From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Thu Feb 04 2010 - 09:53:15 EST
The Balance of Power in Somalia's Central Regions [Intelligence Update #3]
Feb 4, 2010 - 2:18:37 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
>From mid-January into early February, the balance of power in the conflict
in Somalia's central regions, specifically Hiiraan and Galgadud, shifted
slightly in favor of the armed opposition to Somalia's internationally
recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and its allies of
convenience, and against the latter.
The major event was the January 22 recapture of the strategically located
capital of Hiiraan, Beledweyne, which is close to Somalia's border with
Ethiopia and sits astride key transportation routes, by the armed opposition
composed of the nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam (H.I.) and the
transnationalist revolutionary Islamist Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen
(H.S.M.). Given its strategic importance, Beledweyne has been continuously
contested in recent months by the parties to the conflict, and has changed
hands several times. Its current occupation by H.I. and H.S.M. does not
spell an end to the armed conflict; H.I. and HS.M. have not eliminated their
rivals, but they have gained an edge for the time being.
At present, the conflict in the central regions is the major determinant of
the direction that the struggle over control of Somalia's southern and
central regions, including the country's capital Mogadishu, will take in the
near future. The conflict in the central regions involves all the major
players in the more general struggle, except for the African Union
peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), which is confined to protecting the small
enclave of Mogadishu that houses the T.F.G. All the other players are
actively engaged - the rivalry over control of Hiiraan and Galgadud is where
the action is.
The parties to the conflict in the central regions are H.I. and H.S.M. on
one side, and local coalitions of clans opposed to the armed Islamists,
regional T.F.G. politicians, ex-warlords, and local politicians - all of
which are gathered loosely under the Sufi organization, Ahlu Sunna
Wal-Jama'a (A.S.W.J.), which embraced a traditionalist Islamist political
ideology after H.S.M desecrated Sufi graves and shrines, and assassinated
several Sufi clerics - on the other side.
Both sides are uneasy alliances of convenience. The protagonist is H.S.M.,
which as reported by this writer in Garoweonline, is pursuing a strategy of
encircling the T.F.G. and AMISOM in Mogadishu prior to moving against them
in the capital. Having achieved dominance in the southern regions, H.S.M. is
now making its move in the central regions, collaborating tactically with
the weaker H.I., which had been the dominant Islamist faction in Hiiraan.
The alliance of anti-H.S.M. forces is the antagonist, defending against the
implementation of the encirclement strategy.
The source who had provided this writer with intelligence on H.S.M.'s
encirclement strategy has offered new information about and analysis of the
present status of the conflict in the central regions. The following
assessment will weave together the source's new intelligence with data
gathered from daily monitoring of open sources.
Assessment of Forces
The recapture of Beledweyne on January 22 by H.I. and H.S.M. confirms the
source's previous analysis that H.I. would have to rely on H.S.M. in its
offensive, and that H.S.M. would use the opportunity to gain a foothold in
the strategic town as a prelude to dominating H.I. in Hiiraan.
January 14 found Beledweyne split between the rivals, with the A.S.W.J.
alliance holding the town's east side and H.I. holding its west side, and
fighting reported at the Liq-Liqato bridge that links east and west. On
January 19, IRIN reported that fighting had entered its tenth day, with
heavy shelling in Beledweyne's central district, and quoted a traditional
elder as saying that mediation efforts had failed because neither side was
willing to "negotiate about its religious beliefs."
On January 20, the situation altered when Ethiopian troops with heavy
weapons were reported to have moved into Beledweyne and H.I. withdrew from
the town in order to reorganize. H.I.'s head of information, Ma'alin Hashi,
announced that Western spies had infiltrated H.I. and that troops controlled
the by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of
Investigation were "fighting alongside" H.I. forces. Then, in a sharp
reversal, on January 22, H.I., fortified by H.S.M. forces, attacked A.S.W.J.
positions around Beledweyne and took the town. Local media reported
"hundreds" of H.S.M. fighters in the town, patrolling the streets in
"armored vehicles." On January 23, fighting was reported to have ended.
On January 25, H.I.'s administration in Beledweyne met with traditional
elders and assured them that H.I. would not "cause problems" for the town's
residents or "victimize" those who had worked with A.S.W.J., but that it
would, against the wishes of the elders, continue its campaign against
A.S.W.J. On January 26, H.I. and H.S.M. attacked A.S.W.J. bases in El-gal,
to the north of Beledweyne, and took control of them. Garoweonline reported
that A.S.W.J. mounted a counter-attack, which proved to be unsuccessful.
Hashi announced tellingly that H.S.M. and H.I. were in control of El-gal. On
January 27, there were reports of continued fighting around El-gal, as H.I.
officials met with elders, scholars and residents of Beledweyne to gain
their cooperation. Since January 27, monitoring has found no reports of
further clashes.
How were H.I. and H.S.M. able to retake Beledweyne so swiftly after the
reported incursion of Ethiopian forces and Hashi's announcement of
subversive elements in H.I.'s ranks? The source reports that A.S.W.J.
explains its defeat by a move on the part of officials in the T.F.G. from
the Hawadle clan to split A.S.W.J. by paying Hawadle militias not to engage
in fighting. Those officials were also reported to have departed from
Hiiraan on the day that it was retaken by H.I. and H.S.M. If this is true,
then it reflects the underlying tensions in the anti-H.S.M alliance of
convenience. The T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmed, has determined
that A.S.W.J. is his rival rather than permanent ally and does not want to
strengthen A.S.W.J. The source reasons that Sh.Sharif would prefer that the
situation in Hiiraan remain undecided to give him "breathing space."
As for the failure of Ethiopia to protect A.S.W.J., which it supports
materially, the source reasons that Addis Ababa is likely to be following a
strategy of letting the conflict in Hiiraan intensify to the point at which
the Western powers, led by Washington, will feel sufficiently threatened by
an H.S.M takeover that they will give the green light for Ethiopia to
intervene militarily "without restritions." The source concludes that only
Ethiopian intervention can turn the situation around for the fractured
A.S.W.J. alliance.
With Beledweyne's east side demographically dominated by the Hawadle and its
west side the by the Galja'el clan, the situation remains problematic. H.I.
has found its base of support in the Galja'el, as has H.S.M. in the town of
Buloburde, and has sometimes had tense relations with the Hawadle, some of
whose leaders have close ties with Sh.Sharif's faction in the divided T.F.G.
The Hawadle have been divided in their support of the contending factions,
with shifts in sentiment often following the fortunes of the various
factions on the ground. On February 2, traditional elders from Hiiraan met
in Mogadishu. The chair of the Council of Elders for the Galja'el clan,
Muhammad Kulmiye Meyle said that "foreign countries together with the
Transitional Federal Government" were responsible for the recent fighting in
Beledweyne.
On February 1, there were reports that low-flying aircraft were spotted over
Beldweyne that were probably on Ethiopian reconnaissance missions.
In Galgadud, which also borders Ethiopia on the west but is less accessible
than Hiiraan, and where the conflict is between the A.S.W.J. alliance, which
has controlled most of the major towns, and H.S.M., which has some
strongholds, the situation tightened through January.
On January 15, A.S.W.J. renewed its offensive against H.S.M. in the villages
of Wabho and Warhole, which are gateways to El-bur, where H.S.M. has its
major base in Galgadud, and announced that it had gained control. In the
succeeding ten days, H.S.M. gathered reinforcements and, on January 25,
attempted to consolidate its control over El-bur by forming an
administration there that gained the support of traditional elders; the
sultan of El-bur urged residents to cooperate with H.S.M. despite A.S.W.J.'s
protests.
A.S.W.J. responded by imposing curfews in the town of Guri-el, where it was
in the process of forming its own administration for the central regions,
and in Galgadud's capital, Dhusamareb. On January 26, A.S.W.J. announced
that it had killed two people who were caught planting a bomb on the
outskirts of Dhusamareb.
On January 27, fighting began again in Warhole, with some local media
claiming that H.S.M. had attacked A.S.W.J. positions and others that
A.S.W.J. had initiated the hostilities; both sides claimed victory. On
January 28, H.S.M. spokesman Sh. Ali Dhere, announced that H.S.M. had seized
a boat loaded with munitions for A.S.W.J. off the coastal El-der district,
indicating H.S.M. intelligence capabilities. Fighting spread to El-der when
H.S.M. attacked A.S.W.J. in the village of Ausweyne.
On January 30, the competition to establish administrations in Galgadud
continued, with A.S.W.J. completing its process of forming a government by
electing Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow as its chief executive in Guri-el. Hefow
announced: "We will continue fighting al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in all the
Somali regions and there is no conflict between us and the government
[T.F.G.]." On January 31, H.S.M. formed an administration in El-garas.
On January 30, AllPuntland reported that A.S.W.J. and militia leaders and
politicians associated with the T.F.G. were holding talks on plans to open
an offensive against H.S.M. A.S.W.J. was reported to have appealed to
Puntland and the semi-autonomous Galmudug administration in the central
Mudug region, both of which border Galgadud, to lend their support to action
against H.S.M., since both would be threatened by an H.S.M. takeover of
Galgadud. Meanwhile, H.I. and H.S.M. were reported to be holding talks on
resisting Ethiopian incursions.
With both sides appearing to be girding for a confrontation in Galgadud and
attempting to consolidate their positions, the source reports that A.S.W.J.
is losing morale, due to the loss of a key commander who was killed in a
"feigned retreat" from Beledweyne and who had earlier led in a recapture of
Dhusamareb from H.S.M. by A.S.W.J. The source expects an Ethiopian
intervention only if H.S.M. threatens Galkayo, the strategic capital of the
Mudug region that is divided between the Galmudug and Puntland
administrations.
Conclusion
A synthesis of the closed source's intelligence and data from open-source
monitoring indicates that momentum remains with H.S.M., which has succeeded
in becoming an essential tactical ally of H.I. in Hiiraan and has gained a
foothold in Beledweyne; and has maintained and consolidated its position in
Galgadud, where A.S.W.J. is still dominant, but is showing signs of
vulnerability. The central regions are actively contested and are currently
the testing grounds of southern and central Somalia's conflicts. That
situation could change if threats of major offensives by the T.F.G. in
Mogadishu and by the A.S.W.J. alliance in the southern regions materialize;
and/or if Ethiopia takes decisive action. If the anti-H.S.M. coalition
cannot or will not mount major military action, H.S.M. is like to continue
to increase its dominance over H.I. and to persist in implementing its
encirclement strategy, meeting with incremental success.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
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