From: wolda002@umn.edu
Date: Mon May 10 2010 - 22:30:53 EDT
SPIEGEL ONLINE
05/07/2010 01:17 PM
Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America
Is Brazil Developing the Bomb?
By Hans Rühle
Brazil has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but experts suspect
it may be working on a nuclear bomb. The country is allowed to legally
enrich uranium for its nuclear submarines, but nobody knows what happens to
the fuel once it is on restricted military bases.
In October 2009, the prestigious American periodical Foreign Policy
published an article titled "The Future Nuclear Powers You Should Be
Worried About." According to the author, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Burma, the
United Arab Emirates and Venezuela are the next candidates -- after Iran --
for membership in the club of nuclear powers. Despite his interesting
arguments, the author neglected to mention the most important potential
nuclear power: Brazil.
Nowadays, Brazil is held in high esteem by the rest of the world. Its
president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has become a star on the
international stage. "That's my man right here," US President Barack Obama
once said, in praise of his Brazilian counterpart. Lula, as he is known,
can even afford to receive Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with all
honors and demonstratively endorse his nuclear program, for which Iran is
now ostracized around the world.
Lula da Silva's self-confidence is indicative of Brazil's claim to the
status of a major power -- including in military terms. The military claim
is reflected in the country's National Defense Strategy, which was unveiled
in late 2008. In addition to the mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle
-- which has since been achieved -- the document calls for the building of
nuclear-powered submarines.
Close to Building a Bomb
It sounds harmless enough, but it isn't, because the term "nuclear-powered
submarines" could in fact be a cover for a nuclear weapons program. Brazil
already had three secret military nuclear programs between 1975 and 1990,
with each branch of its armed forces pursuing its own route. The navy's
approach proved to be the most successful: using imported high-performance
centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium from imported uranium
hexafluoride, so as to be able to operate small reactors for submarines. At
the appropriate time, the country's newly acquired nuclear capabilities
were to be revealed to the world with a "peaceful nuclear explosion," based
on the example set by India. The 300-meter (984-foot) shaft for the test
had already been drilled. According to statements by the former president
of the National Nuclear Energy Commission, in 1990 the Brazilian military
was on the verge of building a bomb.
But it never came to that. During the course of Brazil's democratization,
the secret nuclear programs were effectively abandoned. Under the country's
1988 constitution, nuclear activities were restricted to "peaceful uses."
Brazil ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean in 1994 and, in 1998, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty. Brazil's flirtation with the bomb had apparently ended.
Under Lula da Silva, however, this flirtation has now been reignited, and
the Brazilians are becoming less and less hesitant about toying with their
own nuclear option. Only a few months after Lula's inauguration in 2003,
the country officially resumed the development of a nuclear-powered
submarine.
Even during his election campaign, Lula criticized the NPT, calling it
unfair and obsolete. Although Brazil did not withdraw from the treaty, it
demonstratively tightened working conditions for inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). The situation became tense in
April 2004, when the IAEA was denied unlimited access to a newly built
enrichment facility in Resende, near Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian
government also made it clear that it did not intend to sign the additional
protocol to the NPT, which would have required it to open previously
undeclared facilities to inspection.
In mid-January 2009, during a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a
group of nuclear supplier countries that works toward nonproliferation by
controlling exports of nuclear materials, the reasons for this restrictive
policy became clear to attendees when Brazil's representative did his
utmost to fight requirements that would have made the nuclear submarine
program transparent.
'Open to Negotiation'
Why all this secrecy? What is there to hide in the development of small
reactors to power submarines, systems that several countries have had for
decades? The answer is as simple as it is unsettling: Brazil is probably
also developing something else in the plants it has declared as production
facilities for nuclear submarines: nuclear weapons. Vice President José
Alencar offered a reason when he openly advocated Brazil's acquisition of
nuclear weapons in September 2009. For a country with a 15,000-kilometer
border and rich offshore oil reserves, Alencar says, these weapons would
not only be an important tool of "deterrence," but would also give Brazil
the means to increase its importance on the international stage. When it
was pointed out that Brazil had signed the NPT, Alencar reacted calmly,
saying it was "a matter that was open to negotiation."
How exactly could Brazil go about building nuclear weapons? The answer,
unfortunately, is that it would be relatively easy. A precondition for the
legal construction of small reactors for submarine engines is that nuclear
material regulated by the IAEA is approved. But because Brazil designates
its production facilities for nuclear submarine construction as restricted
military areas, the IAEA inspectors are no longer given access. In other
words, once the legally supplied enriched uranium has passed through the
gate of the plant where nuclear submarines are being built, it can be used
for any purpose, including the production of nuclear weapons. And because
almost all nuclear submarines are operated with highly enriched uranium,
which also happens to be weapons grade uranium, Brazil can easily justify
producing highly enriched nuclear fuel.
Even if there is no definitive proof of Brazil's nuclear activities (yet),
past events suggest that it is highly likely that Brazil is developing
nuclear weapons. Neither the constitutional prohibition nor the NPT will
prevent this from happening. All it would take to obtain a parliamentary
resolution to eliminate these obstacles would be for Lula da Silva to say
that the United States is not entitled to a monopoly on nuclear weapons in
the Americas. If that happens, Latin America would no longer be a nuclear
weapons-free zone -- and Obama's vision of a nuclear-free world would be
finished.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
URL:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,693336,00.html
RELATED SPIEGEL ONLINE LINKS:
Better Late than Never: Germany Looks to Play Catch-Up in South America
(03/10/2010)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,682519,00.html
The Bomb for Beginners: A DIY Guide to Going Nuclear (03/03/2010)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,681525,00.html
Brazil's President Lula: 'Father of the Poor' Has Triggered Economic
Miracle (11/24/2009)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,662917,00.html
RELATED INTERNET LINKS
Foreign Policy: The Future Nuclear Powers You Should Be Worried About
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/20/the_future_nuclear_powers_you_should_be_worried_aboutSPIEGEL
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