From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Thu Apr 15 2010 - 09:04:24 EDT
Ethiopia: At a Decisive Stage Between Its People and the TPLF
15/04/2010
Notice: Part I&II were posted in Dehai-News on the 11th of April 2010.
Part III
In the previous part it is not that, in 1976, the EPLF leadership invited
both EPRP and TPLF to a meeting to propose a means on how to settle their
quarrels. The EPLF also recommended that they plan realistic objectives and
work together towards their goal. Due to their different views, however,
they failed to accept the plea. Especially the TPLF was expecting that the
EPLF would change its stand and align with it skidding from its principled
conviction. Hence, the TPLF was not happy with the balanced and unbiased
view of the EPLF. The leadership of the TPLF which was not pleased by the
impartial statement of the EPLF opted to abandon the EPLF which had nurtured
it from the cradle.
However things were not as they were supposed to be for the TPLF leadership.
Those which it befriended without much confi dence never extended the
desired assistance.
Besides the TPLF began armed confrontation with EDU and in November 1977 by
changing its countenance it approached the EPLF and once again expressed its
desire to renew its relationship and work together. It also requested a
meeting to be conducted.
Even though the EPLF already knew that the TPLF is such a masquerader, it
readily accepted the invitation. And in the meeting, the EPLF not only
strongly reprimanded the TPLF leadership but also strongly advised it to
make constructive amendment in its plan and pursue a clear agenda with
regards to the request of the people of Tigray as well as on the issue of
unity of the people of Ethiopia. And the EPLF promised unreserved assistance
if the TPLF reforms its strategy and work by charting a realistic objective
and action program. It accepted the plea and the relationship between the
two organizations became normal once again. Moreover an agreement was
reached to continue the assistance between both of them.
Based on this understanding, the EPLF, in order to boost the military
capability of the TPLF delivered sizeable amount of weapons and ammunitions.
It also trained a number of mTPLF fi ghters on operating heavy artillery,
de-mining and other military activities.
The TPLF also secured a base in Mai-Idaga i.e. on Eritrean territories. A
road corridor that would enable it pass to Sudan was also made accessible.
Besides to upgrade the military capability of the TPLF joint offensives were
waged against the enemy in Serona and other places of Tigray. In those
times, the health service of the TPLF was below standard. For that reason,
adequate health assistance was provided to war-injured TPLF fighters in the
health centers of the EPLF. Consequently, this assistance enabled the TPLF
to buoy up from its opponents and other competing militant forces.
The TPLF waged armed confrontation with EDU at the end of 1977, and in March
1978 with EPRP. And it not only managed to survive in that armed confl ict,
but also it won the fi ght and marched out victorious. And this enabled it
to be master of the battlefi elds of Tigray. And this for no other reason
but for the mere fact that it had a reliable supporter behind.
When it was conducting its fi rst congress back in 1979, encouraged by this
victory, the leadership of the TPLF expressed its desire to augment its
military power so as to strengthen its offensive against the Derg regime.
Declaring that its relationship with the EPLF is based on principle, the
TPLF expressed its desire to further strengthen the bilateral alliance. And
once again it said it is requiring more assistance from its ally. Based on
this, the EPLF again extended to it considerable amount of weaponry,
ammunition, health kits and other essential equipment. Besides, beginning in
April, 1979 the EPLF allowed the TPLF leadership to transmit its radio
programs via the “The Voice of the Broad Masses” in Tigrinya and Amharic
languages. It was known as the “The Voice of Weyane Tigray”, whose broadcast
was aimed at the people of Tigray and Ethiopia respectively. Ironically, it
later scolded the EPLF using the very dissemination tool it secured in
assistance, while still in the liberated area of Eritrea.
Realizing that the Tigrayan people had endured innumerable atrocities at the
hands of successive Ethiopian rulers and considering their historical ties
with the Eritrean people the EPLF had always been supportive of the Tigray
people’s just cause despite the TPLF’s ambiguous outlook and wavering
stance. Just looking at the EPLF records of 1981, we can detect that the
TPLF had received 1,750 different types of guns, 55 machine guns, four 8m.m.
mortars, two B-10s, 5,000 grenades, over half a million of ammunitions, one
x-ray machine and many other medical equipments from the EPLF. This being
just one example of the assistances given before and after 1981, the TPLF
was always given the armaments captured in joint military operations.
Besides these military and other assistances, the EPLF also tirelessly and
continuously provided the TPLF with political advice to amend its deceptive
and sinister ways, set a clear objective as regards the Tigrayan question
and Ethiopian unity as a whole, and strive to lead the Tigrayan people’s
struggle with integrity and perception. This is a historical truth that the
TPLF would not dare deny. However, even then, whilst receiving genuine
support from the EPLF, the TPLF’s hidden agenda had at intervals bubbled to
the surface despite their efforts to seem as if they have reformed their
political outlook and approach.
In October 1981, in a meeting held in Khartoum between the leaders of both
the EPLF and the TPLF, the latter had raised a drawn out argument that the
chances were very slim for the Tigrayan people’s question to fi nd a
suitable answer within a united Ethiopia. Records from the meeting also
indicate that the clique, no doubt in an effort to present itself as
experienced and knowledgeable, had tried out its hand in giving the EPLF a
lecture as regards to military operation strategies. In the course of the
Khartoum meeting, the EPLF leadership was able to realize that the TPLF’s
untried and rash attitude was still in place. Still, the EPLF chose to
continue its support to this organization in the hope that with time its
leaders might become aware of their unrealistic philosophy and develop some
sense. The EPLF had continued its support to the TPLF simply because it fi
rmly believed that the question of the Tigrayan people was just and
legitimate, even if they had such reckless and narrow-minded leaders.
Part IV
As a matter of fact, the relations were not always smooth. Indeed, the TPLF
leadership was making senseless moves that emanated from lack of experience
and naïve features. During the October 1981 leadership meeting of both the
TPLF and EPLF held in Khartoum, the TPLF leaders had presented
incomprehensible points saying, “We have a lot of differences with the EPLF
in our points of view”. However, the EPLF leadership was keen and sensible
that it responded to the TPLF, “We have viable revolutionary grounds to go
along with our struggle, besides our mutual benefi ts are far stronger than
our difference”.
This endorsed the mutual military cooperation and provided added impetus to
the struggle of both peoples. As a result, Eritrean freedom fi ghters fought
by the side of the TPLF in Tigrayan soil in 1982, and so did the TPLF fi
ghters by standing on the side of the EPLF force in some military operations
in the Sahel trenches. Hence, like all the martyrs, glory and respect goes
to the TPLF martyred fi ghters in Eritrea and also to the fallen Eritrean
heroes and heroines who laid down their lives in the Tigray battlefi elds!
Such cooperation and joint operations had indeed not only created favorable
grounds for both Eritrean and Tigrayan fighters but also induced great hope
to both peoples. Leaders of the Weyane were, however restless by the bond
created among fighters of both the EPLF and that of Tigray. Accordingly, the
Weyane leaders wedged continued watch through its cadres upon its fighters
to make sure they don’t establish close ties with the Eritrean revolutionary
fighters.
Dismayed by the strengthened ties between fi ghters of both sides, the
Weyane leaders, following their second party congress in 1983, gathered
their forces under the pretext of “Army reinforcement” and had stopped its
forces from fighting any military operation against the Derg regime inside
Eritrea. Indeed, it is plain and clear that the Weyane came up with that
diabolic hope that the EPLF would be weakened in fighting the Derg regime
all on its own. Hence, considering the fact that the EPLF foiling and
deteriorating continuous enemy operations with the TPLF leadership
refraining from any military move would jeopardize the then growing
revolutionary ties of both peoples, another round of meeting between leaders
of both the EPLF and the TPLF was arranged in June and July of 1983 in
Khartoum.
Yet again, the TPLF leaders raised a copy of excuses that include, “We have
a lot of misunderstanding and differences with the EPLF”. Some of the then
presented complaints alleged, “The EPLF does not have a clear policy as
regards the right to self-determination of suppressed peoples, the EPLF not
supporting independence of Tigray from Ethiopia would not let us work in
harmony, military strategy of the EPLF is wrong, the EPLF does not have a
clear stand concerning international and regional issues, they didn’t even
condemn the Communist Soviet Union…” and more other issues.
The point raised as regards the right to self-determination of peoples was
indeed a verym critical juncture that highlighted the double-crossing point
of view of the Weyane. The EPLF leadership has to this end underlined that
the question of the people of Tigray was just and legitimate and that it
should be solved within the realm of the unity and integrity of Ethiopia. As
for the rest of the drawn out arguments, the EPLF leadership performed the
best of its acumen to proudly end the hours of argument by announcing that
such reckless issues would not subdue the mutual mission of both peoples
against a common enemy, and gave the TPLF leaders an insight to keep up
their fi ght against the tyrant and thus herald the just struggle of the
Tigrayan people. Ironically, the Weyane leaders were not yet satisfi ed
because the EPLFleadership would not change its stand regarding the question
of the Tigrayan people and the issue of Ethiopia’s unity.
Even after the Khartoum meetings, the Weyane launched a large-scale
blackmail offensive against the EPLF among the Tigrayan masses and fi ghters
as a refl ection of their dissatisfaction. Claiming to “cleanse them from
the socio-imperialist culture and mind set they were infl uenced with by the
EPLF”, the TPLF began a campaign of brainwashing the military units that
were deployed in Eritrea. Some of the unusual stories that the then Weyane
fighters can still remember is the decision taken to severely punish and put
into rehabilitation a battalion claimed to “have become extremely
contaminated with EPLF politics”.
TPLF leaders at that point in time released the manifesto that was
originally issued in 1976 and quickly pulled it away from circulation, and
began openly campaigning with it involving fi ghters and the population.
Also claiming that “our land on the south starts from the Alowha valley,
comprising of Tselemti and Welkait on the west and the districts of Badme
and Tsorona, which are in Eritrea, belong to us. And we also have a sea gate
through Bada”.
The TPLF hopped to start a practical offensive against the EPLF on the
ground by launching alluring campaigns among the Tigrayan masses.
Nonetheless, the EPLF overlooked those plots by underlining the fact that
colonial boundaries are plain and clear so as not to comply with the
unremitting campaigns the TPLF leadership was engaged on.
On top of their engagement in such diabolic efforts to get the EPLF into
undesired arguments and confl icts, the Weyane also abused the genuine
permission of using Dimtsi Hafash airwaves to enlighten and upraise their
people, and geared their propaganda against the EPLF. Indeed, the peoples
and revolutionary fi ghters of Eritrea and Tigray found it ironic to see the
shameless TPLF leaders propagating reckless defamatory statements targeted
against the EPLF through the airwave granted to them out of the goodwill of
the EPLF. Yet, because the people and fi ghters of Tigray were well aware of
the situation on the ground, the EPLF leadership did not bother to respond
to these baseless and insane propaganda attempts. Disappointed of its own
self, the TPLF leaders were eventually compelled to pull out from the Dimtsi
Hafash out of their own accord and cut off their connections with the EPLF.
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