflict turns out to be, the attack on
Dhusamareb confirms the intelligence reported by this writer in
<http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/publish/Somalia_27/S
omalia_Al-Shabaab_s_Encirclement_Strategy_Intelligence_Brief.shtml> Garowe
Online on December 8, 2009 that H.S.M. has adopted a strategy of encircling
Somalia's weak and internationally recognized Transitional Federal
Government (T.F.G.) in Mogadishu by achieving dominance in the central
regions of Hiraan, Galgadud and southern Mudug. Should H.S.M. succeed in
capturing Dhusamareb and then extend its sway to strategic towns in
Galgadud, such as Guri-el, Abudwaq, and Balanbal, which remain A.S.W.J.
strongholds, the balance of power between H.S.M. and the variegated
coalition resisting it in the central regions and in southern and central
Somalia in general will be decisively altered. Although A.S.W.J. is only
partially aligned with the T.F.G., the former's control over Galgadud - a
buffer region between the Hiraan region to the west, in which the
nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam movement (H.I.) and H.S.M. are dominant
and dispute and collaborate; and the Middle Shabelle region to the east, in
which H.S.M. predominates - has been one of the most important pillars of
the anti-H.S.M. coalition's aim of rolling back H.S.M., which is currently
dominant in most of southern and central Somalia; the noose around the
T.F.G. will tighten, which is the aim of the encirclement strategy. At the
least, Galgadud has been thrown into contention and A.S.W.J.'s credibility
as a resistance force against H.S.M. has been thrown into question.
The source of the December 8 report had anticipated that H.S.M. would move
first against H.I. in order to take command over the armed Islamist movement
and thereby consolidate its power. Instead, H.S.M. has attempted to
conciliate with H.I. in Hiaraan and has moved directly against a more
important and irreconcilable opponent, A.S.W.J.
Although the decisional processes of H.S.M. are not readily accessible to
outsiders, its decision to attack Dhusamareb is intelligible in terms of
A.S.W.J.'s efforts from mid-December into January to form a permanent
administration in Galgadud. In a later communication, the source of the
December 8 intelligence reported that Ethiopia - the muscle behind much of
the anti-H.S.M. coalition - would move into Galgadud to protect A.S.W.J.'s
conference on creating an administration for Galgadud. It is likely that
H.S.M. moved to derail the conference, which it succeeded in doing on
January 2, when A.S.W.J. suspended the conference for two weeks, as its
attention became fully absorbed in tightening security in the towns that it
controlled, and in preparing for a counter-offensive against H.S.M. in
Dhusamareb.
Run-Up to Dhusamareb
The stage was set for a confrontation between H.S.M. and A.S.W.J. on
December 13, when an A.S.W.J. delegation led by Sh. Mahmud Sh. Hasan Farah
met in Addis Ababa with Ethiopia's foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin. A press
release from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Hasan
had told Mesfin that A.S.W.J. would hold a conference and had asked Mesfin
to mediate its disputes with the T.F.G. Hasan expressed concern over the
emergence of a "parallel" A.S.W.J. movement and urged the T.F.G. to
cooperate in maintaining A.S.W.J.'s "unity.," Hasan pointed out that
A.S.W.J. had confronted H.S.M. thirty times and had won each time, and
criticized the T.F.G. for failing to honor a previous agreement on security,
claiming that had the T.F.G. held up its end of the bargain, the conditions
would have been in place for weakening and eventually wiping out H.S.M. and
H.I.
On December 18, Ethiopian troops crossed into Galgadud, set up positions in
the town of Balanbal, and conducted search operations. On the same day,
H.S.M.'s commander in the Hiraan region, Sh. Abukar Ali Adan, announced that
H.S.M. had "close working relations" with H.I. and that the two groups were
in the final stages of forming unified local administrations in Hiraan.
Abandoning Dhusamareb for the town of Abudwaq, the leadership of A.S.W.J.
opened its conference on December 20 with Hasan in the chair. It was
reported that A.S.W.J. had sent invitations to other regional
administrations and the T.F.G.; further reports did not mention any other
participants than the A.S.W.J. delegates - more than 200 from different
regions of post-independence Somalia and the diaspora.
The agenda of the conference was to formulate policy for opposing the
Islamists, to determine how A.S.W.J. might support other regional
administrations and the T.F.G., and to create one super-administration for
areas in the central regions under A.S.W.J.'s control. On December 22,
committees were set up to work out the form of administration for the
central regions.
On December 31, the new administration began to take shape; delegates
elected a 41-member parliament, which in turn elected a speaker and a deputy
speaker. Two days, earlier, Ethiopia had withdrawn its forces from Balanbal.
On January 1, the governor of the H.I. administration in Hiraan, Sh. Shuriye
Afrah Sabriye, declared war on A.S.W.J. in Dhusamareb and Guri-el, accusing
the group of being Ethiopian pawns. On January 2, H.S.M. struck Dhusamareb.
Analytical Note
The most telling feature of the period between mid-December and early
January in Galgadud is the apparent confidence of A.S.W.J. in its effort to
consolidate and institutionalize the power that it thought that it had in
the central regions. The leadership of the movement abandoned Dhusamareb and
decamped for Abudwaq where it held protracted negotiations. When the
parliament was about to be set up, Ethiopia withdrew from Balanbal - an
indication that Addis Ababa also had confidence in A.S.W.J.'s control of the
situation, unless there is more than meets the eye. The run-up to Dhusamareb
indicates that both A.S.W.J. and Ethiopia had grossly underrated H.S.M.'s
power, and had not understood and taken into account H.S.M.'s encirclement
strategy.
Whereas there was reporting on A.S.W.J. during the run-up to Dhusamareb,
there was not a word from open or closed sources about H.S.M.'s preparations
for an assault on the capital. The attack and especially its coordinated
force came as an apparent surprise to all the actors but H.S.M.
H.S.M. is currently the protagonist in southern and central Somalia and its
leadership knows that it is. In the sense of international recognition, the
T.F.G. is Somalia's "legitimate" government and H.S.M. and H.I. are the
"armed opposition"; in the sense of power and momentum, the T.F.G. and the
rest of the anti-H.S.M. coalition (warlords, clan politicians, A.S.W.J.,
Ethiopia, other regional powers, Western great powers, the African Union,
and the United Nations) form a variegated and divided opposition to H.S.M.
Despite reported divisions within H.S.M., its two contending factions made a
demonstration of unity on January 1 at a ceremony in Mogadishu showing off
hundreds of newly trained H.S.M. fighters. Despite its conflict with H.I. in
the deep southern regions, H.S.M. appears to be able to collaborate with
H.I. tactically and, perhaps, strategically elsewhere.
H.S.M. is confident. H.S.M. is implementing a strategy. Can the same be said
for its opposition? At present, H.S.M. has momentum.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University
<weinstem@purdue.edu">http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/weinstem@purdue.edu>
weinstem@purdue.edu
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