From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Tue Jan 12 2010 - 06:35:42 EST
Yemen and the Al Qaeda Pretext: A Closer Look at the War on Terrorism's "New
Frontier"
by Ali Jawad
January 12, 2010
"Remember, the Al Qaeda that was in a very few countries -- and most
specifically in Afghanistan in September of 2001 -- is now an Al Qaeda that
is in about 58, 59 -- who knows precisely, but we sort of peg it around 60
countries. It is a global network, which it wasn't." -- John F. Kerry, 7
October 2009
If recent experience is anything to go by, the mere mention of any 'Al Qaeda
threat' is enough to signal the swift exit of rational thought and/or due
regard to definition in Washington. The superior military outfit in history
whose sheer might none could aspire to 'equal, let alone surpass', has been
madly spooked - as we are led to deduce - by a band of former
cave-inhabiting, shoddy-bearded ragtags now transmogrified into a "global
network".
The media scene is abuzz once again as spinmeisters tap away in overtime
mode to direct world attention to the latest frontier in the so-called
Global War on Terrorism: Yemen.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articlePictures/middle_east_pol_2003.jpg
With its fate arguably sealed on Christmas Day following the failed attack
by the comically-named "underwear bomber", the least-developed Gulf state
positively checks all the tick-boxes required of a nation for it to qualify
for greater US interference - leaking poverty, internally fractured,
geopolitically pivotal and fatefully, a nation that can feasibly be
associated with a global terror threat. Just weeks earlier, connections to
Yemen were apparently uncovered in investigations relating to the Fort Hood
shooting.
In between the two incidents, the US military conducted a series of deadly
airstrikes having received the go-ahead from Nobel-winner Obama. The target
of the attacks (as with the case of routine deadly drone-strikes in
north-western Pakistan) was an ethereal Al Qaeda top figure who,
unsurprisingly, seems to have escaped unscathed. [1]
Following months of in-house policy talks, top figures in the US
administration have added their voices to the mix by underlining the need to
confront the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the troubled nation. With the stage
seemingly set, and greater US involvement very much in the pipelines, there
is a need to plumb through some unchartered territory surrounding the
present situation and what it holds for the region as a whole.
Measuring the Al Qaeda Pretext
Obama's AfPak strategy brought to surface the touchy issue of defining terms
previously assumed to be self-evident such as 'Al Qaeda' and 'Taliban'.
Despite Bush-era treatment of these terms as some kind of fixated Platonic
archetypes, problems of definition have always been raised by observers and
analysts who have cited the misuse of the Al Qaeda pretext in justifying the
expanding imperial project, as well as in bolstering instruments of state
authority and security in a number of countries. In this regard, the
fictitious link tying Iraq to Al Qaeda in the prelude to the war on Iraq
represents one of the more obvious examples. Yet, there are a number of
other cases in which the same pretext has been falsely employed to serve as
a 'welcome!'-sign for direct US involvement.
In his book 'The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa', Professor
Jeremy Keenan unveiled how the Algerian government theatrically staged
operations beginning from 2003 (which it blamed on Al Qaeda), in order to
secure US military support. The man running the 'terror show' whose group
eventually renamed itself the 'Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb' (AQIM) was
in fact an agent of the Algerian secret military intelligence service (DRS);
a man operating with the pseudonym, El Para. The Bush administration duly
obliged and entered into a marriage of convenience with the Algerian
government; a relationship in which both sides, in the words of Professor
Keenan, "wanted terrorism in that area".[2]
The resource-rich Sahel subsequently became a "swamp of terror" and El Para,
whilst still an agent of the DRS, turned into "Bin Laden's right-hand man in
the Sahel". Similar blueprints were replicated in nearby Niger and Mali
within the context of a wider militarization project in Africa. [3] Invented
Al Qaeda threats allegedly active in the "swamp of terror" conveniently
functioned as "the early seeds" of AFRICOM.
Squarely under the purview of AFRICOM, Yemen seems to be the next country in
line; quietly adamant not to lose out on a historic opportunity to shore up
its strength and silence all internal dissent by simply throwing up the Al
Qaeda card.
Broadening Definitions
In an interview to BBC Arabic, the comments of Yemeni Chief of Staff in the
Central Security Forces, Brigadier Yehia Mohammed Abdallah Saleh, were
revealing insofar as how he chose to define the nature of the threat: "the
problem that Yemen is facing remains with Al Qaeda sympathizers rather than
with Al Qaeda itself." He went on to add, "Al Qaeda is trying to weaken
Yemen thinking it could operate unchecked if it cooperated with the Houthis
to undermine the country". [4]
The import of the brigadier's comments is instructive; in addition to being
extremely vague, the business of tackling "sympathizers" inherently requires
some form of extended commitment. Yet, as the brigadier would no doubt
insist, this should be no cause for short-term complacency, for he
immediately proceeds to sanctify the ongoing war on Zaydi Houthis by falsely
associating it with the wider war on terror - a tactic that is being
continually recycled in order to fit newer purposes all around the world.
As one would expect, a brief look at the facts brings forth an entirely
different picture. Over the years, the government in Yemen has tried to play
it both ways with Al Qaeda. By adopting a strategy of accommodation, and
indeed signing a non-aggression pact in 2003, the Yemeni government has in
the past solicited the support of Al Qaeda in its fight against the Houthis,
as confirmed by counterterrorism expert Michael Scheuer.
In a recent news article that appeared on BBC Arabic, a Houthi official
speaking to correspondent Bob Trevelyan declared that the government's
strategy to fight Al Qaeda was bound to fail since it was itself responsible
for "sponsor[ing] these movements in the past". [5] Unsurprisingly, such
stories or even implicit nuances to that effect are missing altogether in
the BBC's English coverage of Yemen - instead, analyses are teeming with
talk of a symbiotic relationship between Houthi 'rebels' and Al Qaeda.
For a government that has no qualms with Machiavellian realpolitik and
outright deception, one can safely assume that the vocal southern
secessionist resurgence will likewise be confronted in the name of
counterterrorism. The more pronounced involvement of figures like Tariq
Al-Fadhli - a former member of Yemeni president's senior council who also
fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan - in the south [6] will turn the
"Al Qaeda sympathizers" criterion into quite a useful tool to justify more
iron-fist policies towards the region.
At another level, the government's tentative treatment of the Al Qaeda
threat is indicative of both the complex social dynamic within the country,
as well as the inability of the central government to effectively exert
state control. Although a considerable number of Yemenis subscribe to a
Wahhabist-Salafist version of Islam, they certainly do not advocate the
militaristic outlook that is symptomatic of Al Qaeda.
Growing US involvement or perception of US-client status (as enjoyed by
next-door Saudi Arabia) associated with Yemen however, will certainly serve
to radicalise great swaths of the Yemeni population, and in turn intensify
the nature of the threat from the country. Well aware of this dimension,
foreign minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi stressed that any direct confrontation
with Al Qaeda within Yemen should remain a strictly-Yemeni affair, adding
that it is not "in the interests of the United States or western countries
to send security forces to Yemen".
The Saudi Connection
It is impossible to speak of an Al Qaeda threat in Yemen without accounting
for the role played by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in giving rise to this
threat, as well as determining how it is in turn affected by it. In a July
testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Brigadier
General James Smith - current US ambassador to Saudi Arabia - underlined the
need to "bolster Yemen's capacity to defeat violent extremism"; his mention
of Yemen, tellingly, came before any mention of Iraq or Syria. [7]
During the 80s and 90s, Saudi Arabia embarked on a project to propagate a
strong Wahhabist current in order to establish itself as the paramount power
in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Billions upon billions of petrodollars were
devoted to this global undertaking in which Yemen, a nation joined to the
Saudi kingdom "through historical, ethnic and tribal ties", was certainly
not ignored. In Yemen, the kingdom created "a strong Wahhabi current that
was politically and ideologically loyal to the ruling al-Saud", as noted by
Dr. Mai Yamani, an expert on Saudi Arabia. Earlier in May of last year, Dr.
Yamani summarised the present dilemma with the following assessment:
"the two largest countries on the Arabian peninsula - Saudi Arabia, the
biggest in terms of landmass and oil wealth, and Yemen in terms of
population, are now locked in life-and-death struggles with internal
enemies. The paradox is that, though the threat to both countries is the
same, each is worsening the outlook for the other by the policies it is
pursuing." [8]
As President Ali Abdallah Saleh's control over Yemen falters with popular
movements in the north and south increasingly gaining momentum, the Al-Saud
royalty is acutely aware that it would be the first to feel the
after-effects of its backfired policy, as it comes under increasing threat
from the same quarters it once funded and used to buttress its global
standing. The US is likewise very cognisant of this threat, and acknowledges
that any de-stabilization of the kingdom would immediately diminish the
empire's regional coult.
In conclusion, the recent focus on Yemen is primarily driven by geostrategic
imperatives which revolve around preserving a pro-US configuration of the
Middle East. Media hype and sensationalized analysis obscure the underlying
dynamics which, in fact implicate the US's closest regional clients most
notably, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in engendering the Al Qaeda threat.
Further, the stakes in question for Ali Abdallah Saleh's government are
unmistakable: simple old-style survival. With a distinguished heritage in
the vocation, the US is thus set to pursue a tradition of bolstering an
unpopular, oppressive regime in Yemen. Indeed, Sana'a will be hoping for
greater aid and extended commitment from the US (under the cover of the
international community), to come out of the London conference called on by
British PM Gordon Brown.
As officials from the Yemeni government sing the 'give us more aid, we'll
deal with Al Qaeda' tune [9], the message is clear: discreetly strengthen
our armed counterterrorism capacity. Not in the least surprising, the head
of Commander of Special Operations - the outfit that is responsible for
counterterrorism - Ahmed Ali Abdallah Saleh happens to be the son of the
Yemeni president. In connection, any international recognition of a
vaguely-defined Al Qaeda threat in Yemen will thus provide much needed
ammunition to the Yemeni government to silence its internal foes.
For the US, the paramount objective is to secure the surrounding
neighbourhood of its prime Gulf client and gradually build a stronger
presence in Yemen. The geopolitical prizes on offer are significant: in
addition to neighbouring Saudi Arabia, Yemen is the only country from which
oil can potentially reach the open seas without passing through either the
Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal. Should Yemen fall within the orbit of
direct US influence, the above factor will ominously reduce the geostrategic
importance of the Strait of Hormuz in formulating calculations surrounding
any future 'shock and awe'-type strikes on Iran. Further, with a greater
presence in Yemen the US will have almost secured the Bab el-Mandeb passing,
since Djibouti already hosts a 2,000-man strong AFRICOM base. The only
remaining quandary for the US in the war of access to the nerve-centre of
global energy supplies will once more leave the Strait of Hormuz and Iran.
In the short-term however, much rests on how the US will act in response to
the 'Al Qaeda threat' in Yemen. Indeed, it could be said that Ali Abdallah
Saleh's fate is firmly chained to Washington's decisions over the coming
months. That perhaps, is in itself revealing as to the present status of
regional equations, and how these will in turn pan out.
For individuals and groups concerned with issues of human rights, the most
immediate task is to strongly press for a clear, rigid and measurable
definition of 'Al Qaeda' and related terms such as 'terrorism' in the
upcoming London conference - particularly with relevance to the Yemeni scene
- in addition to a clear call for a binding ceasefire to the ongoing war
against Yemeni Houthis. Furthermore, any commitment of aid to Yemen
(regardless of its nature) must stand up to rigorous standards of
transparency; encompassing in this regard, the ability to closely scrutinise
how any such aid is (or will be) utilised by the Yemeni government.
Ali Jawad is a political activist and a member of the AhlulBayt Islamic
Mission (AIM)
Notes
1. Awlaki: I'm Alive, ABC News, 31 Dec 2009
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/awlaki-alive/story?id=9455144
2. British Anthropologist Jeremy Keenan on "The Dark Sahara: America's War
on Terror in Africa", Democracy Now, 6 August 2009.
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/8/6/keenan
Also refer to: America's New Frontline: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, Al
Jazeera English (accessible on YouTube)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYoRiCLX6Tk
3. AFRICOM and America's Global Military Agenda: Taking The Helm Of The
Entire World, Global Research, 22 October 2009
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15788> &aid=15788
4. Yemen faces Al-Qaeda sympathizers not the group itself, Global Arab
Network, 21 December 2009
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/200912214107/Yemen-Politics/yemen-f
aces-al-qaeda-sympathizers-not-the-group-itself-says-official.html
5. Houthis: Strategy to fight Al Qaeda in Yemen will fail, BBC Arabic, 6
January 2009
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2010/01/100106_aq_yemenrebels_tc2.sht
ml
6. The Yemen Hidden Agenda: Behind the Al-Qaeda Scenarios, A Strategic Oil
Transit Chokepoint, Global Research, 5 January 2010
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16786> &aid=16786
7. See: Statement of James B. Smith Ambassador-Designate to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia before the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, 22 July 2009
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/SmithTestimony090722a.pdf
8. Yemen, haven for Jihadis, Guardian Online, 25 May 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/25/yemen-jihadi-guantanamo-
saudi-arabia
Also refer to: Saudi Arabia goes to war, Guardian Online, 23 November 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/23/saudi-arabia-yemen-houth
i-war
9. Interview: Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi, Financial Times, 6 January 2010
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f0356f8-fae1-11de-94d8-00144feab49a.html
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