From: Biniam Tekle (biniamt@dehai.org)
Date: Wed Mar 17 2010 - 07:33:07 EST
NOTE: The complete UN report can be found at:
http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp217208.pdf
***************************************************************
"The Somalia Monitoring Group reports became the most authoritative
documents on Somalia since the US successfully lobbied for Matt Bryden, the
renowned regional expert and former director of the International Crisis
Group’s Horn of Africa project in Nairobi, to become the group’s new
coordinator in 2008"
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=113820
17 Mar 2010
Eritrea Recalibrates Somalia Policy
A new UN monitoring report gives fresh and detailed evidence of Eritrea’s
support for Somali armed opposition groups. Eritrea says its intentions are
misunderstood, but the country has found itself on a dead-end road and is
now forced to recalibrate its policy, Georg-Sebastian Holzer writes for ISN
Security Watch.
By Georg-Sebastian Holzer for ISN Security Watch
------------------------------
>From Eritrea’s point of view, it might all look like a huge
misunderstanding. Asmara considers its political, financial and military
support for armed opposition groups in Somalia as a legitimate
counterbalance to its archenemy, Ethiopia, which invaded Somalia in late
2006 with the consent and active help of the US, thereby shifting the
balance of power in the region.
Subsequently, Ethiopia found itself entangled in a counterinsurgency it
proved incapable of winning and has since backed the second Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu, which in the meantime also appears
doomed to fail, having lost all its political capital and being unable to
expand its control beyond the immediate surroundings of the presidential
palace in the capital.
Eritrea might also consider its actions as justifiable at a time when an
increasing number of regional and western experts are saying that the war on
terror in Somalia was a self-fulfilling prophecy and the current exclusive
assistance to and backing of the TFG might not be the winning formula to
solve or even contain the civil war.
But that is not how the international public, at large, sees things in terms
of Eritrea’s contribution to the ongoing insurgency. Eritrea has failed to
grasp that a different consensus on the conflict in Somalia has emerged in
the wider region, not least with respect to its role in the conflict. But as
often the case, totalitarian political systems find it hard to adapt to new
developments or to communicate their own views and interests.
In fact, Eritrea made headlines last year as the world’s second most
militarized country after North Korea. Moreover, it was given last place in
the World Press Freedom Index and was said to have created one of the
highest numbers of refugees of any country in the world not at war with its
population of 5 million. The thousands fleeing the country were simply
"going for a picnic" as President Isaias Afewerki explained in a
*Reuters*interview in October.
*Caught off guard*
Afewerki, Eritrea’s president since 1993 and leader of the independence
movement, was subsequently caught off guard when the African Union (AU), in
an unprecedented step, asked the UN Security Council to sanction the
country, an AU member, late last year. This incident could not solely be
attributed to Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Union.
In December, the UNSC imposed limited sanctions on arms sales to Eritrea and
laid the groundwork for sanctions against some of its officials by expanding
the mandate of the Somalia Monitoring Group to Eritrea in order to get a
clearer picture of Asmara’s involvement in Somalia.
On 5 March, *Africa Confidential* cited diplomatic sources as saying that
the Somalia Monitoring Group had already recommended in mid-2009 that
Eritrea’s intelligence chief Colonel Te’ame Goitom, Public Information
Minister Ali Abdu Ahmed and the head of political affairs for the ruling
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice Yemane Gebreab be designated for
sanctions.
The Somalia Monitoring Group reports became the most authoritative documents
on Somalia since the US successfully lobbied for Matt Bryden, the renowned
regional expert and former director of the International Crisis Group’s Horn
of Africa project in Nairobi, to become the group’s new coordinator in 2008.
Recent death threats against the five-member monitoring group investigating
the links between Somali businessmen and armed opposition groups are an
indicator of their in-depth work.
*Substantiated allegations*
According to the most recent report by the Somalia Monitoring Group
discussed on 16 March at the UNSC, “the Government of Eritrea has continued
to provide political, diplomatic, financial and - allegedly - military
assistance to armed opposition groups in Somalia during the course of the
mandate.”
The report describes in detail Asmara’s already well-known role in hosting
the senior leadership of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Asmara
(ARS)/ARS-Asmara, between November 2007 and April 2009. It details how
Asmara facilitated the formation of a new opposition alliance, Hizbul Islam,
headed by Hassan Dahir Aweys.
In addition, it describes how Eritrea’s government facilitated the return of
Aweys to Mogadishu on 23 April 2009, including an obscure chartered airline
story, to assume the leadership of Hizbul Islam and prepare for the
movement’s joint al-Shabaab offensive of May 2009.
Asmara’s support included all major armed opposition groups from ARS Asmara,
Hizbul Islam to al-Shabaab. The report points out that in addition to
military and diplomatic support, Eritrea has consistently provided financial
support to the armed groups, with monthly payments to each group in the
order of $40,000-$50,000, plus additional funds for large-scale operations.
“Provision of cash permits armed opposition groups to purchase weapons from
government forces, thereby arming themselves while disarming their
adversaries,” the report stated.
The report points out four high-ranking opposition figures who received such
cash contributions during the course of 2009 to show the widespread reach of
Asmara’s support for armed opposition groups in Somalia. They include Yusuf
Mohamed Siyaad ‘Indha’adde’ (ARS-Asmara, central regions, subsequently
joined the TFG as defense minister); Issa ‘Kaambooni’ (Raas Kaambooni
forces, Lower Juba region, arrested in Kenya late in 2009); Mukhtar Roobow
(al-Shabaab, Bay and Bakool regions); and Mohamed Wali Sheikh Ahmed Nuur
(Hizbul Islam, Gedo region).
“Eritrea continues to send arms to Somalia in small vessels via the northern
Somali port of Laasqoray for onward shipment to Shabaab forces in southern
Somalia,” according to their sources. “In May 2009, Eritrea allegedly sent
Ukrainian-made small arms and anti-tank weapons to Hizbul Islam via the port
of Kismaayo.”
In addition, Eritrea also maintains training camps for Somalia’s armed
opposition groups near Assab in eastern Eritrea as well as near Teseney to
the west, at times even deploying trainers and/or military advisers inside
Somalia to assist armed opposition groups.
*Successful international pressure?*
Eritrea’s line of defense is to strictly reject all allegations and demand
hard evidence. While some analysts fear that the current sanctions might
further alienate Afewerki and exacerbate his sense of isolation, Asmara is
already recalibrating its policy towards Somalia despite the rhetoric
distractions.
According to the Monitoring Group describes, "by late 2009, possibly in
response to international pressure, the scale and nature of Eritrean support
had either diminished or become less visible, but had not altogether
ceased."
Another explanation might yet be as persuasive: Eritrea’s links to all major
Somalia armed opposition groups have become an increasing liability to the
country’s interest.
A good example is the senior al-Shabaab official Sheikh Mukhtar Robow
publicly declaring to send fighters to Yemen to help al-Qaida there in its
fight against foreign forces at the end of last year. Even though this was
only a propaganda move, it endangered Eritrea’s relations with Yemen’s
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which is why Afewerki was quick in criticizing
and distancing himself from al-Shabaab’s move.
In addition, al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam are not only split by clan and
sub-clan divisions, but persistently fight over strategic installations such
as the port of Kismayo, from which revenues are an important income for
Somalia’s war economy. In an environment in which ideology and alliances
come second to money, Asmara realized it could quickly find itself caught
between two forces in trying to support the major armed opposition groups in
the country.
As Eritrea has no genuine political interests in Somalia but sees it as a
mere battle ground to counterbalance Ethiopia and engage in a proxy war on
Somali soil, it finds it easier than Ethiopia to recalibrate its policy.
Hence, Asmara down-scaled its support and shifted it to Hizbul Islam, in
which it sees an ideologically less radical actor with whom it might be
easier to deal.
In the end, Asmara would like to have its stake in a potential political
settlement in Mogadishu, whatever that might look like. Taking into
consideration Asmara’s past inability to communicate with regional and
international actors in Somalia, this might well remain wishful thinking.
------------------------------
Georg-Sebastian Holzer is an analyst and free-lance journalist. He focuses
in particular on conflict dynamics in the wider Horn of Africa.
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