From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Thu May 06 2010 - 11:32:44 EDT
Somalia: A Revision of the International Crisis Group's Strategy Position
6 May, 2010 - 6:13:13 AM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Acknowledging a severe crisis in Somalia's political organization, Rashid
Abdi and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, analysts for the International Crisis Group
(I.C.G.), have published a strategic analysis on May 3 as a column in The
East African ("
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/910688/-/item/1/-/3n9m96/-/inde
x.html> It's not too late to rescue Somali Islamists from the jihadis who
have hijacked them").
The following analysis will be a revision of Abdi's and Hogendoorn's that
builds on its sound foundation by trying to improve its accuracy.
I.C.G. Position
Reflecting the position of the I.C.G. as a globalist think tank representing
the interests of transnational capitalism and the coalition of great powers
that mediate it politically, Abdi and Hogendoorn frame their analysis as a
warning that immediate action is necessary to prevent a possible takeover of
southern and central Somalia by the transnationalist revolutionary Islamist
movement, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.). Their thesis is that
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) could be made capable of
defeating H.S.M.
To say that the I.C.G. represents an interest and has chosen sides in
Somalia's conflicts - some alternative to H.S.M. - is not meant as a
criticism of Abdi and Hongendoorn. It is possible for a polemic to be
informed by an objective reading of the power configuration and an impartial
judgment on the relative effectiveness of strategies in the light of the
power configuration.
Abdi and Hogendoorn begin by admitting that it is "easy to be pessimistic
about Somalia," yet move to the position that the T.F.G. "can still effect
change if it can learn from its mistakes."
Those mistakes are major. Firstly, the T.F.G. has "no reconciliation
strategy" and has not compiled a list of interlocutors and mediators;
therefore, forces within the T.F.G. opposed to reconciliation with groups
outside and opposed to the T.F.G. have gained a foothold. Secondly, the
T.F.G. has not taken advantage of splits within the components of the armed
Islamist opposition and has, indeed, turned down peace feelers. Thirdly, the
T.F.G.'s incorporation deal with the Sufi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama'a (A.S.W.J.)
movement is in jeopardy because of efforts by powerful officials in the
T.F.G. to sabotage it.
Abdi's and Hogendoorn's description of the political weakness of the T.F.G.
is accurate and provides the basis for revising their analysis. It is when
they turn to advocating strategy and tactics that their analysis shows
flaws.
Arguing that the T.F.G. needs to be "more transitional and more federal,"
Abdi and Hogendoorn state that the divided A.S.W.J. "remains the most
effective bulwark against the advance of Al-Shabaab," and warn that unless
the T.F.G. consummates its deal with A.S.W.J., it risks losing the backing
of the international donors on which it depends for its existence. That,
however, will not be sufficient to save the T.F.G. Abdi and Hogendoorn
believe that the T.F.G. must also cultivate factions in H.S.M. that oppose
the latter's transnational program. Arguing that H.S.M. is deeply fragmented
and that foreign revolutionaries and their allies in the top echelons of
H.S.M. have "hijacked" the movement, thereby disaffecting its lower ranks,
Abdi and Hogendoorn prescribe that the T.F.G. "should reach out to these
disenchanted jihadis."
How is this scenario to be actualized? The formation of a "grand coalition"
out of the T.F.G. would be "the supreme act of collective sacrifice demanded
of Somali patriots of all stripes and ideological persuasions."
Revised Position
The I.C.G.'s position represents the possible limit point of Western
strategy, led by Washington, towards Somalia since the 2006 Islamic Courts
revolution. Most generally, that strategy has been to isolate and eventually
eliminate Islamist opposition to the T.F.G. The first moment of this
strategy was to refuse to negotiate with the Courts. Then, when the Courts
threatened to eliminate the T.F.G., Washington condoned and assisted
Ethiopia's invasion and occupation of southern and central Somalia, which
led to an Islamist insurgency that succeeded in causing an Ethiopian
withdrawal, making a change in Western strategy necessary. The result was
the Djibouti agreement, in which the size of the T.F.G. was doubled to
accommodate the conciliatory wing of the Courts; the aim was no longer to
prevent Somalia from having an Islamic political formula, but to isolate
anti-Western Islamists. The expanded T.F.G. has, however, proven unable to
gain traction, and the Islamist opposition has gained control over most of
southern and central Somalia, isolating the T.F.G. in an enclave of
Somalia's capital Mogadishu where it is protected by the armor of an African
Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM). Now, with the T.F.G.'s situation more
precarious than ever, Abdi and Hogendoorn want the West of fall back yet
another step, to the last line of defense, by pressuring the T.F.G. to
somehow engineer a "grand coalition" to isolate only the transnational
revolutionary Islamists in H.S.M.
The flaw in Abdi's and Hogendoorn's analysis is that the actors on which the
success of their strategy depends are too divided within themselves and
between each other to effect a "grand coalition" against the transnational
Islamist forces.
Abdi and Hogendoorn are correct that the T.F.G., A.S.W.J., and H.S.M. are
all factionalized, and have conflicting interests. At present, the T.F.G.
has been rendered politically ineffective by a dispute over office holding
at the highest levels, which directly bears on its ability to incorporate
A.S.W.J. (unlike the Djibouti agreement, the deal to incorporate A.S.W.J.
means that some current officeholders in the T.F.G. will have to sacrifice
their positions - and they are reluctant to do so). Whether or not this
dispute is resolved (Abdi and Hogendoorn do not even mention it), the
conflicting interests that have generated it will remain. A.S.W.J. has split
over the incorporation agreement, with even the faction backing it
withdrawing from negotiations with the T.F.G. after the latter failed to
proceed with the agreement's implementation. Meanwhile the fragmentation of
H.S.M. has not led to open breaks, leaving H.S.M. able to continue military
pressure on the T.F.G. and A.S.W.J., and maintain control of the territory
it holds. No faction in the T.F.G. wants to share power with A.S.W.J., which
has its own agenda for dominance in Somalia; the incorporation deal is
another imposition of the donor powers and their regional "partners,"
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the African Union. A.S.W.J. is in direct
conflict with H.S.M. on a religious plane, with both sides committed to
eliminating the other. With its strong position on the ground, H.S.M. has no
interest in dealing with the T.F.G., and the donor powers are at the least
ambivalent about having the T.F.G. put out feelers to disaffected members of
H.S.M. The T.F.G., already faced with difficulties in incorporating
A.S.W.J., cannot think of incorporating elements of H.S.M. In addition, Abdi
and Hogendoorn fail to mention the warlords and clan militias ranged under
the A.S.W.J. banner, and the anti-Western nationalist-Islamist group Hizbul
Islam (H.I.), which is itself split and sometimes works in tandem with
H.S.M. and in other cases is in conflict with it. Add Ethiopia, which would
oppose a "grand coalition," given its strategy of divide and rule in
Somalia, and one gets a still incomplete indication of the obstacle in the
way of Abdi's and Hogendoorn's strategy - a proliferation of conflicting
interests. Even if all the actors but H.S.M's transnationalist faction have
an interest in preventing a transnationalist Islamist takeover of Somalia,
they also have other interests that, at present, prevent them from forming a
united front.
That Abdi and Hogendoorn are aware of the dense conjuncture of conflicting
interests is indicated by their admission that "a supreme act of collective
sacrifice" is required of the actors if they are to form a "grand coalition"
against transnational revolutionary Islamism through a "more transitional
and more federal" T.F.G. In that conclusion they are correct, but what is
the probability that such a "supreme act" will be performed?
The formula that Abdi and Hogendoorn present is entirely based on a shared
interest of Somali actors in opposing transnationalism in H.S.M, which, of
course, is their own hardcore globalist/transnationalist interest. They have
no positive interest to offer to motivate sacrifice, because a positive
interest would have to unite Somali actors against both forms of
transnationalism in the name of self-determination. The probability of an
interest in self-determination gaining traction is also very low, but it is
a genuine possibility, whereas asking Somali leaders to make a supreme
sacrifice for Abdi's and Hogendoorn's interpretation of Western interests is
beyond the pale of reason. The threat that the "donors" will pull the plug
on the T.F.G. is real, but it is unlikely to be sufficient to overcome the
conflicts of interest in Somalia. A national movement would allow Somalis to
bring something to the table.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago <mailto:weinstem@purdue.edu>
weinstem@purdue.edu
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----