From: Biniam Tekle (biniamt@dehai.org)
Date: Mon Jan 25 2010 - 08:13:07 EST
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201001244510/Sudan-Politics/independence-or-unity-a-critical-year-for-sudan.html
Independence or Unity - A Critical Year for Sudan
Posted by Shahid Abbas
Monday, 25 January 2010 00:02
Just one year from now, in January 2011, voters in Southern Sudan are due to
take part in a referendum that gives them the choice of independence or
continued unity with the North. For the vote to take place, many significant
administrative, social and political obstacles must be overcome. Failure
risks a return to conflict that could destabilize the region for decades to
come.
A new Chatham House report, Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for
Sudan, examines how key actors can best engage to ensure the obstacles are
overcome in an extremely tight timeframe.
Sudan will hold potentially transformative elections in April 2010 and its
complex peace processes require the organization of three referendums in the
coming year, including one in which Southern Sudanese voters will decide on
unity or independence.
The report argues that at this late stage Sudanese and international actors
who want to see a peaceful transition in Sudan will reluctantly need to rely
on elite deals, but that the transition will not be lasting unless ordinary
people are engaged and empowered.
'International actors sponsored the CPA and have an important role in
supporting Sudanese elites to bring it to a peaceful conclusion,' says
Edward Thomas, author of the report.
Yet this is not nearly enough, says Dr Thomas. 'Resolution of the conflict
in Darfur requires a government that invests in its people, supports
reconciliation and ends impunity. If Southern Sudan chooses unity, its army
needs to be integrated with that of the central government - a daunting
task. If it chooses secession, deals are needed on oil-revenue shares,
nationality, currency and a host of other fraught questions.'
Even at this late stage, Sudan's elites need to 'start an engagement with
the country's diverse populations, if they are to avoid perpetuating the
politics of exclusion and conflict and help citizens participate in the big
decisions facing the country,' concludes the report.
On Wednesday 13 January 2010, Ambassador Torben Brylle (EU Special
Representative for Sudan) chaired the launch of the report.
The two distinguished panellists were: Mr Omer Siddig, the Sudanese
Ambassador and the Most Reverend Dr. Daniel Deng, Archbishop of the
Episcopal Church of the Sudan.
*Global Arab Network <http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/>* has
received a press release from Sudanese Embassy in London stating that Mr
Siddig started his comments by saying: he was a career diplomat; not a
politician and that he did not belong to any political party. He accepted
the invitation to comment on the report as part of his duties regarding all
news and views expressed about Sudan abroad. His plank is National not
party political. He went on to point out that the report highlighted (very
selectively) negative aspects of the political landscape in Sudan.
References to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not emphasize its
historical significance as an achievement of the government which agreed to
negotiate in good faith and make the necessary concessions. Successive
governments have failed in the past is this respect.
According to the Embassy press release, the report referred to the
politically loaded concept of marginalization without mentioning that Sudan
was shaken to the core by rebellious disruptions 1955-1972 and 1983-2005
which destroyed towns and villages, distorted the economy and hampered
development in ALL parts of Sudan, not only the periphery.
Sudanese Ambassador went on to discuss the report’s reference to the
“minority regime” which is not a suitable understanding of the balance of
political power. The National Congress Party is the major partner in the
National Assembly because it (in tandem with others) represents the majority
of the population.
Furthermore, the term the “black belt” around Khartoum was not coined by
northerners; but by top Southern politicians in a reference to the Southern
displaced in the capital’s outskirts, according to Sudanese Embassy press
release.
He accepted that the ambitious time-table for the implementation of the CPA
has not been adhered to; but there were compelling reasons. The tragic
death of Dr. John Garang in an air crash in 05 set back the time-table by
months as the SPLM went back to the drawing board to reorganize. On other
occasions the SPLM requested delay by changing the names of its
representatives or not submitting a name until very late. There is a
documented list of all these incidents. Ambassador Omer Siddig said that he
didn’t dispute the importance of balanced development; but stated that the
Southern Sudan was autonomous for 5 years and had its full share of Billions
of petro-dollars. The Central government cannot be blamed for the lack of
development in this respect. Southern Sudanese ministers were represented
in the Ministry of Energy and other bodies and were in a position to oversee
and monitor assets and prices.
Sudanese Ambassador expressed hope that the full implementation of the CPA,
which the report calls for will take place in an atmosphere of trust and
mutual understanding, with the help of the International Community.
As far as Darfur is concerned, He said that the rebellion there was almost
over according to UN and hybrid force leaders. What we have is banditry and
lawlessness. Registration for elections was very impressive in Darfur.
The census was carried out with the highest international standards with UN
help and monitoring. Those who question its outcome should remember that
before it started some politicians have publicly astounded the media by
stating that any result that said southerners were less than 15 million
would be rejected. It came as no surprise that AFTER the declaration of the
results the same leaders expressed doubts.
*Report Executive Summary
*In January 2011, voters in Southern Sudan – one of the least developed and
most war-damaged places in the world – will take a decision with
far-reaching consequences for the peace and development of the whole country
and its nine neighbouring countries, many of them conflict-prone.
The decision will be taken through a referendum that gives Southern voters a
choice between independent statehood and continued unity with the government
in Khartoum. The referendum date is a deadline, marking the end of six years
of transitions that were charted by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
The CPA is a 2005 deal between the Southern-based former rebels of the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the ruling National Congress Party
(NCP) – a coalition of Islamist, commercial and security interests largely
based in the developed core of Sudan, the Northern Nile Valley.
The CPA ended two decades of war between the centre and the South and aimed
to restructure the former’s wealth and power in order to make Sudan a freer
and fairer place. It set up an autonomous government in the South with its
own army, financed from Southern oil revenues which are shared between the
two parties. In the referendum, Southern citizens will pass their own
judgment on these arrangements.
The SPLM is formally committed to the unity of Sudan, but its most senior
leaders are voicing a preference for secession as the referendum deadline
nears, accusing the NCP of delaying investment in development and holding on
to mechanisms of coercion.
The SPLM has focused political energy on securing a procedural lawthatwill
ensure a favourable referendum– and both parties spent nearly all of 2009
deadlocked on the content of that law.
This has stalled progress on complex processes, including the demarcation of
the troubled, populous and oil-rich 2,100 km border, that are needed for the
referendum to take place.
Southern Sudan’s route to self-determination shapes the decisions and
deadlines of the coming year. But it is not the only big question in the
year ahead. The long war that started in the South spread to or inspired
other conflicts in Northern peripheries neglected or abused by Sudan’s
powerful centre.
Darfur and three areas along the troubled and populous border between North
and South Sudan (Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan) all have
referendums or consultations aimed at letting them pass judgment on Sudan’s
unstable political order. And the NCP and SPLM will both face their first
credible electoral test in April 2010. All these processes are supposed to
answer the wider problem of self-determination in Sudan – whether the
Sudanese state represents the interests of all Sudan’s peoples, or only
those of the elites in the powerful rich centre and their clients.
Successive central governments withheld investment from Sudan’s Northern and
Southern peripheries and pushed ordinary people towards antagonistic ethnic
identities when violence was needed to manage the situation. The democratic
processes envisioned by the CPA were supposed to transform these antagonisms
for both North and South, and make the state responsive and accountable. But
both parties have neglected and delayed the engagement with ordinary life
that is required for this transformation. This engagement is needed for
resolution of the conflict in Darfur – which requires a government that
invests in its people, supports reconciliation and ends impunity.
So processes that were intended to help Sudanese people determine their own
future freely now run the risk of perpetuating violence. But they must be
completed in time, because the big deadline of the Southern referendum
cannot be altered without enormous risks. The widespread Southern perception
that the central government has failed to take the opportunity to transform
itself has strengthened the hand of SPLM leaderships favouring secession –
and many of them privately express the opinion that any attempt to postpone
the referendum will be a cause for war.
In order to avoid this risk, and secure their interests, Sudan’s elites are
likely to manage the run-up to the referendum through high-level,
last-minute deals. Such deals are possible: both parties need each other to
maintain oil revenues; the NCP wants the legitimacy that an election and a
peaceful transition could provide; and the SPLM wants the referendum to
happen. But both parties have a history of bad faith and delay in
negotiations. This means that vital and complex questions about what comes
after the referendum are postponed – and extremists on both sides will be
tempted into unilateral measures that could make instability more
widespread.
If Southern Sudan chooses unity in January 2011, its army needs to be
integrated with that of the central government within 90 days – a daunting
task, given that the two armies now confront each other along the length of
the border. If it chooses secession, an independent state will be born as
soon as the vote is announced. But independence is more than secession.
Independence cannot happen without a whole range of agreements on fraught
questions. Assets need to be divided – oil revenues, water, national
infrastructure and other assets.
Nationality needs to be defined. Any new currency will need to come into
circulation at a price that is sensitive to the interests of many different
economic groups. Somaliland and Eritrea are two nearby political entities
that have recently fought wars after secession, in part because these issues
were not addressed.
But these precedents and warnings are not being discussed, as the two elites
turn their backs on their constituencies and the wider regional history in
order to engage in brinkmanship over procedural questions. This poses
challenges for the many international actors who sponsored the CPA and who
still have an important role in supporting Sudanese elites to bring it to a
peaceful conclusion. A new US policy on Sudan, announced in October 2009,
balances the need for an end to violence in Darfur with the need to avert a
violent ending to the CPA.
US engagement is welcome, but the fact that so much of Sudan’s future will
be decided at the highest level may perpetuate the politics of exclusion
into the post-referendum period. US mediation may mean that Sudan is not
seeking to redefine itself through engagement with its peoples or its
neighbours, but is looking to the superpower to set out a solution.
US engagement is not enough – other actors including the United Nations, the
African Union and other regional bodies, Arab and European supporters of the
CPA, and countries with large investments in Sudan should also support Sudan
as it negotiates its big decisions and deadlines.
Regional bodies have a role in promoting local and national dialogue that
will mitigate the exclusionary politics of the moment. The UN has made
enormous investments in peacekeeping and mediation in Sudan: it needs to
show that it can help limit violence, encourage dialogue and protect Sudan’s
long-suffering citizens in the critical year ahead.
*Report Recommendations
*Engagement with people: Sudan’s powerful elites need to reach agreement on
a wide range of complex processes in the coming year. They also need to
start an engagement with the country’s diverse populations, if they are to
avoid perpetuating the politics of exclusion and conflict and help citizens
participate in the big decisions facing the country.
The parties to the peace agreement need to show commitment to public
information about the critical processes of the coming year.
The two parties need to take steps to remove obstacles to the enjoyment of
constitutional rights, including through the repeal of repressive
legislation.
A UN radio station for all Sudan would signal a clear NCP commitment to free
information in the run-up to the elections. The parties need to explain how
processes such as the census and border demarcation will work.
The UN should invest in information dissemination through popular meetings.
The AU Implementation Panel has a role in initiating these meetings, and its
high-level representatives should play an active role in initiating these
meetings. Particular attention should be paid to meetings in areas where
Popular Consultations are due to be held. The international community should
support dialogue in these areas at the highest level.
International engagement: The CPA’s supporters need to work together to
support the final act of the CPA, paying attention to local as well as
national and international dimensions of the peace process.
The US should continue building a coalition of support for a peaceful
transition in the country, and recognize that its support for elite deals
needs to be complemented by local engagement. US engagement is not enough;
it needs to be orchestrated with that of other actors.
The AU’s proposal to support a new Global Political Agreement is based on
the principle of inclusion that this report identifies closely with
sustainable peace in Sudan. There is no peaceful alternative to inclusive
politics in Darfur at the moment. However, the Implementation Panel led by
former president Thabo Mbeki quickly needs to address perceptions that they
are partisan if they are to be accepted by other political actors.
Different mediators – including the UN, AU, IGAD and the US need to
coordinate their work. No prospective mediator in Sudan can afford to create
the impression that parties can go shopping for sympathetic forums.
International mediators should support processes which allow elites and
ordinary people to learn about the experiences of the region; and regional
organizations should convene high-level meetings to support the peace
process. They should seek to learn from the experience of Eritrea and
Somaliland.
Security: Breakdowns in security in Darfur, Kordofan and most states of
Southern Sudan undermine popular engagement in elections, referendums and
other processes. Both parties need to address the urgent need for local
peace in the coming year, and the UN and other international actors should
support them.
In order to build trust between the parties, the UN should investigate
claims that the NCP is supporting violence in Southern Sudan. The UN should
also take steps to support the deployment of accountable security forces in
Southern Sudan.
The UN needs to make clear what protection it can offer civilians in the
case of local or wider breakdowns in Darfur and Southern Sudan, and it
should report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians.
Support for elections and plebiscites: International actors need to provide
adequate support for elections, Popular Consultations and the referendums
while recognizing that these processes will complicate politics in regions
of Sudan that are not at peace.
Delays in reaching political agreements and adopting laws on referendums and
Popular Consultations will put impossible pressures on electoral
bureaucracies in the coming twelve months. Donors should commit now to
mitigating those pressures with their resources.
Donors and regional organizations should provide unstinting support for
monitoring and reporting on the elections and other plebiscites at every
stage of preparation. This means a significant increase incurrent
commitments. Post-referendum arrangements: In the event of Southern
secession, the two parties to the CPA need to reach deals on security
arrangements, oil revenues, water, assets and liabilities, currency,
nationality and a host of other issues. In the event of unity, some of these
issues may need review. Primary responsibility for these processes lies with
the two parties. But both CPA supporters and foreign investors need to work
together to limit the possibility of failure:
CPA supporters, neighbouring countries and countries with major investments
in Sudan need to support stable and durable arrangements, and avoid seeking
their short-term interests from what will be a heated series of discussions.
CPA supporters should work to include political parties and social movements
from all areas of Sudan in discussions on post-referendum arrangements
Sudan’s two governing parties need to find means to include groups that have
been so far excluded from the politics of the centre. A constitutional
convention scheduled immediately after the referendum is one way to achieve
this. International actors should help Sudanese actors – particularly
opposition groups – to come up with their own proposals.
*Global Arab Network
*
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